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"You Are What You Eat Up: Deposing Chiefs in Early Colonial Natal"

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Abstract: This paper examines three incidents in the history of early colonial Natal in which colonial forces under Secretary for Native Affairs Theophilus Shepstone attacked subject chiefs, deposed them and seized their herds. These incidents, which presaged the later conflict with Langalibalele, would have been considered in local African terms as "eating up," a practice whereby a chief confiscated the property of a subject convicted of conspiring against him through witchcraft. Close examination of these incidents shows the ways in which the early colonial state's rule over African subjects was inevitably imbued with African understandings of power and authority.

Inj' idl' umniniyo (A dog eats its master).[1]

Introduction

On three occasions within the first thirteen years after the establishment of the British colony of Natal in 1845, subject African chiefs found themselves attacked, put to flight and deposed by the government. In each case, the government official who coordinated the attacks was Natal's powerful Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) Theophilus Shepstone. The third incident, the crushing of Chief Matshana and breaking up of his chiefdom in 1858, presaged the infamous clash with Langalibalele in 1873. The pursuit, arrest, and trial of that important chief, and the scattering of his prosperous amaHlubi chiefdom, was a colonial crisis that marked the denouement of Shepstone's lone-ranger career as SNA, leading to the partial bureaucratization of his functions. Each of these

incidents was a contest over the symbols and exercise of authority. They concerned especially markers of sovereignty, including the power to inflict the punishment of death, the regulation of witchcraft, the display of arms, and the use of armed force.

This paper will examine the first three of these affairs, those that occurred during the initial decade and a half of British colonization of Natal, involving struggles between Shepstone and his colonial state against non-submissive chiefs Fodo, Sidoyi and Matshana. In each case, the chief or his followers took actions that implicitly challenged the authority of the colonial state, then refused a summons to answer charges, leading the colonial authorities to cobble together a "coalition of the willing" to take military action against the chiefs and their loyal followers. In each case, colonial forces succeeded relatively quickly in establishing military supremacy over the chief's territory, and in confiscating large numbers of cattle belonging to the rebellious chiefdom. In each case, however, the chief himself escaped and crossed the border out of Natal into neighboring African kingdoms. In each case, the chief was deposed, being replaced in the first two cases with colonial protégés. In the last conflict, that with Matshana in 1858, the colonial state followed through by disbanding the chiefdom, as it was to do with Langalibalele's amaHlubi in 1873.

What do these incidents reveal about power and authority in a nascent colonial state? I argue that in their obsession with asserting authority over recalcitrant African chiefs, colonial officials in Natal reflected and assumed both real and imagined African styles of the exercise of sovereignty and lordship. This offers an opportunity to explore Carolyn Hamilton's thesis that Shepstone consciously adopted a "Shakan" mode of rule in dealing with African chiefdoms in Natal and beyond its borders. Examination of these

three cases leads me to conclude that the interactions of colonial authorities and African leaders in the colony's first decade and a half themselves formed an intertwined discourse on the proper exercise of power, and that the later partial adoption of a particular Shakan model reinforced ideas that Shepstone and others had come to through long experience. Furthermore, I suggest that colonial disciplinary actions against the three disobedient chiefs were inevitably understood by African subjects through African conceptions of power. The early colonial state in Natal was an African state as well as a filter between African and Euro-imperial modes of rule and economy.

Fodo

Chief Fodo's conflict with Natal's colonial authorities began at the end of 1846 when he launched an attack against a section of Dushani's amaBhaca people.[2] The amaBhaca were fleeing from conflict with the independent chief Faku, whose Pondo kingdom lay just southwest of the colony's borders. The amaBhaca refugees had crossed into Natal when Fodo's men attacked and made off with the refugees' cattle.[3] (Ironically, in 1840 Fodo had attacked the amaBhaca as a colonial ally, leading the "native" troops assembled by Pretorius of the Republic of Natalia.[4]) Upon learning of what they saw as Fodo's breach of the colonial peace, Shepstone decided that it was important to meet this challenge to the authority of the colonial state with military force. In January 1847, he led a contingent of African troops to Fodo's territory near Natal's troublesome southern border.[5] Fodo sent word to Shepstone that the latter should come to him with the amaBhaca whom he had "eaten up," (meaning that he had seized their cattle)[6] along with the head of his deceased father, presumably a victim of earlier Bhaca aggression. The message suggests

that Shepstone was acting as the protector of Fodo's deadly enemies, and that if Shepstone wished to negotiate with him, he would have to compel the Bhaca to answer for the killing of Fodo's father. Shepstone, who considered this message "impertinent," issued Star-Trekian notice to Fodo that resistance was futile. Shepstone's force occupied Fodo's homesteads and captured large numbers of his cattle in the hope that this would lead him to submit, but "in the face of the whole of the natives of the Natal District and in the presence of such a force [he] has defied the power as well as denied the authority of the Government." Shepstone worried that this course of conduct was influenced by reports Fodo had received from the War of the Axe then raging between amaXhosa and white settlers on the eastern frontier of the Cape.[7]

Although many of his subjects defected for fear of having all their cattle seized by government forces, Fodo himself managed to evade capture by holing up in a "deep bushy *kloof* (ravine)."[8] Shepstone therefore resigned himself to the capture of cattle and announced that those of Fodo's subjects "who should submit themselves to the Government" would have their cattle restored. He announced that Fodo had lost his office and named Fodo's uncle Zungwana as the new subaltern ruler of the chiefdom. Some principal men who had been held prisoner by Shepstone were sent as messengers to Fodo "to explain to him that he could be no longer recognized in any other light than a fugitive culprit" under warrant of arrest and that he had been deposed, but he remained out of reach of the government. The expedition lasted 44 days, a long stretch of time considering its failure to capture Fodo, but came back to the capital with 450 cattle, about half of which would be used to compensate those raided by Fodo from the amaBhaca.[9]

Shepstone claimed to be satisfied that the expedition had reinforced the tendency of Africans in the district to obey the government.[10]

There the matter rested for several years, but eventually the government lifted its warrant and restored some of Fodo's cattle, though he remained on the opposite side of the Mzimkhulu River (Natal's southern boundary), where he continued to rule a section of his people. Not surprisingly, there was ongoing conflict within the chiefdom as to who was properly in charge, Fodo or his uncle. In connection with continued hostilities between Fodo and the Bhaca chief Dushani, both of whom remained outside the colony's formal borders, Fodo in 1856 requested the government's armed assistance to recover cattle seized by Dushani, citing as precedent the government's earlier "punishment" of him. "I now ask justice of the hand that struck me and which I kissed. I am unable to cope with Dushani alone because my power has been weakened by the Government. I therefore ask for strength." The Lt. Governor replied that no such assistance could be rendered, as "both [Fodo] and Dushani are residing beyond [the colony's] jurisdiction."[11] A few years later, following a decisive defeat at the hands of the amaBhaca, Fodo, calling his own condition "pitiful, forlorn and destitute," asked to return to Natal as the government's "dog." He asked similar consideration for his relative Sidoyi, who had taken refuge with him after his own conflict with Natal. Although these requests were denied, by this time the government contemplated annexation of the troublesome "No Man's Land" between the colony and Faku's kingdom as Alfred County, a solution implemented in 1865.[12]

Sidoyi

In April 1857, the Lt. Governor called on Shepstone to organize a military force to arrest and seize the cattle of another chief on the southern boundary, a relative of Fodo named Sidoyi. Chief Sidoyi had incurred the wrath of the government of Natal by attacking, killing and "mutilating" a neighboring chief, actions Shepstone argued were open only to an independent chief and were therefore unacceptable declarations of independence from colonial control.[13] Both Sidoyi's case and that of Matshana, in the following year, were intimately bound up with the colonial state's attitudes towards witchcraft and the infliction of death. The government found itself in the delicate position of recognizing the power of chiefs, but seeking to limit those powers severely with respect to the punishment or use of powers of witchcraft. The government also wished to define all killing (except that meted out by itself through judicial punishment or in acts of war) as murder.

In 1850, the government had tried and convicted Chief Matshana of the Sithole after he executed his uncle Uvela for engaging in witchcraft in a challenge to Matshana's right to the throne.[14] The government, in consideration of "the strong feelings of Her Majesty's Native Subjects on the subject of Witchcraft," as well as Matshana's youth and alleged ignorance, essentially let him off with a warning and a large fine[15] but used the occasion to announce that "thenceforth the crime of murder under any circumstances would be punished with death." Not surprisingly, this did not put an end to unauthorized killing in the colony, and the government convicted and executed several people on murder charges. In 1853, a Hlubi man was convicted of poisoning a white family and was sentenced to death. The government again felt constrained to exercise clemency. Shepstone issued a proclamation to the chiefs in Natal that even attempted murder

(apparently the victims in this case did not die) would be punished with death. Furthermore, “the Cattle of any person who shall be found guilty of murder or attempted murder shall be confiscated.”[16]

The addition of confiscation of cattle to the penalty for murder convictions was an outgrowth of Shepstone’s belief that Africans should in all instances—even criminal offenses (though not torts) against whites—be judged according to precepts of African law, as he understood them.[17] He also applied this concept in dealing with recalcitrant chiefs, seizing large numbers of cattle. Although John Lambert argues that there was “no precedent in African law” for breaking up chiefdoms and confiscating property of disobedient subordinate chiefs, he suggests that these actions connected Shepstone, in African perceptions, to Shakan despotism.[18] If this was deliberate on Shepstone’s part, it supports Hamilton’s thesis that Shepstone sought to model his rule over Africans on a particular image of Shaka as an authoritarian leader.[19] She bases this argument, however, on Shepstone’s researches into precolonial history of the region, a project undertaken a decade later, in 1863.[20] I will take this matter up more fully below. But clearly Shepstone had well-formed ideas about African law and the powers of paramount chiefs (of whom he saw himself as one) well before his specific research on the subject in the 1860s. It was clear, for instance, that “eating up”—a chief’s confiscation of a subject’s property—was a common punishment when subjects were found to have engaged in witchcraft directed at the chiefly house.[21] Indeed, the proclamation against murder was part of a larger campaign to limit the powers of chiefs to punish witchcraft, including forbidding the practice of “eating up.” In 1856, for instance, Shepstone directed a Resident Magistrate in the Thukela Valley to remind Chief Somahashe that only the government,

and not its subordinate chiefs had the power to have persons eaten up, a principle the chief had violated by eating up a subject accused of witchcraft against him.[22] In addition, this was a punishment Shepstone reserved for disobedient chiefs and those convicted of murder—he disallowed a magistrate's sentence of confiscation against an individual for contempt in refusing to answer the official's summons.[23]

Before the principle of eating up disobedient chiefs was applied against Matshana himself, in 1858, Shepstone's carried out his expedition against Sidoyi during six weeks in the autumn of 1857. In his report of this matter, Shepstone noted that when Sidoyi had come of age, in about 1850, Shepstone had warned him "that neither the Tribe nor the Country were his, that he himself was deputed by the Government to take charge of a section of its subjects, and that should he ever lose sight of this fact, calamity would certainly fall upon both."[24] In 1857, Shepstone attributed Sidoyi's newfound "recklessness"—that is his independence of action in relation to the colonial government—to the chief having become a "Witchdoctor," presumably meaning that the chief had developed the ritual power and authority to "smell out" those who sought to undermine his power by magical means.[25] The crisis, however, grew out of a fight at a wedding between Sidoyi's people and a neighboring group, the followers of a chief named Mshukungubo. After some initial skirmishes, Sidoyi attacked his neighbor with a force of 500 men against the latter's 80 defenders. Mshukungubo and all but one of his brothers were killed. After the battle, Sidoyi found Mshukungubo's body and "with great ceremony" cut off the right eyebrow, right hand, right eye and tongue of the dead chief. As Shepstone noted, such a ritual was intended to "transfer the powers, diplomatic and military, of the vanquished chieftain to his conqueror."

Despite the sense of independence of governmental control demonstrated by this action, Sidoyi had reported the original disturbance to his magistrate. However, when the magistrate summoned Sidoyi to his investigation of the matter, the chief sent messengers but refused to attend in person. The failure to answer a summons of a magistrate or the SNA was apparently a crime the government could not forgive. In this case, as in the case the following year of Matshana and 15 years later of Langalibalele, it was this refusal to appear in answer to a summons that precipitated military action against the chiefs.[26]

At this point then, Shepstone argued for the necessity of regime change. He asserted that Sidoyi's "treatment" of the smaller neighboring chiefdom had put fear into the hearts of small chiefdoms throughout the colony. Small chiefdoms, he said, especially those bordering more powerful neighbors, were anxious to see how the government would respond to Sidoyi's breach of peace and decorum. According to Shepstone, to make war and to "mutilate" a defeated foe were acts that were the prerogatives of independent, hereditary chiefs. As Shepstone imagined Africans of the small chiefdoms asking, "Would the government permit this proclamation of independence within its own territory? If so, then the minor tribes would be destroyed by the more powerful and a struggle for supremacy between the latter and the Government would soon follow." In other words, not responding decisively to this act of war and mutilation could be the first misstep on a slippery slope that would end in a vast conflagration. The weapon of mutilation was truly a weapon of mass destruction! Weaker chiefdoms, according to Shepstone, feared that white failure to take seriously "superstitious notions" would lead the government to ignore the ominous nature of Sidoyi's actions, actions that could "never reside in a subordinate Chief."[27]

Shepstone therefore again assembled a coalition of the willing: two forces of 400 Africans each, under white officers, one of them his brother John who was to figure so nefariously in the following year's expedition against Matshana. Theophilus Shepstone himself, who shortly after the Fodo affair had been given command of all "native forces" in the colony,[28] would lead the "regular" troops, and would be assisted by a detachment of Cape Mounted Rifles. They implemented a plan to engage in a pincer movement to sweep up the cattle, horses and guns of Sidoyi's people, and to capture him and his principal men. As with Fodo a decade earlier, however, this expedition succeeded in capturing large numbers of cattle, but failed to arrest the recalcitrant chief. Sidoyi escaped over the border accompanied by a few young men, allegedly planning to join his uncle on the Orange River. The elders pragmatically took this opportunity to express their loyalty to the government, expressing their distaste for the departed chief. "They said they were sure that *hereditary* Chiefs placed family pride before the interests of their people and they hoped the Government would provide" a new leader.[29] Shepstone obliged, announcing that "Government induna" Zatshuke—who was later to be appointed the colony's "head *induna*" (deputy) and would participate in the trial of Langalibalele in 1873[30]—was to be placed in charge of the chiefdom. Shepstone's report noted that this man had been "under [his] notice" for many years as an excellent candidate to be appointed to a chieftaincy. The elders pledged their loyalty and asked for "a spark to kindle a fresh fire," that is the return of some of their cattle.

Shepstone's official report noted that the six-week expedition resulted in the capture of 7,000 cattle, of which 1,600 were restored to Sidoyi's former subjects, 700 given to the troops, and 3,000 were sold at public auction, while the remnant, those

infected with lung sickness, were retained as “Government cattle” to settle any remaining claims with the community. The body count showed only five men killed in the expedition, four of them adherents of Sidoyi.[31]

Though Shepstone argued that the expedition was a great success and that never before had such a severe punishment been meted out to a chiefdom within the colony, the failure to capture Sidoyi was not without consequence. Little more than a year later, Resident Magistrate (RM) Hawkins reported that Sidoyi was living just beyond the border, with his cousin Fodo. Sidoyi’s subjects, of whose loyalty to the government Shepstone had been assured at the time of the expedition, were now crossing the border in considerable numbers to join their former chief. The magistrate argued that this gathering community posed a danger to the colony, especially as the deposed chiefs were no doubt intent on recovering their seized cattle, and because they were becoming a nodal point for the gathering of disaffected people from the already troubled area as well as from British Kaffraria on the eastern border of the Cape, including “Rebel Hottentots.”[32]

Matshana

It was against this background, then, that the colonial government confronted the defiance of Chief Matshana of the Sithole in the summer of 1858.[33] In December of the previous year, RM Kelly in Ladysmith (Klip River district), reported the murder of a man named Sikadiya in Matshana’s reserve, allegedly at the behest of the chief. Sikadiya had been accused of using witchcraft to bring about the death Matshana’s uncle, Mtwetwa, “a great favorite of the Chief.”[34] The magistrate therefore issued a summons to the chief and other suspects. Although he was willing to turn over the men charged with committing

the murder, Matshana himself refused to appear. At this point, the magistrate sought permission to use force to compel obedience. Acting Colonial Secretary Philip Allen, writing on behalf of the SNA while the latter was away on duty, reacted cautiously. He noted that although the Lt. Governor was clear that it was important for magistrates to be obeyed by chiefs, and that he was willing if necessary to use armed force, it was important to avoid such "extreme measures" if possible. Recalling the actions against Fodo and Sidoyi, he noted that the use of force to arrest a chief would almost certainly result in the chief's flight, and armed conflict would result in "repressive measures against the whole Tribe." Allen noted that Matshana's willingness to give up the suspects militated against a quick assumption of the chief's guilt. Why not try the alleged perpetrators first, then consider if there was evidence against the chief? Perhaps the chiefs' messengers had conveyed contempt where none was intended? Allen even reprimanded the magistrate for not visiting the chief's residence instead of issuing a summons![35]

In less than three weeks, however, Shepstone implemented the very extreme measures Allen warned about and, acting in the name of the Supreme Chief (the Lt. Governor), issued a proclamation declaring Matshana to be an outlaw and dissolving his chiefdom.[36] As with Sidoyi, the SNA rehearsed his version of the facts leading up to this decisive moment. Once again, it was noted that Matshana had assumed the chiefship on the death of his grandfather Jobe "under the distinct declaration and injunction that he was so allowed only on condition that he ruled the said tribe in the name of and as the lieutenant of the British Government." Shepstone further recalled the leniency the government had shown in connection with Matshana's witchcraft-related murder of his

uncle in 1850. This, as noted above, had led the government to issue the order outlawing murder, including executions of those found guilty of witchcraft. His failure to answer the magistrate's summons in response to the new murder charge had led to the present crisis. This also implicated his subjects, because far from separating themselves "from these acts of their Chief," they had armed for war and guarded him from colonial authorities. Following the armed confrontation with the chief discussed below, the proclamation deposed Matshana, declared him and all persons sheltering him to be outlaws, and disbanded the tribe. How did such a severe result come about?

We have two main written sources for these events: Shepstone's report of April 1858, and an investigation launched by Bishop Colenso in 1875 in the fallout over the Langalibalele affair.[37] Anxious to avoid the failure to capture the offending chief that had marked his expeditions against Fodo and Sidoyi, Shepstone again assembled a formidable force, consisting of three settler volunteer militias and 500 Africans from Langalibalele's Hlubi chiefdom again under the SNA's brother, John Shepstone, who had become a sort of all-around *consigliere* and fixer for Theophilus.[38] True to the pattern established by the other chiefs under attack by colonial forces, Matshana and his men retreated into the broken country of the Thukela valley, and the colonial forces were left to sweep the area capturing Sithole cattle, 7,000 head in all. At this point, the white fighters withdrew while John Shepstone and his African force were left in the field to attempt to "overawe Matyana's people and … open a communication with the Tribe…." It was only then that the SNA himself appeared on the scene to inform the community that if Matshana were not given up to the authorities by reaping time, they would be dispersed from their

"Location." He left his brother with his *impi* (warriors) on the edge of the reserve and returned to the capital.

John Shepstone managed to have several meetings with Matshana, but the latter "was on every occasion surrounded by a strong force fully armed," and so could not be apprehended. Eventually, John arranged for a meeting that would enable them to talk without the presence of Matyana's armed bodyguards. Matshana, not surprisingly, feared that he would be seized at this meeting. It seems reasonable to suppose that he had heard of the outcomes of parleys with British officials like that with Xhosa king Hintsa in 1836 that had resulted in the latter's assassination.[39] John, too, no matter how devious his own intent, is likely to have been nervous about the presence of a large number of Matshana's armed followers. John prevailed upon the chief to have his men leave their arms 200 yards from the meeting place, while he arranged for a mounted force to move between the meeting place and the weapons should his plans go awry. Theophilus' report argues that John had learned that Matshana and his men had plotted to attack him at the meeting, and that he knew the signal the chief planned to give his followers. On hearing the signal, John ordered Matshana to be seized (just as the chief had suspected!), and produced the hidden gun. In the fracas that followed, thirty of Matshana's men were killed, and John and some of his men were wounded. The chief escaped across the Mzinyati River into "Panda's country" (the Zulu kingdom) accompanied by a few young men.[40]

It was in the aftermath of this debacle that the SNA declared Matshana to be an outlaw and dissolved his chiefdom. His cattle, of course, had already been seized. This was the most severe "eating up" yet imposed by the SNA on a disobedient chief,

establishing the precedent that was to be followed in the case of Langalibalele's "rebellion" in fifteen years time.

Eating Up and the Intertwined Discourses of Power

What do these three incidents tell us? In one respect, it is remarkable that Shepstone's administration experienced so few acts of open defiance during the colony's first decade and a half of existence. Indeed, Shepstone never tired of boasting in his reports that Natal was peaceful—that the natives were not restless—while the Eastern Cape experienced one savage frontier war after another. While he attributed this to his own sound methods of administration, it is more likely that the difference lay in the fact that Eastern Cape settlers were exerting pressure on the land and labor of people in the relatively large and (until the Cattle Killing of 1857) resilient Xhosa kingdom, while the colony of Natal deliberately refrained from antagonizing its similarly militarily able neighbor to the north, the Zulu kingdom, until the tail end of the 1870s. Most of the people of Natal lived in relatively small chiefdoms, and indeed many of them were only organized into chiefdoms through the agency of the colonial government, which saddled them with appointed chiefs. While the demands and impositions of the colonial state were a burden,[41] the larger chiefdoms had reason to view it to some degree as a protector against the interests of land-hungry settlers and speculators, but also against the interests of the Zulu king, from under whose thumb some of them, such as Langalibalele, had fled into Natal.[42]

It is notable, however, that each of these disturbances occurred in areas on the colony's borders. Between the southern border and Faku's Pondo kingdom fell an area that colonists tellingly named "No Man's Land," though they technically recognized it as

within Faku's borders. It was to this area that Shepstone proposed several times in the early 1850s to remove a considerable portion of Natal's African population.[43] He argued mainly on the basis that this would tend to relieve pressures on land in Natal, avoiding conflict between settlers and indigenes there, and enabling him to carry out the type of interventionist, civilizing administration initially envisaged by the Locations Commission of 1847. But an unspoken piece of his case was that placing him in charge of a loyal group of followers there would tend to settle a region that was notorious for "Bushman" raids, cattle theft, and clashes between neighboring chiefdoms. Faku, though nominally sovereign over the area, clearly lacked the power to enforce his will there except through occasional armed forays. Thus, although they were located (before being attacked by the authorities) on the colonial side of the Mzimkhulu River, Fodo's and Sidoyi's clashes with neighbors were part of this pattern of a disturbed border area, in this case one that was quite far from the capital, and indeed had not yet been organized into reserves. In Fodo's case, particularly, the conflict was with refugees who were fleeing from an attack by Faku and were part of a community that Fodo had been asked to attack only a few years earlier by the jurisdictional predecessors of Natal's government, the Republic of Natalia. It is unlikely that Fodo attached any great significance to the difference between Pretorius and Shepstone—both were white men from the Eastern Cape who had settled in Natal and had become important officials. Fodo may have been somewhat bewildered by the change in colonial attitude toward the Bhaca. His most serious offense, of course, was his "impertinent" response to Shepstone's demand to surrender himself to the latter's armed force.

Between the attack on Fodo and the time of the confrontations with Sidoyi and Matshana, Resident Magistrates had been installed in each county. In addition to their administrative duties with respect to the white population, these men were "Administrators of Native Law" in cases among Africans and were the local arm of Shepstone's Native Affairs department. In the first several years of their existence, there was a good deal of confusion, anxiety and tension over their proper authority, behavior and chains of command.[44] Their initial appointment stemmed from an attempt by the Lt. Governor, Benjamin Pine, to evade Shepstone's authority by placing his own men, answerable only to himself, in the counties. But once he re-established an uneasy working relationship with Pine, Shepstone brought the magistrates under his command with respect to native affairs. However, they were in some respects loose cannons. In one particularly egregious case in the late 1860s, a magistrate named Captain Lucas was charged with flogging a prisoner to death.[45] Several African leaders attempted to continue to have direct relationships with Shepstone, whom they "knew" and who was able to communicate effectively with them both in style and in language.[46] As one chief's messenger pleaded, "Nodada trusts that although his Magistrate is in the Klip River he will not be debarred the privilege of sending to Pietermaritzburg when he shall think it necessary."[47] Indeed, in 1858 Shepstone directed that cases involving "offenses of a political nature," involving for instance questions of succession, should be referred to the SNA rather than decided by the magistrates on their own.[48] Similarly, Shepstone had ordered that only he, and not a magistrate, could permit a chief to hold a First Fruits ceremony, an occasion imbued with military and ritual significance.[49]

The crises that developed in these 1857-58 incidents were partly to do with the inability of magistrates to command the obedience of chiefs in the form of a summons to the magistrate's "great place" to answer for an alleged wrongdoing, a pattern that would be repeated in the later conflict with Langalibalele.[50] Summons to answer for wrongdoing were of course viewed with some apprehension. As a proverb had it, "*Ibizelo ladl' ikhondekazi*" (the summons ate up the great baboon).[51] Sidoyi was of course intimately familiar with the incident ten years earlier involving his relation Fodo. He therefore had every reason to expect that an armed force would be arrayed against himself and his people. His cattle would be seized and he would be forced to choose between the humiliation of surrender and flight across the porous border into "no man's land" where he would join Fodo and other renegades caught between the exactions of the white colony and raids and attacks emanating from Faku's Pondo kingdom. Certainly it was not desirable to suffer exile, especially if it meant losing most of his cattle, but on the other hand he knew that Fodo had been able to rebuild his power and that he had eventually been reconciled to the colony. Sidoyi had reported the fight that took place at the wedding, and had sent messengers to the magistrate in response to the latter's urgent inquiries about his full-scale attack on his neighbors. But why should he appear in person, especially at the seat of a mere magistrate? Shouldn't Mr. Hawkins more properly show his respect by coming to see him?

A similar chain of events ensued in Matshana's case. Following the report that one of Matshana's subjects had been killed, together with rumors linking the chief to the murder, the magistrate commanded the chief to appear at his office. Like Sidoyi on the opposite end of the colony, Matshana considered this beneath his dignity and instead

offered to send the men charged with the killing. In effect, then, he was signaling that he accepted the political-juridical authority of the colonial state over his chiefdom, but that he saw important limitations on its authority over his chiefly person. At this point, the frustrated magistrate sent urgently to Pietermaritzburg seeking backing from the authority of the SNA and the armed force he could bring to bear. The cautious response of Acting Colonial Secretary Allen recognized the chief's implicit political submission and therefore suggested that the magistrate visit Matshana in his location. But events were already spinning out of control, thanks largely to Shepstone's apparent unwillingness to proceed with the caution suggested by Allen. To Shepstone, the risk that the expeditions would meet the same mixed results obtained (at tremendous expense) by the earlier missions against Fodo and Sidoyi was outweighed by the risk that chiefs would fail to respect the authority of magistrates and of the colonial government generally.

The presence of weapons at negotiation meetings was also an issue of prestige, authority and masculinity for colonial and African leaders alike. It is notable that the last act of the Matshana affair was a parley that was supposed to be weaponless, but at which two colonial representatives were wounded with spears after the younger Shepstone produced and fired a gun. The events leading up to this moment suggest the importance of weapons to chiefly prestige and honor, as well of course to his personal safety, as events proved. After the "allies" expropriated the Sithole cattle, the younger Shepstone was charged with continuing to put pressure on Matshana to submit. He found that he was able to meet with the chief, but that on each occasion the chief was surrounded by a large retinue of armed men. What the colonial sources leave unstated is that John

Shepstone was also the commander of a force of 500 African warriors, and that he was equally concerned with protecting his own manly prestige and safety.

In each instance, the SNA was at pains to demonstrate to his superiors that although the chief in question had escaped punishment, most of his subjects had quickly declared their loyalty to the colony and had been more than willing to provide damning evidence against their former chiefs, implying therefore that he had been greeted as a liberator. He claimed that Sidoyi's men had suggested that the loyalty of a hereditary chief was to his own lineage rather than to his subjects as a whole, and that they, as loyal subjects of the colony, therefore wished to have an appointed chief instead. Such evidence is laden with ambiguity. No doubt there were real tensions between powerful hereditary chiefs and their commoner subjects, and no doubt these were exacerbated when the actions of a chief placed the economic security of his subjects in jeopardy, as had happened in each of these cases with the government's seizure of cattle and in the last case with the chiefdom's banishment from the location. At the same time it is hardly surprising that colonial subjects with their backs to the wall would seek to curry the favor of authorities once their former chief was out of the picture.

Both the Sidoyi and Matshana affairs involved sensitive issue of exercise of ritual power and authority in a manner that the colonial state was determined to restrain. In Sidoyi's case, the chief's offense was threefold. First, he had used military force without authorization. Second, he had defied the summons of the magistrate. But the issue over which colonial anxiety rises most loudly from the archival pages is that of the chief's "mutilation" of his rival. Shepstone provides no analysis of the chief's actions, except to say that it was intended to transfer the dead man's powers to his vanquisher. But this

makes it clear that the cutting was not a senseless act of savagery, but instead one with a clear purpose. It does not require much of a cultural leap to imagine the importance of the right eye, eyebrow and hand, along with the tongue, in terms of chiefly *amandla* (power). In Zulu cultures, the right side of objects is associated with masculine attributes. For instance, men and their tools belong on the right side of a dwelling, while in ritual slaughter of cattle, pieces are cut from the animal's right side at the beginning of the butchering process.[52] A proverb notes "*Inxele kaliwubus' umuzi*," (the left-handed one does not rule the homestead).[53] I would hazard a guess that the significance of eyes and hands to ideas of power is extremely widespread, if not universal.

As Clifton Crais reminds us, chiefs' power was centrally bound up with "their access to, and control over, magic" in southeast Africa and beyond. One of the ways chiefs consolidated and extended their power was through control of witchcraft and the "eating up" of subjects who were found to have used magical powers against the chief or his close relatives. Colonial states in southeast Africa were determined to stamp out his practice as one of those aspects of indigenous custom deemed repugnant.[54] The use and control of magic was central to the colonial conflict with the two chiefs in 1857-58. In Sidoyi's case, the colonial government was adamant that subject chiefs should not use armed force except under the command of colonial officers for colonial aims, but it was also apparently unnerved by Sidoyi's savagery in removing selected body parts from his deceased foe in order to magically enhance his own power. Recall that Shepstone argued that Sidoyi's "recklessness" began with his becoming a witchdoctor. The ritual appropriation of body parts was further evidence of the chief's involvement with magical

forces that might (at least in African perceptions) give him the strength to challenge other rivals, or even the colonial government.

In the case of Matshana, the connection to witchcraft was even more direct. In attempting to establish its authority, the colonial state found itself compelled in 1850 to proclaim the seemingly obvious principle that killing was illegal. The context, of course, was the conviction of a young chief, Matshana, for ordering the execution of a man who had used witchcraft to challenge his succession. The officials of a nascent colonial state were unwilling to risk the execution of the chief for something they knew to be central to their African subjects' understandings about the exercise of power. Ironically, the proclamation and its enforcement must have to some extent reinforced this understanding in a number of ways. The proclamation, and arrests, trials and executions carried out under it asserted that only those in power could properly punish killing. Further, to the extent people believed that witchcraft had been used against a chiefly family, prohibiting the chief from responding effectively put the government in league with the alleged witches.[55] Finally, the proclamation insisted that those found guilty of murder would, in addition to being liable to execution, suffer the confiscation of their cattle. In other words, the government would punish those found guilty of the improper exercise of power—witchfinding and execution—through the eating up of their households, just as African chiefs punished witches.

Even though the government was unable to arrest any of these three chiefs, and therefore unable to try any of them, each was effectively subjected to eating up. It is interesting that despite the lack of legal proceedings in these cases the authorities not only used the seizure of cattle as a tactic to compel submission of the chief's subjects, but

followed through with distribution of cattle to loyal followers, restoration of some to those deemed to have suffered an unjust loss, and enhancement of the government's own coffers. The market-oriented colonial state did this through auction of the seized cattle rather than through loans to clients or retaining them for further redistribution. However, it is likely that in the eyes of African subjects, this was perceived as an eating up much like that a chief might impose on a subject found guilty of plotting against him through witchcraft, though on a scale not easily imaginable for most chiefs in Natal, with the total number of cattle seized in the 1857-58 operations amounting to over 14,000 head. In the affected chiefdoms, the confiscations may have done much more than hut taxes in these years to "encourage" young men to seek wage labor in white-owned enterprises or labor tenancy on white-owned farms, with the hope of rebuilding lost herds, especially in the context of *lobola* inflation.[56] The auctions of seized cattle were also no doubt a windfall for the emerging commercial farming economy of white settlers in the colony. When the colonial state acted to eat up a subject chief, therefore, it also acted as a alchemical filter between the homestead economy and the growing colonial economy, transforming cattle as social relations into cattle as signifiers of the market.[57]

Hamilton argued that Shepstone modeled his administration on an understanding of Shakan rule he developed from his own 1863 research with African informants.[58] Based on the sketch of precolonial history of the region he developed from interviews, Shaka's "instances of despotism were represented not as wanton savagery, but as linked to processes of rule."[59] This entailed a model of sovereignty that was centralized and despotic, and therefore able to circumvent European post-emancipation notions of individual freedom and emerging democratic structures. Indeed, a central part of the

model was the idea of collective responsibility, the antithesis of liberal individualism.[60] Hamilton's argument is persuasive to the extent that she seeks to connect Shepstone's research to his ongoing conceptualization of his own actions as a ruler and to his engagement with the Zulu royal house, especially in the ceremonies surrounding the installation of Cetshwayo as king, where Shepstone was invited to appear "as Shaka,"[61] an episode that occurred immediately prior to his confrontation with Langalibable.[62] However, close examination of the first decade and a half of colonial rule in Natal shows that Shepstone's style of rule and his own conceptualization of it preceded this research, which was carried out only five years *after* the Matshana affair.[63] Although Hamilton acknowledges, in a general way, Shepstone's experiences growing up on the Eastern Cape frontier[64], she has little to say of his early years as a high colonial officer in Natal or of the interactions of the Natal administration and its subjects before the 1860s. We have seen, however, that the interplay between government and chiefs involved significant questions over what types of actions and symbols most effectively displayed the supremacy of the colonial government and the subordination of chiefs. These conversations, verbal, military or symbolic, tended to take place in terms of both African and colonial understandings of African practices of power.

Conclusions

Hamilton has been rightly praised for her insight that the image of Shaka developed in the 19th and 20th centuries from the intertwined discourses of indigenes and colonists in southern Africa, and she convincingly argues that this process had implications for the style and methods of colonial rule in Natal. If we wish to understand the modes of

governance and that emerged in colonial southern Africa, however, it is necessary to go beyond narrative discourse and look at discursive practices involved in the creation of the colonial state. When we do so, and when we remember that the colony in question had its origins in the 1840s (and that it was directly linked to the much older Cape Colony as well as to its immediate colonial predecessor, the Boer republic of Natalia), we must examine the multivalent interactions between African communities and their leaders and their white overlords in the colony's first decades.

Coming across the archival accounts of the military coercion of first Fodo (1847), and then, in quick succession a decade later, Sidoyi and Matshana, I was immediately struck by the similarity with the much better-known clash with Langalibalele in the 1870s. As Jeff Guy reminds us, Natal's chiefdoms were not directly conquered at the outset of the colonial era, but were instead incorporated with chiefly power only partially diminished. Still it is clear that to ensure compliance with the emerging colonial order, violence was applied in a variety of quotidian ways, as well as through the constant threat and occasional application of military force to recalcitrant African notables.[65] From the perspective of 2005, and thinking also of the imperialist attack on the Zulu kingdom at the end of the 1870s, it is also worthy of note that Shepstone and other aggressive colonial officials were quick to assemble coalitions of the willing to practice regime change against troublesome subalterns.

The clashes with Fodo, Sidoyi and Matshana are also revealing of the intertwined understandings of sovereignty and governance developing between ruler and ruled in Natal's first two colonial decades. Just as the use and control of violence and magic was key to the power of chiefs, a colonial state that legitimized itself through its claim to

pursue a civilizing mission found itself inextricably caught up in these very African understandings of sovereignty and power. Consider why the colonial authorities thought it necessary to bring the chiefs to heel. In the case of Fodo, it was fairly straightforward—he had used unauthorized military force against a neighboring community. The colonial state was struggling, as it continued to do for many years, to establish itself as the pre-eminent power—in effect the paramount—in the Mzimkhulu basin, matching or surpassing the power of the paramount Faku's Pondo kingdom on the other side of the region. With Sidoyi and Matshana, however, questions of authority and sovereignty were more ambiguous, and led to deeper interlacing of meanings among colonial officials and African subjects. First, in each case a resident magistrate was the colonial official who attempted to call the chief to account. The sense of these and other incidents in the record for the first decade of the magistrates' existence is that chiefs often considered it beneath their empowered dignity to be compelled to attend the magistrate at the latter's seat of authority. If they were willing to answer to anyone, it was more likely to be to the authorities in Pietermaritzburg, especially Shepstone, who could be considered an equal or even a first among equals. Magistrates were in many ways intermediaries, much like the chiefs themselves, but they lacked the legitimacy, familiarity and cultural fluency of chiefs.[66]

Magic was also at the heart of these encounters. Both Sidoyi and Matshana were involved in asserting their ritual supremacy in their respective realms. Recall that Shepstone claimed that the trouble with Sidoyi began with the latter becoming a "witchdoctor," in other words a ritual specialist in the elimination of witches. His appropriation of the key right-side body parts of his rival was an effort to enhance his

magical powers, in order to reinforce the material powers inherent in his position as chief, the armed force under his command, and his control of a sizable herd. Matshana stands accused in the colonial record of two killings related to his own efforts to snuff out witchcraft aimed at undermining his power. The colonial state, then, wanted not only to charge the chief with murder, as it had proclaimed repeatedly that it would do in such situations, but also to deny the chief's power to control witchcraft. Given the way that colonialism inverted the relationship between power and witchcraft—punishing witchfinding while ignoring the practice of witchcraft—the authorities' actions in calling a chief to account in such a situation was similar, from an African point of view to the chief's own actions in punishing accused witches. From African perspectives, it was surely not a coincidence that the chief who suffered the greatest colonial wrath, Langalibalele, was a powerful rainmaker who did not submit to the humiliation of a summons to the capital.[67]

It is not merely ironic that the actions Shepstone and other Natal officials took against recalcitrant chiefs were as despotic, violent, and unbounded by law as the allegedly disobedient acts of the chiefs themselves. A closer look at these crises in the life of the early colonial state shows that colonial rule in Natal was deeply imbued with African understandings of and practices of power and authority. Shepstone's later justification of his methods by reference to the history of Shaka's rule was no doubt cynical, or at best a convenient justification of practices that were primarily the result of pragmatic considerations, especially the dearth of resources and imperial backing. But in another sense the appeal to Shakan methods reflects a consciousness of involvement with African discourses of power, one that involved minor chiefs and anonymous subjects as

well as the storied leader of the Zulu kingdom. In this sense, the colonial state in Natal was truly that which it ate up.

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[1] C.L. Sibusiso Nyembezi, *Zulu Proverbs* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1954), 60.

[2] John B. Wright, *Bushman Raiders of the Drakensberg, 1840-1870: A Study of Their Conflict with Stock-Keeping Peoples in Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1971).

[3] Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (PAR), SNA 1/8/1, Diplomatic Agent (DA) to Secretary to Government, Natal, 25 Dec. 1846.

[4] Timothy J. Stapleton, *Faku: Rulership and Colonialism in the Mpondo Kingdom (C. 1760-1867)* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001), 57.

[5] SNA 1/8/1, DA to Secretary to Government, Natal, Feb. 24, 1847. For more on this region and Shepstone’s actions pertaining to it, see Thomas McClendon, "The Man Who Would Be *Inkosi*: Civilising Missions in Shepstone's Early Career," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30, no. 2 (2003), 339-58.

[6] Doke’s dictionary gives this sense of *ukudla* as “confiscate,” but contemporary documents inevitably use the expression “to eat up,” which conveys the connection to the verb “to eat.” C.M. Doke, D.M. Malcolm, J.M.A. Sikakana, and B.W. Vilakazi, ed., *English-Zulu Zulu-English Dictionary* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1990).

[7] SNA 1/8/1, DA to Secretary to Government, 29 Jan. 1847. For the War of the Axe, see Jeff Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981).

[8] SNA 1/8/1, DA to Secretary to Government, 7 Feb. 1847.

[9] Ibid., 24 Feb. 1847.

[10] Ibid., 14 April 1847. This sense of satisfaction did not last long, as Shepstone, shortly after a diary entry stating that Christmas 1847 was "anything but a merry one," noted widespread fear of a major African rising at the beginning of the following year. Shepstone Papers, A96, Diaries vol. 1, 25 Dec. 1847 and 1 Jan. 1848.

[11] SNA 1/6/1, Message from Fodo to Government of Natal, 18 June 1856.

[12] SNA 1/7/4, Message from Fodo to Government of Natal, 6 Sept. 1861; SNA 1/7/6, Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) to Chiefs in No Man's Land, 23 September 1865.

[13] SNA 1/1/7, Lt. Governor to SNA, 13 April 1857; SNA 1/7/2, SNA to Lt. Gov, 27 May 1857.

[14] SNA 1/8/8, Minute Paper, Copy of Proclamation, 19 Jan. 1858.

[15] SNA 1/8/6, SNA to Lt. Governor, 16 April 1858. The offence was judged to be one of collective responsibility, and accordingly a fine of 500 head of cattle was levied against Matshana's community.

[16] SNA 1/1/5, SNA to all Native Chiefs and people, 15 Aug. 1853.

[17] SNA 1/7/2, Report on Document 893, 18 November 1856. By 1862, the government had concluded that "murder and other grave offences" were under the jurisdiction of the "ordinary laws," that is, the laws applying to whites, rather than under "Native Laws." SNA 1/8/8, SNA to Resident Magistrate (RM) Weenen, 8 May 1862.

[18] John Lambert, *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1995), 31.

[19] Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 72-129.

[20] Ibid., 90-94.

[21] SNA 1/7/1, Statement of Umlata, November 18, 1850; SNA 1/7/2, Statement of Makandela, 28 July 1851. Shepstone argued in a report of his of violently forcing the amaHlubi into the Drakensberg locations that "being Eaten up," was "the only description of Tribal punishment a

Native can understand." He hoped to change this understanding through his action in compelling the amaHlubi to move to the new locations, while retaining most of their cattle. SNA 1/8/1, SNA to Secretary to Government, 14 Oct. 1849.

[22] SNA 1/8/6, SNA to RM Umvoti, 31 July 1856.

[23] SNA 1/8/7, SNA to RM Klip River, 26 May 1859; SNA 1/3/8, RM Klip River to SNA, 25 April 1859.

[24] SNA 1/7/2, SNA to Lt. Governor, 27 May 27.

[25] Clifton Crais, *The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power, and the Political Imagination in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 50.

[26] The official account of the incident and the record of the trial of Langalibalele is contained in Natal, *The Kafir Revolt in Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: 1874).

[27] SNA 1/7/2, SNA to Lt. Governor, 27 May 1857.

[28] SNA 1/8/1, SNA to Secretary to Government, Sept. 6, 1848. Shepstone noted this appointment with apparent pride in his diary. Shepstone Papers, A96, Diaries, vol. 1, 15 Sept. 1848.

[29] SNA 1/7/2, SNA to Lt. Governor, 27 May 857 (emphasis added).

[30] Natal, *The Kafir Revolt*.

[31] SNA 1/7/2, SNA to Lt. Governor, 27 May 1857.

[32] SNA 1/3/7, RM Upper Umkomanzi to SNA, 28 July 1858. See also SNA 1/1/10, unknown to SNA, 15 November 1860, concerning an attack made by Fodo and Sidoyi. The "Rebel Hottentots" were those who had allied with Xhosa against the Cape Colony in the war of 1850-53. See Elizabeth Elbourne, *Blood Ground: Colonialism, Missions, and the Contest for Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799-1853* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002), 345-76.

[33] According to some sources, Matshana was Thembu, but this apparently relates to a tradition of close relationship between the Sithole and the Thembu. My thanks to John Wright for this clarification.

[34] SNA 1/8/6, SNA to Lt. Governor, 16 April 1858.

[35] SNA 1/8/6, (Philip Allen for) SNA to RM Klip River, 2 Jan. 1858.

[36] SNA 1/8/8, Minute Paper, Copy of Proclamation, 19 Jan. 1858.

[37] Shepstone's report can be found at SNA 1/8/6, SNA to Lt. Governor, 16 April 1858. Guy discusses Colenso's charges and the commission in his biography of Colenso. Jeff Guy, *The Heretic: A Study of the Life of John William Colenso, 1814-1883* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1983), 244-46.

[38] Hlubi participation in the 1858 conflict, including the presence of Langalibalele at the final meeting with Matshana, was noted repeatedly at the trial of Langalibalele as a reason for the latter's fear of being seized or killed if he should answer Shepstone's 1873 summons. See Natal, *The Kafir Revolt,* 13, 26. John Shepstone was the prosecutor at the trial of Langalibalele.

[39] As a young interpreter, Theophilus had been in military service under Col. Harry Smith, the man responsible for killing Hintsa, but Theophilus was apparently away on other duty at the time of the assassination. Ruth Gordon, *Shepstone: The Role of the Family in the History of South Africa, 1820-1900* (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, 1968), 88-89.

[40] SNA 1/8/6, SNA to Lt. Governor, 16 April 1858.

[41] Indeed, Langalibalele and his followers referred to Natal in 1873 as "the country of taxes." Natal, *The Kafir Revolt*, 18.

[42] Ironically, Shepstone had employed similar coercion against Langalibalele's Hlubi when they entered Natal in 1849, in order to force them into buffer locations in the foothills of the Drakensberg. SNA 1/8/1, SNA to Secretary to Government, 14 Oct. 1849.

[43] McClendon, "The Man Who Would Be *Inkosi*."

[44] See e.g. SNA 1/3/7, RM Weenen to SNA, 3 Feb. 1858.

[45] SNA 1/7/5, SNA Memorandum, 5 June 1861. This act presumably violated the prohibition on magistrates inflicting more than 25 lashes. SNA 1/8/7, Circular to RMs, 7 April 1859. In an 1874 case, a magistrate had inflicted 35 lashes each on 75 Africans who refused to give testimony in a cattle-stealing case. SNA 1/7/8, Memorandum on W.J.D. Moodie's letter, 13 Feb. 1874.

[46] McClendon, Man Who Would Be *Inkosi*. In 1860, Shepstone distributed copies of Colenso's Zulu grammar book, *First Steps in Zulu-Kafir*, to the magistrates. SNA 1/8/7, Circular to RMs, 11 Jan. 1860. See also SNA 1/7/2, Report on letter from RM Steele, 3 Aug. 1852 directing that an interpreter should be found for the magistrate.

[47] SNA 1/7/1, Message from Nodada, 26 July 1851.

[48] SNA 1/8/6, Circular to the RMs, 14 July 1858.

[49] SNA 1/7/2, Report on letters of RMs Blaine and Steele, 8 Jan. 1853; see e.g. SNA 1/8/7, SNA to RM Weenen, 3 Jan. 1859, granting permission to Chief Zikali to hold the "annual tribal dance." On the significance of the first fruits ritual, see also SNA 1/8/1, SNA to Secretary to Government, 2 Aug. 1848. Crais argues a similar significance for the rite in the Eastern Cape. Crais, *Politics of Evil*.

[50] Natal, *The Kafir Revolt*.

[51] The proverb is found in Nyembezi, *Zulu Proverbs,* 111. I have modified the translation based on Doke, ed., *Zulu Dictionary*, 402.

[52] Axel-Ivar Berglund, *Zulu Thought-Patterns and Symbolism* (Indiana University Press, 1989), 238, 363-34.

[53] Nyembezi, *Zulu Proverbs*.

[54] Crais, *Politics of Evil*, 50.

[55] SNA 1/3/7, Message of Chief Umtali to Lt. Gov., April 7, 1858. Cf. Alan Booth, "'European Courts Protect Women and Witches': Colonial Law Courts as Redistributors of Power in Swaziland 1920-1950," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 2 (1992).

[56] Lambert, *Betrayed Trust*.

[57] Cf. John Comaroff and Jean Comarroff, "Goodly Beasts, Beastly Goods," in *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

[58] Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*.

[59] Ibid., 92.

[60] Ibid., 93.

[61] Ibid., 72-80.

[62] Natal, *The Kafir Revolt*, xi-xii.

[63] SNA 1/6/7, Historic Sketch of the Tribes Anciently Inhabiting the Colony of Natal as at present bounded, and Zululand, n.d.; Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*, 90.

[64] Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*., 241, n.85. For more on this influence on Shepstone, see McClendon, "The Man Who Would Be *Inkosi*."

[65] Jeff Guy, *The View across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle against Imperialism*, *Reconsiderations in Southern African History* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2002), 34-38.

[66] For intermediaries, see Benjamin Lawrance, Emily Osborn and Richard Roberts, ed., *Intermediaries, Interpreters and Clerks: African Employees and the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

[67] Zulu king Cetshwayo was so persuaded of Langalibalele's powers that after the latter was deposed he asked to be given custody of Langalibalele. SNA 1/7/6, Cetshwayo to Lt. Gov. 31 March 1874. The Lt. Governor's reply states that "by consenting to such an arrangement, the

Government of Natal would be admitting the truth of what it does not believe," that is, the power of rainmaking. Ibid.