Sections from

Workers and Warriors

Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa

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Introduction

South Africa's political transformation at the end of the twentieth century was celebrated worldwide. Yielding to a resolute popular struggle for liberal democracy, the repressive and racially exclusive apartheid regime came to an end in a negotiated transfer of power, and millions watched in joyful amazement as citizens of all colors lined up together at the polls in the election of 1994. Yet this seemingly peaceful transition was hardly bloodless. The bloodshed, however, did not surface in the generally anticipated pattern of a war between black and white people. The most acute and tragic expression of civil strife developed between competing liberation movements and was entrenched through violence, state manipulation, and self-interested leadership. This was the conflict between the Zulu nationalist movement, Inkatha, and the African National Congress (ANC), which escalated into a regional civil war. Claiming more than fifteen thousand lives and generating immeasurable suffering, this strife on the cusp of victory was the bloody anomaly in a revolution regarded as one in which people "defied the logic of their past, and [broke] all the rules of social theory, to forge a powerful spirit of unity from a shattered nation."[1]

The "logic of the past" was, quite obviously, much more complex than categories of race. A global public that understood apartheid solely in racial terms (white over black) could not but consider the emergence of so-called black-on-black violence with bewilderment. The assertion of ethnic solidarity appeared as a snag in the momentum of national liberation, and photojournalistic images of Inkatha's leadership arrayed in leopard skins, surrounded by assemblies of Zulu men wielding knobkerries and spears, dramatized the militant challenge posed by Zulu political identity.

As in so many other instances of political conflict, men played the

most visible part in the violence between Inkatha and the ANC. In the workplace and in migrant worker hostels, in township neighborhoods and streets, at political rallies and cultural celebrations, the gender identities of men were imbued with political meaning. The martial reputation of Zulu manhood acquired new and controversial significance in the context of anti-apartheid mobilization. A politics of masculinity significantly shaped the courses and outcomes of this struggle for nation, most notably in contributing to the failure of ethnic communitarian nationalism against the tide of political liberalization and the new constitutionalism that informed the revolutionary aspirations of the ANC and its allies.

Because nationalisms are doctrines of political unification, they have most often been studied for the community they imagine and the unity they achieve across fields of social difference. Yet the power of nationalism is by no means unlimited, and imagined communities do not always manifest as viable self-determining entities. Nationalisms frequently fail and yet rarely are conceptualized in terms of failure or examined because of what they do not achieve. Rather, nationalisms continue to be studied primarily for their narrative construction and, in this sense, are attributed an implicit and uniform kind of success. In its focus on Inkatha's Zulu nationalism, this book examines the case of a nationalist movement that failed to achieve political hegemony despite protracted efforts and a sophisticated, imaginative, and historically informed discourse of national unification.

Investigating questions about gender and nationalism through the lens of political failure represents a methodological and theoretical departure from most feminist studies of nationalism. While feminist theory has led the way in advancing an understanding of how gender divisions are linked to nation-building politics, this scholarship has generally focused on the way that normative discourses of gender and patriarchal relations have been *functional* for nationalism.[2] The aim of this book is to complicate the picture emerging from a substantial interdisciplinary literature that has tended to overstate the utility of gender ideology in securing national cohesion and to amplify the power of nationalism in extending the social power of men. Hence, this study

focuses on men and masculinity not to suggest that women were not also integral agents of resistance and active participants in the civil conflict but rather to revisit the tricky question of how gender power is articulated within the modern politics of nation building.

Failed nationalisms reveal the complexity of gender as a system of relationships and identities that *variously* impact the processes of political mobilization. The case of Zulu nationalism is theoretically instructive in that it highlights gender—and specifically masculinity—as a source of political fragmentation as well as political cohesion. It demonstrates that masculinities are plural, often contradictory, and crucial not only to the formation of loyalty but also in the frequently violent splintering of allegiances. Patriarchal power is not a monolithic force in nationalism, and the ardently masculinist content of national discourses, frequently interpreted by feminist scholars as evidence of ascendant male power, may instead attest to the unsettled state of certain forms of patriarchal dominance within the uneven relations of global capitalism.

This book demonstrates that the gender identities and the social positioning of men—and, more critically, the paradoxes of gender power that are concomitant with modern political and economic life—play a pivotal role in contests over nation and national sovereignty. I argue that the failures of Zulu nationalism may in part be attributed to its inability to level an effectively encompassing appeal to Zulu-speaking men across entrenched social and geographical rifts. Inkatha's difficulties in crafting a discourse that could encompass the often oppositional interests, political sensibilities, and identities associated respectively with the industrial shopfloor and the rural client-homestead reflect the complexity of men's social location in modern southern Africa. The title of this book, *Workers and Warriors*, draws attention to the tensions that framed masculine identities in the context of political change.

Men, Gender, and Nationalism

Nationalism is a claim to sovereignty over a territory in which the pursuit of political legitimacy is vested in the modern conception of "the people."[3] While many formulations of peoplehood are possible, pre-

mised on notions of shared culture, "race," geography, and so on, all are similarly grounded in ideas about a common history, destiny, and set of interests that are defined against those of *other* groups. As Michael Mann has pointed out, the idea of nations as rational repositories of political selfhood is one of the cherished ideas of modern western democracy, yet the modern notion of peoplehood continually reveals its "dark side."[4] Leo Kuper attributes the horrors of genocide not to the excesses of backward or marginalized groups but to the monopoly of sovereignty that modern states possess in territories that are in fact culturally plural and economically stratified.[5] Popular mobilization in nationalist movements is dangerously energized by the moralistic notion of action on behalf of "one's own" against a threatening Other. The dangers of nationalism make the issue of gender an urgent political concern.

The scale of what is at stake is strikingly illustrated by an account of acute political violence from a different region of the world. In a special issue on ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1993, the women's journal *off our backs* reported on a feminist conference organized by U.S. activists to consider the issue of rape in warfare. The conference produced a heated dispute when a panel discussion, which included rape survivors from war-torn regions around the globe, was bitterly denounced by the Bosnian delegates. They objected to the suggestion that their experience of rape could be generalized outside the specific context of ethnic cleansing. In their view, by minimizing the explicitly nationalist motivation behind mass rape in Bosnia and instead employing abstractions like "contexts of violence" or "male domination" to explain rape in war, the conference had downplayed the most crucial issue. As they put it, "Rape as genocide is . . . not the universal rape your [conference] information states but is very ethnically specific. . . . Only when this genocidal particularity of rape is grasped and respected can we begin connecting it with the rape of all women in war."[6]

The conference organizers responded to this charge by insisting that an internationalist approach was necessary to balance the nationalistic perspective of the Bosnian participants. In their view, these rape survivors were choosing to interpret their victimization too narrowly,

as resulting from their ethno-national identities, while downplaying their victimization as women.

The controversy identifies an important problem. "Rape as genocide" refers to an acute instance in which the bodies of men are simultaneously weapons of the nation and instruments of male domination. In coining such a phrase, the Bosnian women expressed their conviction that the violation of their bodies was as much an assault on their ethnic identity as it was on their womanhood. And yet their testimony does not completely avert the question of whether mass rape in Bosnia is best described as a horrific example of male violence against women *or* as nationalist violence in a particular form. This question is not as trifling as it might appear, if only because it so clearly reveals what is at stake: the legitimacy of alternative political strategies between which women are frequently forced to choose.

"Rape as genocide" distressingly illustrates how sex and gender affect agency, identity, and experience in nationalistic violence and demonstrates the scope of what is at issue in interpretations of the linkages between sexual and political power. The unique dangers that nationalisms hold for women have become more widely acknowledged, thanks to the efforts of feminist activism and scholarship. Yet it is also true that feminist politics frequently becomes a heartbreaking dilemma for women when culture and gender compete as categories of loyalty, identification, and interested action. Feminist political theory has tried to resolve such dilemmas through a focus on the "interaction" of gender and ethnicity (nation, race) as mutually constructed domains of ideology and social practice. It has achieved this in part through an endeavor to "make women visible" as political subjects and historical agents. Feminist scholars have employed a "lens of gender" to reveal the political significance of women's agency, social placement, and gendered identity, which is often obscured by the institutional and ideological separation of domestic (private) life from political (public) life.

If women's invisibility is symptomatic of their subjugation, what are we to make of the hypervisibility of men's political agency in nationalism, particularly its most sensational, violent expressions? To all appearances, a zealous and ubiquitous masculinity constitutes the *elemental*

human current on which the voices and activities of nationalism are carried. Charismatic leaders who eloquently invoke the currency of manhood seem to be rewarded by a rush of willing feet as men hasten towards the promise of power. The association between sexual and political power has prompted some theorists to declare that "masculinity and nationalism articulate well with one another."[7] Yet if nationalism, as Cynthia Enloe claims, has "typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hopes," it is important to explore not only the empirical intricacies that make this claim generally valid but also the historical and social processes and conflicts that it conceals.[8] Under the lens of gender, the political agency of men poses specific challenges and questions. It may be the very visibility of men in nationalism that has hampered a more complex and historically informed view of how masculinity articulates with the politics of nationalism.[9]

Why This Case Study?

Zulu nationalism provides a fascinating and highly relevant "test case" through which to explore broad questions about masculinity, gender, and political transformation. To readers who are not area specialists, however, the case of Zulu nationalism may initially appear a somewhat remote focus of study. Especially in the United States, sociological research set in Africa has generally been classified under the rubric of area studies. This is unfortunate, since it contributes to the idea that African social experience stands outside the bounds of what is routinely considered in disciplinary assessments of the social world. The empirical account presented in this book owes more than it can offer to the region's area scholars, and I have directed my writing instead to readers who are new to this material and who wish to consider an African case study in their reflections on gender and political change.

This case commands a broad interest in part because the reputation of Zulu masculinity extends well beyond South Africa and, in the postcolonial "western" imagination, is nurtured by Hollywood and also by longing: dreams of the human spirit outside of the boundless reach of commercial, bourgeois culture. This became apparent to me recently in a mundane if bizarre way. At my daughter's gymnastics competition in Bend, Oregon, I sat with other parents holding the book I'd chosen to sustain me during the six-hour event. The book was *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* by John Lambert. Somewhere around the fourth hour, the clearly fatigued father to my left politely asked what it was about. I gave him a brief summary.

"Oh, the Zulu!" he exclaimed, immediately brightening. "That is my all-time favorite movie! They are an amazing people! Have you seen it? With Michael Caine?"

What impressed him, he explained as we talked, was the bravery and genius of the Zulu army, their psychological tactics, and the discipline of the warriors. He spoke at eloquent length about King Shaka's invention of the short stabbing-spear, the Zulu stand against the British in 1879, and the sense of honor and obedience to authority that was demanded by Zulu military leaders. "Remarkable men," he enthused, again and again.

If the immediate context for this exchange was odd, its content did not greatly surprise me. In the first place, it seemed unremarkable that an American who claimed to know next to nothing about the African continent could simultaneously profess a certain expertise about "the Zulu." Apparently, too, his knowledge was not entirely cinematic nor dependent on the well-circulated anecdotes that fuel various noble-savage traditions. His fascination had prompted him to read popular and semischolarly books on the subject.

While this encounter circumstantially confirmed that Zulu-speaking people continue to enjoy celebrity for their martial history, what especially interested me was the reverence this middle-class, middle-aged Anglo-American male held for the masculine character of people so removed from himself and his style of livelihood. He was clearly speaking as a man of things manly and directly relating them to his own yearnings and sensibilities. The extensive appeal of Zulu masculinity makes Zulu nationalism a relevant case through which to explore critical questions about masculinity, gender power, and political mobilization.

There are other reasons the case is pertinent. The phase of Zulu nationalism that I examine in this book emerged in a context of rapid po-

litical transformation where a number of social movements competed for popular support and grappled with the definitions of words like *culture, tradition, modernity, liberation, rights, democracy, blackness, worker interest, feminism,* and *power.* Inkatha's quest for broad-based legitimacy beyond the boundaries of the region of rural KwaZulu took place amidst intense political and social turmoil. The emerging hegemony of civil democracy required that the discourses of Zuluness, tradition, and rural communitarianism be creatively melded to the sensibilities of urban residents, the industrial working class, and non-Zulus. To complicate matters further, the economic ambitions of Inkatha's leadership informed an unapologetically procapitalist political platform. This meant that narratives glorifying defiant Zulu warriors had be rectified with those that advocated industrial discipline, docile behavior on the shopfloor and in school classrooms, and increased global investment in South African industry. Free-market neoliberalism had to be defended against the radical, socialist vision of change advocated by competing liberation organizations.

Zulu nationalist mobilization was further shaped against a complex regional history that structured demographic and geographical realities in often contradictory ways. The territorial fragmentation that characterized the KwaZulu "homeland" threatened to make the idea of a unitary, integrated "nation" somewhat tenuous, especially to migrant laborers—overwhelmingly male—who moved diachronically between rural and urban communities. The social location of men in this landscape, regulated by the apartheid system of identity management, profoundly affected the way Inkatha attempted to mobilize Zulu-speaking males. The discourses it employed to recruit the support of men reflect the complexities of masculine identity and gender power that shaped the struggle for nation in South Africa.

In Africa, ethnic nationalism is often referred to as "tribalism," a word that has tended to treat the politicization of African ethnicities as an effect of cultural essentialism. In scholarship, recognition of the socially and historically constructed nature of African ethnic identity has been hard won also because *tribe* and *tribalism* have often figured as explanatory concepts, particularly in reference to postcolonial civil conflict.[10] I present Zulu nationalism (the politicization of Zulu ethnicity) as a politics mobilized through the exertions and resources of the Zulu intellectual and class elite to "stitch together and to rally constituencies in order more successfully to engage in . . . competition" for the control of the state and for related economic advantages through the politicization of culture.[11] That ethnic politics could resonate so strongly at the grassroots level is related to how these mobilizations, class-based as they were, articulated with existing and deeply felt collective orientations of culture, language, and historical consciousness—shared identities that shape self-understanding, community, and livelihood within the social conditions of South Africa. This book examines a particular phase in a complex history of twentieth-century Zulu nationalism corresponding to the existence of Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha movement in the context of apartheid's unraveling hegemony. It focuses on Inkatha's mobilization of people through speeches and formal events organized by its official leaders.[12]

The case of Inkatha highlights both the power and the limitations of masculinity as a unifying ideology for nationalism. This book is organized to draw attention to the complexities that shaped Inkatha's mobilization of Zulu-speaking men. Chapter 1 introduces Inkatha's nationalist politics and evaluates the significance of ethnic nationalism in the context of a liberal, constitutionalist struggle for nation and national liberation. In chapter 2, I review the regional history of colonial state-formation, capitalist development, and migrant labor—macrostructural processes that shaped Inkatha's politics of masculinity. The chapter highlights how the identity categories of gender and ethnicity were deeply implicated in the system of economic exploitation and political control crafted by the colonial and, later, apartheid state. It offers a context within which to understand the politicization of these categories in the resistance to apartheid during the late twentieth century. The next three chapters consider Inkatha's politics more carefully by examining how Buthelezi addressed issues of gender and gender power in his political speeches. Chapter 3 examines narratives of home and homeland to show how the very different social locations of men and women within the migrant labor economy compelled distinctive political rhetorics for mobilizing their support. It demonstrates that Inkatha's ethnic appeal was directed expressly to men and suggests that Inkatha's endeav-

or to "retribalize" men was necessitated by men's social and geographical location within the relations of migrant labor exploitation. Chapter 4 considers how the unsettled patriarchal status of men in modern South African society affected Inkatha's gender politics. I look at how conflicts between principles of political authority and male identity came into relief as Inkatha worked to bridge communitarian and secular political ideals associated respectively with rural and urban political institutions. Chapter 5 assesses how Inkatha's antagonistic relationship with the ANC affected its rhetoric of masculinity. It reflects upon how differences of class, age, and geographical location among men were utilized in the speeches of Inkatha to secure the loyalty of certain men *against* the appeal of its rivals. Buthelezi frequently presented the rivalry between Inkatha and the ANC as a difference in styles of masculine performance and identity and, by articulating Inkatha's political platform as an issue of Zulu manhood, attempted to deflect the more substantial political, economic, and doctrinal issues at stake.

The book concludes by briefly discussing the importance of this case study for debates about gender and nationalism more generally. I summarize the main framework of these debates and, finally, offer my own theory of social change, gender, and modern nationalism. Most significantly, I depart from prevailing views to advocate a conception of gender power that accounts for the paradoxes and contradictions associated with men's power, social location, and identity in modern society. I argue that it may be the unsettled state of patriarchy in modernity and the ambiguities of its spatial and social organization that most deeply affect the politicization of men in nationalist struggles.

CHAPTER 4

Unsettled Patriarchy: Conflicts over Political Authority and Masculine Identity

The discourses of patriarchal traditionalism derive their political potency from the unresolved status of men in modern society and the uncertainty of patriarchal power in the face of social change. The alienation of labor, the removal of production from the home and village, advanced taxation structures, military conscription, and liberal conceptions of universal citizenship are modern realities that represent a transfer of power from communitarian patriarchs—including heads of households—to the abstracted but heavy-handed power of patriarchal states. Loquacious promises of a return to a golden patriarchal age are nationalism's sleight of hand in the face of political and economic liberalization. The simplistic chronology implied by the terms "modern" and "traditional" overlooks how modern conceptions of citizenship often appropriate, alter, and adapt preexisting ones. Traditional practices may continue to organize peoples lives, but their social meaning surely changes.

Inkatha's gender rhetoric reflects the unsettled nature of gender power in a revolutionary context where the status of chiefly authority was rendered uncertain by the ascendant democratic ethos energizing followers of the ANC and its affiliates. The political salience of masculinity was located in social tensions that centered on the authority of chiefs, the status of women, and the political identities of working-class men. This chapter examines the dilemmas Inkatha faced as it tried to reconcile recurring clashes between opposing notions of political authority and citizenship.



A miner waits, bag in hand, at a recruitment center, Harding, 1974. Photograph by Gerhard Maré; printed with permission.

Traditional Authority and Modern Legitimacy: Gender Power in the Balance

Inkatha's main support was located in rural KwaZulu, the political domain of traditional leaders, chiefs, and *indunas* (headmen). Despite its ethnicity-based platform, Inkatha's relation to chiefs was complex, and Buthelezi's style of traditionalism did not appeal to all chiefs. Some chiefs welcomed Pretoria's separate development policies and perceived Inkatha as a threat to their stake in homeland independence.[1] Chiefly support was contingent upon the guarantee that their authority would remain intact, an assurance that Buthelezi continually reasserted. The issue was indeed sensitive. A chief himself, Buthelezi faced challenges to his own hereditary claims and to the propriety of hereditary patriarchal authority in a liberated, democratic South Africa.[2]

In the 1980s Inkatha had to contend with a growing paradox. Under apartheid, the territorial organization of the African ethnic groups into tribal homelands effectively politicized ethnic identity in several ways. First, it increased the stakes of culture-based statehood by offering power and material advantage to tribal elites who accepted its terms. Second, it supplied a political infrastructure through which chiefs and black entrepreneurs could form class-interested alliances. Finally, as a means of curbing African urbanization and black resistance it provided material shape and ideological credibility to the concept of ethnic "nations," which had been in many ways unsettled through urbanization and racialized politics. Thus, because of apartheid, ethnicity was afforded greater visibility and bureaucratic support for mobilizing constituencies.

Yet, for a liberation movement that rallied its support through ethnic nationalism, this was as much a liability as an asset. That ethnic purity was crucial to the ontological doctrines of apartheid was sufficient to make ethnic nationalism, in principle, highly suspect. Implementation of the apartheid regime's homelands strategy, which involved the displacement and denationalization of black populations, laid bare the poverty of governmental assertions of essential ethnic unity. Chiefs and other Bantustan elites, shaped by Pretoria into bureaucratic councils and often corrupt legislative governments, were far from credible in the eyes of many black South Africans, especially black urban youth. Resentment

against Bantustan "collaborators" increased during the 1980s, as anti-apartheid politics gained ground.

Inkatha, as an ethnic nationalist movement that was avowed to be against apartheid, found itself at the vortex of this fury. Created within and welded to the government structures of the KwaZulu Bantustan, it emerged alongside trade union politics, youth militancy, township-based civics, and feminist voices that were forging alliances around an ethos of democracy and universal citizenship. To its constituencies, Inkatha was obligated to repeat its pledge of "fighting apartheid from within." To urban civil activists, traditional tribal administrative structures represented a reactionary, antidemocratic element beholden to the architects of divide-and-rule. Inkatha was regarded as a reactionary, despotic, and insufferably patriarchal copy of Afrikaner nationalism.

The liberal underpinnings of mainstream anti-apartheid struggle obligated Inkatha to speak to diverse political principles and seek legitimacy in circles that operated upon opposing notions of political authority and citizenship. To be awarded credibility as a modern representative of "black" (and not simply Zulu) liberation, it had to speak the language of democracy and civic principles—abstract equality, rights, and elected office. Yet it also was continually required to assure chiefs of their enduring authority, which rested on hereditary patriarchy, tribal custom, control of land, and a subject population.[3] While it is possible to overstate the opposition between customary and civic forms of social control—particularly since they had been linked over a century of indirect rule—it is clear that certain highly sensitive issues exacerbated the delicacy of Inkatha's task in a climate of political liberalization. The question of women's political status and rights provides one revealing example of this conflict.

The woman question surfaced most explicitly in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in the early 1980s over a proposed repeal of Section 27 of the yet enduring colonial Natal Native Code. For a century, Section 27 had relegated women to the legal status of minors. The debate over its repeal shows gender to be intimately tied to the question of chiefly authority. The discussion offers a glimpse of what was at stake for chiefs and for rural women in struggles between forms of patriarchal politics. Under the Natal Code, women could not easily achieve economic independence: they were not able to inherit property, and their mobility was subject to the discretion of husbands or (in their absence) chiefs. Women's status under tribal customary law was fundamentally at odds with the democratic ethos of liberation politics that was gaining ground.

Pressure to demonstrate Inkatha's modernist leanings on the woman question was evident in the May 1980 KLA hearings. One official, Dr. D. V. Mkhize, suggested that women be given the right to vote in the election of community councils. He appealed to the assembly, declaring, "Mr. Speaker, as *modern* people, people who think for themselves, I wonder where we would be in this struggle for liberation without our women. We realized that we would get nowhere without them. As *modern* people we find that even our government encourages us to work hand in hand with our women and we take note of this."[4] Buthelezi's response reveals the complexity of what is at stake in regard to this issue. He proposed that, despite Inkatha's principles of equality based on sex, they should "proceed cautiously," because "it is a matter which has such a serious impact on Zulu society. . . . If you look at it, in the first place, *it goes right to the marrow of the authority of the chief.*"[5]

Preserving the authority of the chief clearly required a specific kind of political subjectivity for women, one at odds with Inkatha's need to showcase its modern principles. Yet the issue could not be dropped. A year later, the issue of women's legal status was again raised. This time the debate culminated with the repeal of Section 27, and Inkatha announced its hand in winning the new legal equality of women in KwaZulu and, simultaneously, its victory against the legacy of colonial legislation. However, the problem of chiefly authority retained its awkward tension, as the ensuing strained assurances to chiefs indicate. In this regard, Mkhize proposed that there persisted a powerful ambiguity in the repeal. Women's equality was a legislative technicality that was countered by the weight of ethnic custom and traditional practice:

> I wish to point out that even though there may be two or three clauses which might be misinterpreted by some male members of our society as purporting to give authority to female over male in the same kraal, I say that I do not envisage any complications or difficulties *because we are Zulus, we are blacks, and our custom will always dictate.* The bill is intended . . . to

> raise the status of black women and *it does not exonerate or exempt her from the operation of Zulu customs.*[6]

R. R. Mbonqu added:

> I want to say how grateful I am because this bill will not in any way bring about the situation where the women folk will override the men. . . . *I wish to advise our womenfolk never to forget the Zulu tradition and culture* that the man must always be respected by the woman. . . . I know that it is an accepted fact that to rule the Zulu nation we are in fact dependent on our womenfolk. I am saying this, Mr. Speaker, and I am pleading with our womenfolk not to take things too fast once they realize that they now have these rights.[7]

In regard to the repeal of Section 27, Buthelezi could declare that "if that kind of legislation is expected to be initiated by feminists, I would like to say we are feminists in our own right."[8] Similarly, Mkhize was able to announce that "this bill . . . prove[s] to the world that we as members of Inkatha practice what we preach . . . because . . . we are pledged to non-discrimination even on the ground of sex."[9]

I am not suggesting a solely cynical motivation for the advancement of women's status by the KwaZulu elite. Buthelezi's speeches to the Inkatha Women's Brigade convey a genuine faith in the power of women as the critical component of community development and modernist advancement. He also correctly regarded rural women as the "backbone" of his political support. This instance reveals, however, that the oppositional dualism within Inkatha's politics enabled it to offer to women legal rights and equality while attempting to circumscribe these within the structures of chiefly patriarchy through the discourse of Zulu tradition.

Conclusion: Gender and Nationalism

Alain Touraine, reflecting on the nature of social solidarity in a globalizing world, poses one of the urgent political questions of our time. We are faced with a grand puzzle: Can we reconcile liberalism and community, the market and cultural identity? Can we live together, at the same time both equal and different?[1]

Viewed broadly, the ethnic challenge leveled by Inkatha against the ANC's politics of national liberation is emblematic of struggles—too often, bloody struggles—that have become a familiar enigma of the late modern world, struggles in which communitarian radicalism stakes a claim for sovereignty against the edifice of secular constitutionalism and always encroaching liberalization. Notwithstanding the specific nature of apartheid, the historical factors that produced Zulu nationalism are not particularly exceptional. The widespread support commanded by Inkatha in many ways highlights the limited capacity of urban-based liberal politics to encompass the interests and sensibilities of underdeveloped rural communities, where patriarchal authority at the levels of household and village is progressively undermined or else felt to be under threat by civic liberalism and the uncertainties of an unforgiving labor market. Moreover, it indicates the extent of ongoing struggle between men, who derive their position from opposing principles of power as well as different relationships to the market. The positioning of men, their social location in relation to divisions of class and of rural-urban social geography, is critical in shaping the articulation of masculinity with nationalism.

How does the case of Zulu nationalism—which highlights the power and limitations of masculinity as an ideological force of national cohesion and gender unification—bear on discussions of gender and nationalism more generally? This chapter returns to questions that

emerge from feminist accounts of nationalism and offers some theoretical observations in relation to this debate.

Feminist Theory and Nationalism

Until little more than a decade ago, nationalism and gender were studied as separate areas of inquiry. Scholarship on nationalism typically analyzed the formation of and splits between cultural, linguistic, or geographical communities or "peoples." Studies of gender examined relationships within these groups. Feminist scholarship took the lead in bridging these fields, but initially this required a confrontation with the shortcomings of its own history. So-called second-wave feminism did not critically examine nationalism, either because it tended to look beyond national boundaries toward the oppression of women worldwide, or because it sought to remedy that oppression within the framework of the nation-state. For example, liberal conceptions of gender justice viewed gains for women largely as a legislative enterprise, taking for granted the nation as the given social unit. Radical feminists, however, considered the nation an artificial construct and weapon of patriarchy that women must overcome by embracing *global* sisterhood. Socialist feminism also looked worldwide but focused instead on women's social location within capitalism and its subsidiary of the modern industrial household: the state was viewed as complicit in economic exploitation, but the issue of political identity (whether nation, ethnicity, or race) was deemed less important than the articulation of gender with class. These different conceptions of feminism shared a belief that what was at stake could be defined in terms of women's common and rational interest. Because they theorized women's oppression as universal, feminists found it reasonable to hope for gender solidarity both across and within borders once women everywhere recognized their subjugation and pursued their liberation by joining together *as women.*

Virginia Woolf's treatise against war, written as the Second World War approached, is perhaps the most eloquent early articulation of a feminist stand against nationalism. It also displays some of the unresolved contradictions of this position. Woolf posited that by virtue of

Masculinity and ethnic pride. Chief Buthelezi in a crowd of men celebrate Shaka Day, the press in tow. Photograph reprinted courtesy of the *Natal Witness.*

their exclusion from public institutions of power, women could claim a unique role in protesting war between nations. Women constituted a "society of outsiders" subordinated under the legal framework of the nation as unpropertied, undereducated, and disenfranchised citizens. As such, they were not subject to the same sentiments that prompted men to kill and die for their country but rather were "free from unreal loyalties." Indeed, women's social differences from men delineated a distinct political standpoint in regards to nationalism, summed up in the declaration, "As a woman, I have no country. As a woman, I want no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world."[2]

Of course, Woolf's idealism is not borne out empirically. Women—and men—of little property and power nonetheless may rally with patriotic zeal to the call of national allegiance. Hence, the indictment of nationalism as an "unreal loyalty"—much like the phrase "false consciousness"—laments as well as highlights the often glaring incongruence between subaltern people's material interests and their political allegiances. It is precisely this incongruity that displays nationalism's ideological power and, for critical theorists, has constituted one of its most enduring puzzles. Marxist critics have primarily seen nationalism as an impediment to working-class solidarity. Nationalism is *false* consciousness precisely because it belies a rational basis for political agency calculated through objective, economic interests. An important project of critical theory, therefore, has been to explain the appeal of nationalism over global worker solidarity, the widespread fealty to imagined community over class-consciousness. This has meant some shifting of theoretical emphasis from the question of *interest* to that of *identity*.

Identity had appeared in political theory as an essential property of the self, a positivistic variable that helped explain political group formation and cohesion. Nationality thus existed prior to nation; it was something that everyone possessed, and it entitled those who shared it to pursue their distinctive interests through national self-determination.[3] While nationality might be difficult to define precisely (attributed variously to cultural, physiognomic, territorial, and institutional considerations), it was viewed as ontologically fundamental and seemed to confirm that the nation-state was the proper repository for political loyalty and agency.

If identity was regarded previously as a property or substance, it now appears in theory as a kind of vacuum—a personal and social space filled with social and historical constructions. New studies of nationalism maintain that political identification and agency belong not to rational calculation but rather to imagination. Phrases like "invented tradition,"[4] "imagined community,"[5] and "fictive ethnicity"[6] highlight a general shift of approach to account for the interpretative capacities of ordinary people in the formation of political identities. Nationalism has immense utility as an ideological tool of the ruling class, yet the undeniable popular appeal evident in nationalistic mobilizations demands explanation in terms that do not reduce individuals simply to consumers of ideology, whether docile or reactive. Feminist theory suggests that the popular appeal of nationalism is related to ideologies of gender. The nation is conceptualized as a patriarchal family writ large, ascribing the corresponding gendered division of labor to its members. On the cusp of the nineteenth century, the German theologian Friedrick Schleiermacher wrote: "'How little worthy of respect is the man who roams about hither and thither without the anchor of national ideal and love of fatherland . . . [H]ow the greatest source of pride is lost by the woman that cannot feel that she also bore children for her fatherland, and brought them up for it, and that her house and all the petty things that fill up most of her time belong to a greater whole and take their place in the union of her people.'"[7] Feminist perspectives of nationalism have shifted away from the idealistic and empirically questionable position represented by Woolf, and the current consensus is that women are not so much *excluded* from national processes as they are *incorporated* under distinct principles of citizenship.

[But] in struggles for nation and the horizontal politics of peoplehood, the power of gender ideology does not reside in its prescriptive logic but in its malleability in the face of social change and political contestation.

Gender power is constituted within the broader prevailing material relations of power, which are not fixed but dynamic and embattled. A historically informed conception of gender power is necessary to understand the politicization of masculinity in nationalisms. The case of Inkatha makes this especially clear. The struggle for nation in South Africa demonstrates the effect of a crucial paradox that political liberalization imposes on social structures of gender power. Put simply, patriarchal authority is ambiguously situated in modern nationalism in that it is alternatively preserved *and* undermined by civil society as well as within the relations of economic exploitation. It is the social transformation and ambiguous status of gender power, not its assured persistence, that politicizes masculinity. The extension of liberal politics into the sphere of social relations over which customary patriarchy presides means that the principles of authority that had sustained the gender power of *certain* men are unsettled by new conceptions of civic worth and legitimacy and by new material relations of production—with new beneficiaries. The battle between communitarian and secu-

Notes

Introduction

1. Waldmeir and Homan, "Powerful Spirit of Unity," 1.

2. See, for example, Anthias and Yuval-Davis, *Women-Nation-State;* Yuval-Davis, "Gender and Nation"; Nagel, "Masculinity and Nationalism"; Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases;* McClintock, "Family Feuds."

3. Mann, "Dark Side of Democracy," 19. For further discussion regarding definitions of nationalism, see the summer 1993 issue of *Daedalus*.

4. Mann, "Dark Side of Democracy," 19.

5. See ibid., 19.

6. Hamilton, "How to Address," 4.

7. Nagel, "Masculinity and Nationalism."

8. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases,* 44.

9. A similar point is made by Hearn and Collinson, "Theorizing Unities and Differences between Men," 44.

10. See Vail, *Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa;* Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., *Invention of Tradition.*

11. Saul, "Dialectic of Class and Tribe," 361.

12. My methodological focus on formal speeches emerges from the nature of Inkatha's political campaign. Inkatha relied overwhelmingly on oral rather than printed means to convey its versions of Zuluness and Zulu history and its political vision for the people of KwaZulu. While it also published yearbooks and newsletters (for literate people of a different social category), speeches given at festive or official occasions in villages, towns, and cities throughout the region (in rural and urban contexts) were the most effective means to reach Inkatha's main popular support base. The unpublished transcripts of political speeches by Buthelezi, Zwelithini, members of the IWB, and others represent a remarkable record of Inkatha's efforts as well as an outstanding set of data tracing the official discourse of a rural-based nationalist mobilization. Transcripts of all speeches and other Inkatha documents, memos, letters, pamphlets, newsletters, and glossy serial publications (such as *Clarion Call*) that

were used as primary source material for this book were accessed from two archives: the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and Gerhard Maré's collection of Inkatha materials formerly located in the Natal Room archives at the University of Natal, Durban, campus but recently relocated to the Alan Paton Centre on the Pietermaritzburg campus. Bound transcripts of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly hearings are located at the Alan Paton Centre. The *TEBA Times* is archived in the Natal Society Library, Pietermaritzburg. Copies of the *South African Sugar Yearbook* can be found at the Natal Sugar Institute, Durban.

Chapter 1: Inkatha, Chief Buthelezi, and the Politics of Zulu Nationalism

1. Shaka Day marks the day of King Shaka's death at the hands of his brother, Dingane. It is officially September 24, but the subsequent days also provide occasions for political speechmaking in different towns in the region.

2. In the spelling of Zulu words, the *th* letter sequence is is pronounced as a *t*. Thus, the *h* is silent in names like Inkatha, Buthelezi, and Zwelithini.

3. Buthelezi officially claimed that Inkatha was doing everything it could to minimize the violence. In official speeches, he insisted that Zulu warrior pride had been roused as a defence against ANC assault and implied that, given Zulu history, one would expect Zulu men to fight to protect their own.

4. Bryant, *Zulu People*, 469.

5. Cope, *To Bind the Nation*, 108.

6. L. H. Samuelson describes the making of an "inkata" thus: "'The doctor specially deputed to make it knows exactly what fibres to use. He makes it in secret, sprinkles it with various concoctions, and finally winds the skin of a python round it, as this reptile is considered the most powerful of animals, coiling itself round its prey and squeezing it to death as it does. . . . The Inkata is looked upon as the good spirit of the tribe, binding all together in one, and attracting back any deserter.'" Quoted in Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 227.

7. Guy, "Making an Inkatha."

8. See Morrell, ed., *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu Natal*.

9. Lodge and Nasson, *All, Here, and Now*, 4.

10. Among critical historians and social scientists, it is well recognized that terms such as "traditional" and "tribal" are extremely problematic. The use of "traditional" to describe practices, ideas, leadership, and so on conceals the effects of social change, which not only transform the practices or ideas themselves but also their social function and effect. Notions of tradition have been used both by colonizers and nationalists to authenticate structures of power for political and economic ends. I choose to rely on the reader's mindfulness of the burden these terms carry rather than using quotation marks in every case.

11. IFP, "History and Profile of the Inkatha Freedom Party," news release, June 6, 1996.

12. Lodge and Nasson, *All, Here, and Now*, 153.

13. Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 60.

14. See Jeffery, *Natal Story*.

15. For a thorough discussion of Inkatha's structure, see Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, chap. 5.

16. See, for example, ibid.; Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi*.

17. See Jeffery, *Natal Story*, for a detailed account of this conflict.

18. Ibid.

19. Southall, "Note on Inkatha's Membership," 341.

20. See Ramphele, *Bed Called Home*, for more on worker hostels and living conditions.

21. Zulu, "Durban Hostels and Political Violence."

22. *Mercury* (Durban), July 31, 1997.

23. Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*.

24. Forsyth, "Past as Present," 18.

25. Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi*, 72–74.

26. Forsyth, "Past as Present," 51–52.

27. Maré, *Ethnicity and Politics*.

28. Quoted in Forsyth, "Past as Present," 54.

29. Forsyth, "Past as Present," 55.

30. Speech by Buthelezi, July 13, 1975, Ezakheni.

31. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 601.

32. See Mdluli, "Ubuntu-botho," for a detailed account of Inkatha's promotion of *ubuntu*.

33. See Hassim, "Family, Motherhood, and Zulu Nationalism."

34. Ibid.

35. Maré, *Ethnicity and Politics;* Golan, *Inventing Shaka*.

36. Maré, *Ethnicity and Politics*, 68.

37. In 1984, the television miniseries *Shaka Zulu*—a romantic portrayal of the rise and fall of the legendary king—became an international hit (the DVD was released in 2002). In general, Buthelezi has welcomed such portrayals of Zulu history; he himself played the role of the Zulu king Cetshwayo in the 1964 release *Zulu*, the film that initiated Michael Caine's cinematic career.

38. Harries, "Imagery, Symbolism, and Tradition," 110.

39. Broughton, "Here They Are," 7.

40. Millin, *South Africans*, 259.

41. Ibid., 277.

42. The word *kaffir,* which became a notoriously racist reference to black people in South Africa, has Arabic roots; according to the *Short Oxford English Dictionary,* it literally means "infidel" or "unbeliever."

43. Speech by King Goodwill Zwelithini, May 26, 1991, Johannesburg.

44. Buthelezi, numerous speeches (see, for example, June 30, 1984, Kwadlangezawa).

45. Speech by Buthelezi, May 1, 1986, Durban.

46. Speech by Buthelezi, May 29, 1979, Ulundi.

47. Speech by Buthelezi, September 25, 1989, Stanger.

48. Thus, Gellner's caution that nationalism is not the reassertion of precolonial identities but rather the "crystallization of new ones suitable for the conditions now prevailing" can be extended more specifically to its masculinist expressions. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalisms,* 49.

49. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases,* 44.

50. "The worst election irregularities, and possibly the best case for the invalidation of an election, came from the conflict-torn province of KwaZulu-Natal. The *Weekly Mail* of May 6 reported that in some areas of northern KwaZulu ballot boxes, when opened, contained neatly stacked piles of ballot papers with exactly 2000 votes for Inkatha and only a handful for the ANC. There were also reports of pirate voting stations in IFP controlled areas, accounting for anything up to 500,000 votes . . . the ballots were counted largely as they were." Reynolds, "The Results," 210.

51. Buthelezi served as minister of home affairs under Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki and during the 1999 elections was considered a likely candidate for deputy vice president, an office that was instead conferred upon an ANC-affiliated Zulu, Jacob Zuma.

52. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission found Buthelezi guilty of violating human rights. The South African Defence Force trained a militia as a hit squad in the Caprivi Strip. Buthelezi has challenged these allegations.

Chapter 2: From Agrarian Patriarchy to Patriarchal Capitalism

1. Thanks to Thamsanqa Sibiya, researcher at the Campbell Collection, University of Natal, Durban, for help with translation.

2. Smuts, *Africa and Some World Problems,* 99.

3. Welsh, *Roots of Segregation;* Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society.*

4. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject,* 3.

5. Ibid., 6.

6. Ibid., 17.

7. Quoted in ibid., 6.

8. Lambert, *Betrayed Trust,* 39.

9. Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence,* 23.

10. Lambert, *Betrayed Trust,* 39–40.

11. Guy, "Gender Oppression," 35.

12. Eileen Krige (1936), quoted in Hassim, "Black Women in Political Organizations," 19.

13. Guy, "Gender Oppression."

14. Ibid., 35.

15. Ibid., 40.

16. Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence,* 23.

17. Guy, *Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom.*

18. Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence,* 22.

19. Morrell, Wright, and Meintjes, "Colonialism and the Establishment of White Domination," 57.

20. Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence,* 23.

21. See, for further discussion on gender and the development of industrial labor in South Africa, Bozzoli, "Marxism, Feminism, and South African Studies."

22. See Slater, "Changing Pattern of Economic Relationships."

23. Guy, "Destruction and Reconstruction," 175.

24. Walker, "Gender and the Development," 174–75.

25. See Guy, "Destruction and Reconstruction." See also Slater, "Changing Pattern of Economic Relationships."

26. Guy, *Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom.*

27. See Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion.*

28. Hassim, "Black Women in Political Organizations."

29. Walker, "Gender and the Development," 196.

30. Seekings, *The UDF.*

31. Hughes, "'Lighthouse for African Womanhood,'" 210

32. Meintjes, "Family and Gender," 142–43.

33. Quoted in Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence,* 64.

34. See Hamilton and Wright, "Making of the AmaLala."

35. See Walker, "Gender and the Development," 187.

36. Ibid., 179.

37. Ibid., 187–88. Moreover, "according to the 1911 census, African women in South Africa's towns then numbered just under 100,000, or 19 percent of

the total African urban population. By 1921 the figure stood at 147,000, an annual increase of 4.1 percent, compared to a rate of 1.5 percent per annum for the urban African population as a whole. . . . Between 1921 and 1936 the number of African women in town increased by a further 142.3 percent compared to a 78.4 percent increase among African men" (188).

38. Marks, "Patriotism, Patriarchy, and Purity."

39. See, for example, Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity;* Morrell, ed., *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu Natal;* Beinhart, "Worker Consciousness."

40. Norval, *Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse;* O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme;* Posel, *Making of Apartheid.*

41. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme;* Posel, *Making of Apartheid.*

42. Posel, *Making of Apartheid,* 8.

43. Platzky and Walker, *Surplus People,* 11.

44. Quoted in Murray, *South Africa,* 77.

45. See Walker, "Gender and the Development."

Chapter 3: The "Home" in Homeland

1. Bhabha, "World and the Home."

2. Erlmann, *Nightsong,* 103.

3. Bowman, "'Country of Words,'" 142.

4. Speech by Buthelezi, August 23, 1980, Eshowe.

5. Campbell, "Learning to Kill?"

6. Quoted in ibid., 621.

7. Speech by Buthelezi, October 25, 1986, Ncotshane.

8. Ibid.

9. Speech by Zwelithini, February 3, 1990, Association of King Mpande's Descendants.

10. Speech by Buthelezi, August 8, 1984, Johannesburg.

11. Speech by Buthelezi, March 28, 1981, Esikhawini (emphasis added).

12. Speech by Buthelezi, July 3, 1983, Ulundi.

13. Speech by Buthelezi, October 14, 1984, Kwambonambi.

14. Speech by Buthelezi, November 4, 1984, Ongoye.

15. Speech by Buthelezi, September 25, 1989, Stanger.

16. Speech by Buthelezi, October 30, 1988, Hlabisa District.

17. Speech by Buthelezi, May 29, 1979, Ulundi.

18. Ibid. (emphasis added).

19. Ibid.

20. Speech by Buthelezi, May 29, 1979, Ulundi (emphasis added). "Ja Baas" is Afrikaans for "Yes, Boss," but because it is used as a deferential expression outside the workplace, its translation is closer to "Yes, Master" or "Yes, Sir."

21. Ibid.

22. Speech by Buthelezi, October 28, 1986, Ulundi.

23. Speech by Buthelezi, January 18, 1992, Isandlwana (emphasis added).

24. Ibid.

25. Speech by Buthelezi, September 13, 1981, Mahlabatini District.

26. Hassim, "Family, Motherhood, and Zulu Nationalism."

27. Speech by Harriet Ngubane to the Inkatha Women's Brigade, October 11, 1980, Ondini.

28. Speech by Buthelezi, October 10, 1981, Ondini.

29. Speech by Buthelezi, May 26, 1991, Johannesburg.

30. *Sunday Times,* November 6, 1977 (emphasis added).

31. Speech by Buthelezi, September 13, 1981, Mahlabatini District.

32. Hassim, "Family, Motherhood, and Zulu Nationalism."

33. Speech by Buthelezi, October 10, 1981, Ondini.

Chapter 4: Unsettled Patriarchy

1. Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power,* 88–89.

2. Buthelezi's rightful position as a chief was uncertain due to the claim of his elder brother, who was exiled to the Transvaal by the South African government. See Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi,* 6.

3. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject,* 49–52.

4. KwaZulu Legislative Assembly transcripts, vol. 18, May 18, 1980 (emphasis added).

5. Ibid. (emphasis added).

6. KwaZulu Legislative Assembly transcripts, vol. 24, June 1981 (emphasis added).

7. Ibid. (emphasis added).

8. KwaZulu Legislative Assembly transcripts, vol. 23, May 29, 1981.

9. KwaZulu Legislative Assembly transcripts, vol. 24, June 1981.

10. Speech by Buthelezi, November 4, 1984, Ongoye.

11. Speech by Buthelezi, August 29, 1992, Simdlangetsha region.

12. Speech by Buthelezi, May 29, 1987, KwaPhindangene.

13. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom,* 3–4.

14. Author's interview, subject wished to remain anonymous, June 26, 1996.

15. Author's interview with Gerhard Maré, June 28, 1996. Maré speculated that such rumors might be attributable to the Sotho origins of the Buthelezi clan.

16. Speech by Buthelezi, February 18, 1984, KwaNtambamhlope.