

From War Leaders to Freedom Fighters:  
Forms of Violence in Umbumbulu in the 1980s and 90s

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## Quick Guide to Places and People

### Traditional Authority Areas in Umbumbulu mentioned in this paper:

Embo-Nkasa  
Embo-Timuni  
Makhanya  
Toyana

### Neighboring Peri-Urban Areas:

KwaMakutha  
Folweni  
Umlazi

### Amakhosi Mentioned in the Paper:

Embo-Nkasa = Inkosi Zwelinjani Mkhize  
Embo-Timuni = Inkosi Langalasembo Mkhize

### Places Mentioned:

#### *Embo-Nkasa*

- Mpandwini
- Zwelibomvu

#### *Embo-Timuni*

- oGagwini
- eZimwini

#### *Makhanya*

- Sunduzwayo
- Umbongintwini

### Major Figures:

#### *Embo-Nkasa*

- Vivinya Shoji (brother of Mkhandi Shoji)
- Mkhandi Shoji

#### *Makhanya*

- Siphon Mkhize
- Sibusiso (S'bu) Mkhize (son of Siphon Mkhize)
- Mfungelwa Ngcongco

#### *KwaZulu Police*

- Siphon Mvuyane

For the purposes of this paper, I have stuck to common usage as a way to spell Zulu place names. There is no consistency in the spelling of place names. Some of them are in locative form, some are not, and others have half of a locative. In addition, some capitalize the root, others the locative.

## Introduction

In April of 1984, an army or *impi* of around 3,000 men from Embo marched into the Makhanya area, killing any men that they found and looting shops and homes. Most of the women and children had fled the area and the Embo fighters continued onwards on foot until they met and fought with the Makhanya *impi* at Sunduzwayo, deep into Makhanya territory. Between 70 and 300 men, mostly from the Embo *impi*, were killed in this battle.<sup>1</sup> Around two years after this event, the Makhanya returned the favor, marching with a large *impi* into Embo territory. These two events marked the beginning and end of the Embo-Makhanya war, as it is referred to in the area, during the mid-1980s. Widely perceived as a ‘faction-fight’ between rural chiefs, unrelated to political events, this war was nonetheless closely followed by almost a decade of political violence in the Umbumbulu region from the late 1980s to mid-1990s.

The two men who feature prominently in this war, Mkhandi Shozi and Siphon Mkhize, also played a leading role in the political violence that later racked the region, along with Siphon Mkhize’s son Sibusiso. These three figures continue today to inspire fear or devotion among the people in the region, despite the fact that only Mkhandi survived to see the 1994 elections. All three of these men were affiliated with the African National Congress (ANC) and had many of the characteristics of warlords, although they were not as free to operate as Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) affiliated warlords during this period. However, their involvement in both the ‘faction-fighting’ and the political violence as well as the intensity of the violence during the mid-1980s all challenge the often made separation between faction-fighting and political

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<sup>1</sup> These figures are taken from oral testimonies of those involved in the fighting as well as the police. The death toll of 300 was given by the policeman in charge of picking up the bodies for transport to the morgue. Death tolls reported in newspaper accounts tend to be closer to 70 dead. However, most residents agree that 70 is too small and doesn’t account for the many bodies that were either never found, or were only found weeks after the main battle occurred.

violence during the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, for most of the residents in Umbumbulu, they experienced these two decades as a continuum of violence, with the primary change being the justification used by fighters for the violence.

This paper will examine the continuities and discontinuities between different forms of violence in the Umbumbulu area during the 1980s and 1990s. Of specific interest will be the Embo and Makhanya rural areas and the war that occurred between them in the mid-1980s. Political violence was also unevenly spread in this region, with some areas experiencing much higher levels of violence than other areas. Most studies of political violence focus on urban areas as they tended to experience higher levels of violence. However, the rural regions examined in this paper are bordered closely by many of the urban centers that were focal points of political conflict and there is a considerable amount of interaction between residents of these urban and rural areas.

### Theorizing Violent Conflict

In order to theorize violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, it is first necessary to look at terminology and the way in which terminology has framed the conceptualization of violence. Of particular relevance to this paper are the terms faction-fighting and political violence.<sup>2</sup> Initially used to describe violence within and between chiefdoms during the colonial period, faction-fighting has since been used to describe most forms of violent conflict within African communities, irregardless of whether the participating groups are small units such as families or larger units such as chiefdoms or ethnicities. This usage of the term has a racial or ethnic

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<sup>2</sup> Please note that structural violence, domestic violence, violence between individuals and some forms of criminal violence are outside the scope of this paper.

component as it separates out and links together forms of violence where only Africans are involved as fighters. This conceptual association between the different forms of violence and race or ethnicity, implies that racial or cultural explanations for the violence must be sought, thus often disconnecting these forms of violence from broader political and economic processes.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the term political violence came into widespread usage to describe conflict between supporters of the ANC or the United Democratic Front (UDF) and those of the IFP. This term was a deliberate attempt to reframe the violent conflict that was occurring mostly within African communities during that time period. At a time when many state representatives were dismissing any responsibility for the violence by referring to it as faction-fighting, the use of the term political violence, with its implications of state involvement, forced a recognition of the broader political and economic processes driving the violence. However, the strict usage of the term political violence to refer to fighting between ANC/UDF and IFP has often led to conceptual divisions being made between the forms of violence labeled as political violence and those labeled as faction-fighting. The conflict between Embo and Makhanya, for example, is often left out of descriptions of violence in the region during the 1980s and 1990s because the lack of political party affiliations on either side relegate it to the older and less politically correct category of faction-fighting. This division ignores the continuities between these different forms of conflict.

This division between political violence and faction-fighting is also reflected in Zulu terminology. Zulu-speakers have a general term for fighting, *izimpi*, which is then qualified as *izimpi zombango*, with *umbango* referring to disputes within families, among *amakhosi*, or between ethnicities, but not between political parties. This definition of *izimpi zombango* is effectively the same as the common usage of the English term faction-fighting. The Zulu term

has at times been used by scholars such as Sithole (1997) as a less biased alternative to the term faction-fighting but it fails to break down the divisions inherent in the idea of a culturally or racially applied term for all forms of group violence with the exception of disputes between political parties.

Most violent conflicts do not have a single cause, but rather multiple levels of causality, some of which are more visible to participants than others. Causes can be divided into structural causes that create situations of tension or conflict, and immediate causes, or events that trigger the outbreak of violence. Immediate causes identified by scholarship on faction-fighting in Southern Africa include disputes over political succession or power (see Lambert 1994; Sithole 1997; Thomas 1972), a death during a quarrel, competition or social ceremony (see Beinart 1981), insults (see Argyle 1992; Phimister and Van Onselen 1979) and the actual or perceived abuse of a women (Argyle 1992; Thomas 1972). Often a period of violent conflict between two groups can have several of these immediate causes or triggers. Some structural explanations for faction-fighting include land shortages caused by state dispossession (Clegg 1981; Lambert 1994; Minnaar 1991; Sithole 1997), unequal or neglectful treatment of chiefs by state officials (Beinart 1981; Lambert 1994; Sithole 1997), competition over resources (Phimister and Van Onselen 1979), long-standing enmity or unresolved quarrels between groups (Lambert 1994; Minnaar 1991; Sithole 1997) and a cultural penchant for feuding or warlike behavior (Argyle 1992; Thomas 1972). Structural causes can further be divided into those that look for factors internal to African communities such as feuding or longstanding enmity, and those that look for external factors such as colonialism and land shortage. Emphasis on internal or external factors has tended to be correlated with disciplinary divisions and the political positioning of scholars with respect to apartheid policies with only a few, such as Clegg and Sithole, attempting to

combine both forms of explanation. Until the 1980s, faction-fighting was generally perceived as a rural problem (Minnaar 1991), although a few scholars, such as Breckenridge (1990) and Van Onselen and Phimister have examined the issue of faction-fighting in an urban context.

As violence spread rapidly through urban areas in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s, early popular and state explanations focused on the violence as a new variation of faction-fighting with political affiliations marking the different factions. These explanations were contested by political explanations that focused either on poverty and disruption by ANC youth or the existence of a third force and collaboration between Inkatha and the apartheid state (Byerly 1989; Freund 1996; Woods 1992). Freund also suggested that the violence be understood in terms of the breakdown of state structures, that the “possibility of violence, of the breakdown of law and order, stems from the decline and decay of apartheid as a coherent and articulated system” (187). The 1980s were also marked by the rise of political strongmen that were called warlords (Freund 1996; Minnaar 1992). These warlords were generally IFP affiliated and often gathered paramilitary groups around them, controlling territory and attacking ANC/UDF members. Most of the political violence was concentrated in urban areas, but rural regions experience some fighting between IFP and ANC/UDF supporters, particularly in the later years.

### The Embo-Makhanya Conflict

Local explanations of the cause of the Embo-Makhanya conflict in the mid-1980s are remarkably varied and rather vague. When questioned, many people simply stated that they didn't know why the fighting occurred while others suggested it started over a woman, competition between youth groups, or that the ‘Makhanya wanted to invade and take our land.’

Newspaper reports during that time also reflect uncertainty over cause. The Sunday Tribune (Mthombathi 1984) reported that even fighters themselves are mystified over the cause of conflict while the Sunday Times (Harris 1984) cited many possible causes including fighting amongst chiefs or revenge for killings that occurred a long time ago. This inability to clearly state a cause for the war is not unique to this particular conflict. For every conflict in the Embo area except for the 1930s succession dispute analyzed in Sithole's (1997) study, the cause of the fighting is unclear. Even Embo-Timuni's Inkosi Langalaseambo Mkhize, when asked about the cause of the Embo-Makhanya conflict and another war with Toyana in the 1940s, waved his hand dismissively at the question and stated that it was 'over a woman or something like that.'

These local explanations of conflict, as have been documented by oral testimonies, newspaper accounts, court documents, and some academic studies (see Argyle 1992; Thomas 1972) have often been used to reinforce stereotypes about certain chiefdoms, ethnic groups or races in popular imagination. Stereotypes that certain groups enjoy fighting or are prone to fighting at the drop of a hat are reinforced by the trivial or unclear nature of many of these local explanations of causality. Even Reader (1966) makes distinctions between the Mbo, whom he refers to as a 'warlike people,' (231) and their 'peaceful' Makhanya neighbors. However, what only comes out in verbal testimonies is the lack of importance attached to many of these local explanations of causality. The dismissiveness of the *inkosi* in his response to the question of cause, for example, suggests that the question of 'why' the conflict occurred is not the right question to ask. Instead, for the Embo-Makhanya conflict, it is more useful to approach the issue of causality through an examination of the series of events that led up to the war.

In the early 1980s, there were numerous small conflicts occurring in different areas of Umbumbulu. Within Embo-Nkasa, there were two conflicts, one centered in Zwelibomvu and

the other in Mpandwini. The conflict in Mpandwini originated in a power struggle over a newly appointed *induna*, Vivinya Shoji. After Vivinya gave up the position, his brother, Mkhandi Shoji, took over his position and his supporters, eventually succeeding where his brother failed to establish himself. Thereafter followed a brief period of peace before conflict broke out again at a social gathering between the young men of two singing groups. This incident is the source of the 'youth singing group' explanation for the Embo-Makhanya conflict, and yet this particular event only functioned as a trigger for a new outbreak of hostilities between groups that had been fighting for some time. At some point, the scope of the conflict began to broaden and it became known as the 'Shoji' versus the 'Mkhize.' As Embo-Nkasa is an Mkhize chiefdom, it was not long before Inkosi Zwelinjani Mkhize became involved on the side of the Mkhizes and Mkhandi Shoji was obliged to flee with a large group of his supporters<sup>3</sup> to Makhanya.

Mkhandi Shoji was familiar with violent conflict from an early age, having lived through a conflict in the region during his childhood where his father was badly wounded and hospitalized for months. The young Mkhandi initially fled with his family and stayed in the forest to escape the fighting, and then later went to live with his Mkhize relatives in Makhanya. It was to these relatives that he fled after the destruction of his household and the burning of all his possessions by the Embo-Nkasa Mkhizes after the escalation of the 1980s conflict in Mpandwini. From Makhanya territory, Mkhandi and his supporters then continued to launch forays back into Mpandwini and other neighboring areas and fought full-scale battles with the Mkhize impi. While the Shoji *impi* was usually smaller than the Mkhize one, the Shojis nonetheless were very successful in most of their battles and were greatly feared throughout Embo. In the meantime, the Makhanya Mkhizes with whom Mkhandi took refuge were involved in their own fight with the Ndimandes within Makhanya. These Mkhizes also had a central

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<sup>3</sup> Some people suggest around 60 families may have fled with Mkhandi to Makhanya.

figure, Siphon Mkhize, who was known as an effective fighter and organizer, and under his guidance the Mkhizes tended to win most of their fights. After being effectively defeated, the Ndimandes fled to their relatives in Embo and continued to fight the Makhanya Mkhizes from their places of refuge in Embo.

At this point, faced with incursions into their territory from enemies given sanctuary by their close neighbors, the two Embo *amakhosi* prepared for war against the Makhanya. A call was put out to the men of both Embo-Nkasa and Embo-Timuni to meet at a certain location and time and when all were gathered, the men marched on foot into Makhanya territory. The Makhanya were aware of the gathering of the *impi* and formed their own *impi* under the leadership of both Siphon Mkhize and Mkhandi Shoji. As Makhanya is much smaller than Embo, the Makhanya *impi* waited at the far side of Makhanya territory, so that the Embo fighters were tired and dispersed by the time the two sides met in battle. The police attempted with limited success to separate the two sides and helicopters and tanks were called in to support the police.

The war between Embo and Makhanya continued for just under two years, beginning and ending with major battles and continuing with smaller-scale fighting in the intermediate period. Most residents remember this as a time of great fear and large-scale violence. Taxi operators went out of business as residents were afraid to travel along main roads through enemy territory to get into town. Criminals took advantage of conditions to steal from deserted households or *imizi* as residents took to sleeping in sugarcane fields and forests to avoid nighttime attacks. While the larger battles took place mainly between *izimpi*, with some looting of houses and shops, the smaller battles often involved hastily formed groups of young men attacking *imizi* during the night or early hours of the morning, killing all the men in the *umuzi* and sometimes destroying houses or looting possessions and money. At times, the actions of these smaller

*izimpi* were indistinguishable from the actions of criminals who posed as members of one group or another in order to frighten away residents and steal their property. Stories also abound of mutilation and bodies that were never found because of the sheer numbers of fighters involved and the way battles were spread across large areas of territory. The final push of the Makhanya *impi* into Embo also resulted in the deaths of three out of the five policemen who went to try and stop the *impi* without sufficient backup and were ambushed and shot outright. (See Appendix 1)

### Land, Kinship and the Escalation of Violent Conflict

One of the most frequently cited causes of faction-fighting in the Southern African region is the shortage of land caused by state policies of racial segregation that relegated the majority of the population to a small percentage of the land. With the power of the chiefs dependent on their control over land and their ability to grant land to new subjects or expanding households, land shortages created a crisis in political authority. In their efforts to expand or maintain their power, during a time when boundaries were flexible, chiefs would often settle new households on the land of their neighbors, leading to situations of conflict (Clegg 1981; Guy 1980; Lambert 1994). Land as an explanation for faction-fighting, however, works more effectively for some fights than others, particularly for fighting between large groups such as chiefdoms or ethnicities. For example, Reader (1966) describes a conflict between Embo and Makhanya during the early 1920s over their common boundary and Clegg's study of the Msinga district puts land shortage at the root of conflict between chiefdoms or districts. The studies by Beinart (1981) and Phimister and Van Onselen (1979) add the dimension of ethnicity, and expand the issue somewhat to cover conflict over resources and land in urban areas. Sithole's (1997) account of

the succession dispute within Embo in the 1930s is the only example of a dispute within a chiefdom where land played a major role. However, the reason for the centrality of land was in part the anticipation of the division of the chiefdom and the need for the two sides to establish a boundary between them. Central to the outbreak of violence in most of these studies is also the role of the state in treating the disputing sides unequally, and the lack of any higher authority that was perceived as legitimate to act as a mediator or judge between the two warring sides.

The explanatory power of land for rural conflicts has decreased over time as boundaries between chiefdoms have become more fixed and the ability of the chiefs or the government to alter boundaries has correspondingly declined. In addition, rural land has decreased in value as rural areas have increasingly become labor reserves dependent on migrant wages rather than agriculture or livestock farming. Most rural families in Umbumbulu at present show no interest in acquiring more land as they have neither the labor to work it nor the cattle to graze on it. Population dispersion patterns in the region also suggest that the value of land varies considerably according to its nearness to transportation with those areas further away from the road having a considerable amount of empty land. In addition, land in Mpandwini that was deserted during the conflicts of the 1980s remains empty to this day and no one seems inclined to return there and settle it. The Umbumbulu region is pocketed with empty regions of various sizes that were deserted during fights and never resettled. The one case of violent conflict in Umbumbulu after the 1940s where land was a clear source of conflict was the fight between Zulus and Mpondos in 1985 in Umbongintwini, Malagazi and KwaMakutha. In this case, the conflict was over urban and peri-urban land that was valuable for its access to jobs and other urban resources. Disputes over boundaries or conflict arising from land scarcity remain

important as causes of some conflicts, but they cannot be seen as factors in all cases of conflict that are labeled as faction-fighting.

Long-standing enmity and the existence of a feud or revenge ideology have also been cited in both popular and academic discourses as common causes of faction-fighting (Argyle 1992; Clegg 1981; Thomas 1972). These more culturally-based explanations focus on the commonalities of violent conflicts labeled as faction-fighting such as the role of social gatherings as trigger events and the widespread discourse of retaliation or revenge. Argyle argued that faction-fights and political violence should both be understood as feuds due to the seriality of episodes of violence, the existence of corporate groups within larger political structures and the importance of revenge as a shared value. Clegg's more detailed analysis of Msinga suggested that feelings of revenge were expressed through the concept that violent death created a debt that must be paid before the deceased can find peace and become a supportive ancestor. Hence, he suggested, warring districts would keep count of the dead and say that their opponents 'owed' them a certain number of bodies (191). While Clegg's detailed description provides an important account of the cultural mechanisms by which revenge is justified or understood, it is nonetheless important to note that the very acts in and of themselves, such as counting the dead and ensuring that each of the dead are revenged through more deaths or through retaliatory 'serial' events, are common to most violent conflicts worldwide. Neither Clegg nor Argyle provide sufficient evidence to suggest that a feud or revenge ideology causes conflict in this region rather than merely being features of the conflict.

The concept of longstanding enmity as a cause of faction-fighting also does not work as an explanation for conflict in the Umbumbulu region. Faction-fighting in Umbumbulu has occurred on many levels, including between small groups of young men, families, lineage

groups, villages, larger groups within chiefdoms, between chiefdoms, and between ethnicities. This ability to segment on so many different levels means that groups who are fighting against each other in one conflict are allies in another. For example, Siphon Mkhize is often spoken of as a main instigator of violent acts against the people of Embo and yet Embo residents will turn around and express approval of his actions in defending the Zulus in the area against the Mpondos in the ethnic clashes along the South Coast during the mid-1980s. This segmentation is difficult to reconcile with the idea of longstanding enmity. In addition, oral testimonies suggest that people who live and work as neighbors tend to forget past conflicts rather quickly as long as there is no ongoing source of tension.

Social gatherings such as weddings and funerals are likely to serve as focal points of conflict not because of the gathering of old enemies, but rather because they are the only times in rural areas where large numbers of people are concentrated in one location, making them good occasions for mobilization or targets for attack. In addition, the consumption of alcohol often leads to the development of small quarrels that escalate afterwards. One issue that is not given much attention is the role of kinship in the escalation of violence. Clegg (1981) found in Msinga that 'factions' tended to form around district loyalty or geographic affinity rather than kinship. However, the use of kinship to describe factions is a striking feature of most oral accounts of faction-fighting in Umbumbulu. While 'causes' of conflict are rarely offered up unless asked for, conflict that occurs within chiefdoms is inevitably described using the names of the major families involved. For example from the early 1980s, the conflict in Zwelibomvu is referred to as the Khwela fighting the Magcaba, while the conflict that started in Mpandwini is called the Mkhize versus the Shoji and the fighting in Makhanya is labeled as the Mkhize versus the Ndimande. These surnames usually reflect either the dominant or the original group involved in

the conflict. The members of the group often have different surnames, but can trace some kinship relationship with the original disputants. It is only when the fight becomes *impi yamakhosi*, or a 'fight between chiefs,' that it becomes 'Embo' versus 'Makhanya' rather than 'Mkhize' versus 'Shozi.' Verbal accounts of conflict in the Umbumbulu region also suggest that it spreads through the incorporation of ever broader kinship networks into the groups fighting. An attacked family may flee and take refuge at the homes of their relatives, who are then brought into the fight. In addition, retaliation killings often do not target those directly involved in the fight, but rather any relatives of those involved in the fighting who are available. For example, during a Shange-Mkhize fight in the early 1990s in eZimwini, a young Ndlovu man was shot by the Mkhize group because he was visiting his grandmother whose mother-in-law was born a Shange and was living in the same household.

While it is clear that kinship plays a part in the escalation of conflict, more detailed research would be needed to answer questions such as the degree of relatedness required before someone was considered a target. Older anthropological texts suggest the existence of several different levels of corporate groups within Zulu political hierarchies such as lineage groups. It is doubtful, however, with higher levels of mobility today, that these kinds of corporate groups could be formed beyond a few generations of co-resident family members. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the determination of kin to be targeted or to flee to for sanctuary depends on issues such as memory, opportunity, friendship, and the extent to which a given conflict has spread. It is unlikely, for example, that the young Ndlovu shot by the Mkhizes at his grandmother's house would have been sought out if he had remained at his house about 0.5kms away. His targeting was also a result of opportunity. In addition, the spread of the Mkhize-Shozi conflict in Mpandwini during the 1980s was made more rapid by the closer relationship of one group to the

*inkosi* of the region, and the *inkosi*'s willingness to get involved, thus throwing the entire chiefdom into conflict. Therefore it is important not to overestimate kinship as a factor. Most residents have a variety of loyalties or identities that may be called upon to take sides in a dispute, including territorial affiliation, kinship, marriage alliances, friendships, political affiliation, chiefly affiliation and ethnic affiliation. However, kinship seems to have received little attention relative to its comparatively large role in the escalation of conflict, often turning small disputes between individuals or small groups into large-scale conflicts.

### Experiences of Violence

In the morning of the 1986-11-18 at or about 04h30 I was still in bed at my kraal. I heard noise from outside in the vicinity and I also heard gun shots being fired. I then got out of my hut. Outside I noticed that all people in the area were running away being chased by other people and I realized that it was an impi attacking our people who were unaware of this attack. I then walked out of the kraal yard just a few paces away from my kraal I saw Mkhandi Shoji who was carrying a big firearm and I noticed that it was not a home made fire arm it was a real one, Mkhandi was following people who were running away. I then realized that this was Mkhandi's impi which was attacking us or our people. Then I went home where I informed all young men of our family not to go out of the houses because Mkhandi and his impi was charging. I then went to a nearby kraal where I heard a female crying. On my way I was attacked by two men who were Mkhandi's followers and one of them hit me on my left face with the handle of an assegai asking me the whereabouts of our young men. I sustained some bruises, they then walked away. (From the Statement of Badlinziwe Ngcobo, resident of Mpandwini, Umbumbulu Court Records, Inquest 214/86)

While the Embo-Makhanya conflict is generally described in terms of large-scale battles between *izimpi*, the war was also characterized by smaller scale violence in between the major battles. This smaller scale violence also preceded and followed the war for an unmarked period of time and was characterized mainly by attacks on *imizi* during the night or early morning. Umbumbulu court documents from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s document case after case of attacks similar to the one described above. Groups of men, from as few as two to as many as a hundred would attack *imizi*, killing residents and sometimes destroying the houses by

hitting walls, doors and windows with weapons. In addition, many homes were looted and money or firearms were demanded. There are a few accounts of women killed or raped in these attacks, but for the most part the men alone were targeted.

In some of these nighttime attacks, such as the case above, the attackers were identified and associated with a known conflict in the region. Many cases, however, involved unknown assailants with unclear motivations. Politics, local disputes, or theft, the motivations behind many of these attacks are unclear both in the court documents and in the oral testimonies of residents in the region who refer frequently to the ‘thieves’ that terrorized their communities. At times, people would come through an area calling out that an *impi* was coming and then return in the night to steal from the homes of people who had fled into the forests or fields to hide. In other cases, such as the example below, assailants identified themselves as the police or the army in order to convince residents to open their doors before killing or robbing them.

During the night of 1985-12-04 at or about 20h00 I was at my kraal in the company of the deceased and I was just retiring to bed and I put the lamp off. The door was bolted from inside and just then, I heard a hard knock at the door and a person from outside spoke saying that they were police and that they were searching for unlicensed firearms and this person ordered the deceased to open the door and this person was calling the deceased by his surname of Shezi. The deceased got up and he opened the door but all of a sudden I heard a sound of a gun shot...I could see that there were only two unknown males who were standing at the doorway, and these two persons were armed with certain objects although I did not see clearly because it was dark. When the deceased opened the door, these persons grabbed the deceased and pulled him out of the house and walked away with him saying that they were taking him to Umbumbulu police station. When I cried out one of them told me to shut up, I got out of the house and ran away towards a different direction and I did not see what happened to the deceased again. (From the Statement of Bahlolisile Shezi, resident of oGagwini, Umbumbulu Court Records, Inquest 96/86)

Note that the date on this attack was long before the conflict between ANC/UDF and IFP reached this region.

While the police and army did raid rural homes at night looking for weapons, the majority of those who identified themselves as police or army were not members of the armed

forces. There are also reports of attackers identifying themselves as Mkhandi's group, while nonetheless being groups that Mkhandi Shoji himself denies any affiliation with. In later years, groups would call themselves ANC or IFP and demand membership fees from household residents. This concept of demanding money to help the fighters has a long history. When a fight was occurring in a particular location, residents were generally required to contribute money towards the purchase of weapons, ammunition and medicine to strengthen the fighters. These contributions were rarely considered voluntary and those who tried to avoid them were often killed. In the late 1980s and 1990s, however, despite the claims of young men to affiliation with factions or political parties, Umbumbulu residents persisted in calling these young men soliciting money at night 'thieves.' In many respects, residents themselves were involved in reframing the violence by calling the young men thieves rather than *izimpi*, thus delegitimizing their violent acts. In general, however, most residents were often in the position of being unclear themselves as to the motivations behind these attacks on their places of residence.

Another prominent feature of violence in the region that also contributed to the escalation of violence was the enforced conscription of young men into *izimpi*. Residents recount the tremendous pressures on families to send their men to join in the fighting and refusing to fight was widely considered a death sentence. Court documents also include numerous accounts of enforced conscription. One 16 year old, Sibusiso Nene, relates how he was forced to join an *impi* of about 120 men led by Mkhandi Shoji who attacked several homes and murdered the male residents (Inquest 215/86, Umbumbulu Court Records). Other inquests relate incidents such as a young man being forced to join a group attacking the home of his pregnant girlfriend or accounts of the targeting of men who were not joining in the fighting. One eZimwini resident commented that, "some of the incidents took place during the weekends but I sometimes didn't

go. But no one knew that, otherwise they would have killed me” (name withheld). Accounts of nighttime attacks on *imizi* often started with the forced recruitment of young men to swell the ranks of the attackers. In addition, attackers often forcibly recruited those known to the family targeted as a ploy to draw people out of their houses or convince them to open their doors.

The late 1980s and early 1990s also heralded the onset of more organized political violence. It was during the late 1980s that Siphon Mkhize began to act openly as an ANC member, recruiting a group of armed supporters and setting up people’s courts. During the 1990s, there were many attacks on the KwaZulu police and on prominent ANC or IFP members in the area who were formally linked to and supported by political parties. These attacks tended to be focused in certain regions such as Makhanya, Embo-Nkasa and the Umbumbulu town where prominent political leaders were more active. In other areas, such as Embo-Timuni, the concerted effort of local traditional leaders to keep politics out of their areas and the lack of open activism succeeded in limiting the spread of violence. It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss Embo-Timuni as an Inkatha-affiliated area where traditional leaders suppressed dissent. On the contrary, traditional leaders had a variety of different affiliations and many of the community leaders who spoke of stopping the young men from *toyi-toyi* in the area were card-carrying members of the ANC who hid their political affiliation and didn’t engage in activism. The *inkosi* himself was known for attending the rallies of both political parties during the 1980s and 90s and is today considered an ANC supporter. However, these community leaders speak proudly of their ability to control the youth and prevent the spread of overtly political violence into Embo-Timuni. Nonetheless, all regions were subjected to a certain level of violence, particularly in the form of these nighttime attacks on *imizi* that blurred the lines between political, criminal and other forms of violence.

## Warlords, Legends and Politics

“I saw Mkhandi Shozi who was in possession of a long fire-arm and a cane knife...It was obvious that he was the leader of the group because he was blowing a whistle and giving the order to attack and retreat to the group.” (From the Statement of Shayiwe Maphumulo, resident of Nkanyezi, Umbumbulu Court Records, Inquest 218/86).

“I remember one day when Siphon Mkhize was still alive, I think one of his people was arrested or taken by the police, I think it was his driver at Umlazi bus station. He came, it was my first time to see him, I was in the office and he said I am Siphon Mkhize...Then we discussed about things that happened at Umbumbulu. He was open. He told me that one day they used to say that he is a troublemaker but he doesn't know because he is afraid of the police. He used to buy meats and go and give it to the police. He used to sit with the station commander. And so I went to the station commander and asked him why do you say this man is involved in the fights there and they said well that man is very clever. When there is a fight in Umbumbulu or some other people are going to fight he used to buy meat, liquor and drink and go to the police station and say let's have a braai so that the people would concentrate on the meat.” (retired KwaZulu policeman, name withheld).

“Each and every one was afraid of him. When they say it's S'bu, it's S'bu, he is coming, they would run away because he would kill each and everything that comes in his eyes.” (retired KwaZulu policeman, name withheld)

Violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal during the 1980s and 90s was characterized by the central role of powerful male leaders who came to be known as warlords. The term warlord was used as a critical appellation to describe IFP leaders in and around Durban who maintained control over a certain territory through paramilitary activity, the extortion of money from the people living under them, and the maintenance of a fearful or legendary reputation (Freund 1996; Kentridge 1990; Minnaar 1992). Scholars such as Minnaar suggested that warlords were exclusively a characteristic of IFP supporters and that the ANC supporters were more likely to take the form of youth groups or comrades. However, most of the powerful male leaders described in this paper were ANC affiliated and met many of the criteria of warlords. The predominance of IFP warlords is partly due to the inability of ANC leaders to operate openly, particularly in the early 1990s. And, indeed, Umbumbulu leaders such as Siphon Mkhize and

Mkhandi Shozi were either killed or driven into partial hiding during the 1990s. Their role as warlords comes in part from activities undertaken either before they were affiliated with the ANC, or during their early activities as ANC leaders.

Sipho Mkhize was the Umbumbulu leader with the longest political history, and yet he was mostly known throughout the region for his effective fighting skills. Besides acting as a leader in fights occurring local to his place of residence, such as the war between Embo and Makhanya, he was also frequently sought out by groups further away as a powerful war leader who could potentially turn the tide of a battle. Outside of the Embo-Makhanya war, he is best known for having fought against the Mpondos in the ethnic clashes that occurred in Malagazi, Umbongintwini, and other areas along the South Coast in 1985. What is not as well known, however, is that he gained his fighting skills when he went abroad to be trained as a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Living in Lamontville in the 1960s politicized Sipho, and after receiving training from the ANC, he did considerable traveling throughout KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape in his capacity as an ANC operative. Continually faced with the threat of state violence, Sipho also trained his entire family in the use of weapons.

While a good portion of his activities were undoubtedly ordered by the ANC, it is clear that Sipho Mkhize was also engaged in many fights that were unrelated to his ANC affiliation. During the fight with the Ndimandes and the Embo-Makhanya war, for example, he was a close friend and ally of Mfungelwa Ngcongo, who was to become an IFP warlord in later years. Evidence suggests that it is unlikely that these earlier conflicts were in any way related to Sipho's ANC affiliation. Nonetheless, his military training and his ability to procure more deadly weapons had a decided impact on these local conflicts, both in terms of the escalation of violence, and in his ability to turn himself into a local strongman. Sipho gathered followers

around him who were undoubtedly armed and often worked for him in his taxi and shop businesses. Many of these followers were also likely to have been kin. Although there is no way to know whether or not Siphon was directly involved in any extortion of the people living within his sphere of influence, he and Mkhandi Shozhi are widely credited with making money out of fighting. Residents of the region suggest that fighting was prolonged by the ability of the leaders to profit from it through the collection of protection money and other local sources of funding. In addition, it is likely that Siphon's reputation both protected and gained privileges for his various business ventures.

It has been suggested that one of the reasons for the emergence of rural strongmen such as Siphon Mkhize and Mkhandi Shozhi is that the state was less willing to suppress or punish them during the 1980s due to their hopes of recruiting such figures to fight the ANC/UDF in the urban areas. There is no doubt that during the late 1980s, Siphon was able to establish himself quite effectively as a leader in the Makhanya area. He also spoke once to Mkhandi Shozhi about attempts by the state to recruit him to fight the ANC/UDF. For the most part, Siphon lived openly and maintained a working relationship with the local police in the hopes of keeping himself out of trouble. However, as he became more known as an ANC figure, it was this very relationship with the police that was to be his downfall. Upon hearing that he was sought by the police in June of 1990 in connection with the death of a policeman, he showed up at an appointed time at the station in Umbumbulu for an interview as he had done many times in the past. At this point he was unexpectedly seized and put into a van for transport to Umlazi, a destination he was never to reach. He was shot on route, most likely execution style, by a notorious KwaZulu Policeman named Siphwe Mvuyane. This story of the betrayal of Siphon Mkhize is somewhat of a local

legend, as it marked the end of any open ANC activity in the area as violence continued to escalate going into the early 1990s.

The early 1990s was a time of high-level negotiation towards a transitional government but escalating violence on the ground. This time period saw the final push of the state and IFP forces to create no-go areas for the ANC/UDF and the ANC's creation of self-defense units to keep the state and the IFP out of ANC areas. In the Umbumbulu area, former allies now became enemies as IFP and KwaZulu Police members harassed the family of Sipho Mkhize, assaulting those attending his funeral, burning down his house, and killing associates and members of the Mkhize family (Area Repression Report, June 1990 and August 1991). Sipho's eldest son, S'bu, became a public figure after the death of his father, but he was a very different form of political activist from his father. Trained in Umtata in the Eastern Cape, he spent the two years after his father's death targeting and killing numerous IFP members, warlords, and KwaZulu Police, particularly those he felt were responsible for the death of his father. S'bu never controlled territory, being always on the run, but he did have a following of young men and was widely feared, particularly by the local police. Legend has it that he used to operate primarily from a van that he had modified by upgrading the engine and replacing the back seats with an open area from which to fire weapons. He would then travel around, often shooting at people from the back of his van before speeding off. Stories of his exploits range from full on attacks on police stations to bombs set off at IFP funerals. The police searched for S'bu during this time period, sometimes killing those they suspected of hiding him (Area Repression Reports, March 1991). In November of 1991, S'bu, after several previous attempts, was finally successful in killing Mfungelwa Ngcongo, an IFP warlord and former ally of his father who helped burn down the Mkhize house after Sipho's death. After Mfungelwa's death, S'bu focused his activities on

Umlazi, trying several times to kill Mvuyane, the KwaZulu Policeman who shot his father. On September 9<sup>th</sup>, 1992, S'bu and one other young man were killed in Umlazi during a full-scale police attack on the house in which they were hiding. As word spread that S'bu had been killed, police from all around Umlazi came by in order to view his body (retired KwaZulu Policeman, name withheld). He was just 19 at the time of his death.

Much has been made of the role of revenge in S'bu's actions and whether or not he can be regarded as a politically motivated fighter. In fact, it is S'bu's story that is used by Argyle (1992) in his paper's closing paragraph as unshakable evidence for his conclusion that political violence must be understood as feuding with cycles of revenge and retaliation similar to faction-fights. However, while revenge may have been a strong part of S'bu's motivation and his selection of targets, this does not mean that his acts of violence did not also function as instrumental violence, furthering the aims of the armed division of the ANC. From around 1987, the ANC had realized that the warlords were responsible for much of the destabilization of KwaZulu-Natal and had begun a policy of either recruiting or killing these warlords (Sithole, personal communication). This policy was not unlike that of the state, which also attempted to either recruit or kill warlords, as seen in the case of Sipho Mkhize, who was only executed once it was clear that he was committed to the ANC and would not be turned. These policies meant that powerful men, affiliated with either political party, were primary targets for both sides, thereby encouraging these men to accumulate even more power and weapons in order to defend themselves. S'bu Mkhize lived in a different time than his father and his involvement in violence must be correspondingly understood. While Sipho was initially able to befriend the police despite their political differences and remain visible, S'bu knew that the only way for him to remain alive was to stay on the run. Undoubtedly he felt that his level of violence was

proportionate to the violence directed at him. After all, at the time of his death, he was facing down several tanks, numerous well-armed policemen, and the surety that if taken alive, he would meet the same fate as his father.

Mkhandi Shozi had a rather different history from that of the Mkhizes. Unlike Siphon, Mkhandi was never politicized in an urban context or trained by the ANC. Instead, Mkhandi's primary political influence was Siphon Mkhize himself. From their early acquaintance, Siphon warned Mkhandi that the state might try and recruit him to fight the UDF in the same way that they had tried to recruit Siphon because of his role as a powerful fighter and a potential warlord. During the time of the conflict in Mpandwini and the war with Embo, Mkhandi felt that the police and the government did not treat him sympathetically. Widely perceived as the aggressor, Mkhandi felt himself to be misunderstood, claiming that he was only defending himself in the context of having been challenged in his authority as *induna*, burnt out of his house, and then forced to flee to his relatives in Makhanya. In addition, Mkhandi felt strongly the need to protect his supporters, and was frustrated by the arrests made by the police of his fighters. Siphon Mkhize, unlike the government and the police, supported him throughout, gave him sanctuary, and simultaneously introduced him to the ANC.

The KwaZulu government in Ulundi was familiar with Mkhandi due to their attempts to negotiate peace during the Embo-Makhanya war, and in the late 1980s, Mkhandi was invited to visit Ulundi. While there, he met with an assistant to Buthelezi who asked him to go to Hammarsdale where there was a big fight occurring between IFP and UDF youths. He was told to try and make peace with the UDF, but if he was unable to do so, he would be given weapons, including bombs such as hand grenades and land mines, and he would then lead the KwaZulu Police in the fight against the UDF (taken from interview with Mkhandi Shozi). Fearing for his

life, Mkhandi agreed and spent a few months in Hammarsdale, with his *izinduna* from Mpandwini, talking with the UDF youths. After returning to his home in Mpandwini, he was called to the police station at Umbumbulu where he met with a visiting white man who called himself the magistrate of Msinga. The white man, who was probably a member of the state's security branch, then attempted to recruit Mkhandi to fight against the UDF by offering him weapons, money and a house. According to Mkhandi, "they said to me, Mr. Shozi, you have conquered the fights here. Because you have conquered most of the fights we want to make an award to you to give you the weapons to destroy everything related to the UDF" (Mkhandi Shozi interview). Mkhandi refused and he was told that if word ever got out about their conversation, he would be killed. After this conversation, fearing for his life, Mkhandi went into hiding.

During his time in hiding, Mkhandi remained officially unaffiliated, but he was still sought after by the police and his family was harassed. When eventually caught, he was brought up before the magistrate and banned from the region indefinitely. He was sent up north of Durban to work under a local induna throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, although he continued to return secretly to Umbumbulu and visit both Siphon and S'bu Mkhize while they were still alive. It is not clear how much contact Mkhandi had with ANC members other than the Mkhize family during this time. However, when he was officially allowed to return to Mpandwini, sometime after the death of S'bu but before the 1994 elections, he consulted an ANC lawyer who pressured him to come out publicly as an ANC member. At the prompting of the lawyer, Mkhandi held a press conference, declared himself an ANC member, and began the recruitment of his followers to the ANC using his house in Mpandwini as headquarters. This public affiliation had consequences as he was subsequently harassed by the police and local

white farmers. In addition, in 1995 or 1996, he was ambushed and left for dead in his driveway and several other ANC members visiting his house were killed. The attackers were local IFP members, and some of them were his former allies from the days of the Mkhize-Shozi fight. Mkhandi survived this attack after months in the hospital and continues today to recruit for the ANC. He has also been appointed as an *induna* in his area at a higher rank than his previous appointment in the early 1980s. Although he has not been attacked since 1996, he still lives under threat and carries a personal firearm, as well as traveling with at least one of his supporters armed with a rifle.

#### Continuities and Discontinuities

Traditional explanations for faction-fighting and political violence do not fully explain violent conflict in Umbumbulu during the 1980s and 1990s. In the case of the war between Embo and Makhanya, it is clear that the two areas saw themselves as semi-independent political units that were threatened by incursions into their territory from enemies given sanctuary by their neighbors. Both Embo and Makhanya were subject to the higher authority of the state and they lived and worked as peaceful neighbors for most of their history, and yet when conflicting groups began to cross the boundary between the chiefdoms and launch attacks across that boundary, these smaller conflicts quickly developed into a much larger-scale conflict between the chiefdoms. Secondly, the escalation of this war in the mid-1980s can only be understood in retrospect by later events which showed the previously unknown affiliations and expertise of individuals such as Siphon Mkhize and Mkhandi Shozi. Powerful leaders, with different forms of military training, these men were likely given some leeway by the state in establishing

themselves as local warlords due to the fact that both the state or the IFP and the ANC/UDF were hoping to recruit them to fight in the larger struggle for control of the province.

Kinship has proven to be an important factor in the spread of small-scale fighting in the Umbumbulu area. In particular, the choice of targets, the escalation of conflict through the act of taking sanctuary with kin, and the naming of conflicts all highlight the issue of kinship. However, kinship diminishes as a factor in larger-scale conflicts. To a considerable extent, this is likely dependent on the manner in which the recruitment of fighters occurs. In general, kin may call upon other family members to support them in a fight. The size of this network depends on the spread of the conflict. However when the *amakhosi* become involved, recruitment shifts to a new level, happening through the *izinduna* calling upon ties of loyalty to the chiefdom, rather than to ties of kinship. In addition, leaders such as Mkhandi Shozi and Siphon Mkhize may have started out recruiting among their kin, but probably expanded over time as they attracted allies drawn to them for other reasons such as fighting skills or attraction to power. Political violence then represents a new form of loyalty and recruitment that allows for even greater levels of mobilization, this time to political parties that, in theory, exist outside of the structures of the *ubukhosi*. In practice, however, these political parties and their leaders used existing structures of authority, including the *ubukhosi* to recruit and bind their followers. In addition, warlords with political affiliations continued to attract those drawn to their power as well as their political beliefs. The existence of strongmen in this region and the importance of their role in violent conflict have been noted even in Clegg's (1981) study of conflict in Msinga during the first half of this century. Clegg recounts the formation of what he refers to as *amashinge*, or assassination squads composed of professional fighters that were supported by the community and were responsible for most of the ongoing violence.

The form of violence in rural Umbumbulu also showed many continuities over the 1980s and 1990s. From the large-scale battles to the nighttime attacks, little often changed outside of the affiliations claimed by the men knocking down doors during the hours of darkness or recruiting armed followers. Issues such as the importance of groups of young men and of legendary war leaders are seen not so much as features of particular political parties, but rather more generally as features of violent conflict in this region. However, there are some new features of conflict that emerge during the time of political violence, such as the spread of rape during the 1990s. For the most part, women were not directly targeted or raped during the violence in the 1980s. This protection of women is usually attributed to the use of *umuti* or medicine to strengthen the fighters and the belief that killing or raping women will destroy the effect of this medicine. In the 1990s, however, court documents and the memories of residents suggest that rape became a feature of conflict during this period. Rape was a prominent feature of violent conflict in the surrounding urban areas and it is likely that this development was attributable to the spread of this practice from urban areas. Another change in the 1990s was the use of bombs and the highly specific targeting of individual warlords and policemen by highly trained ANC operatives such as S'bu Mkhize. However, even these forms of violence mostly represent an escalation rather than any fundamental difference as they have their precedents in examples such as the 'assassination' squads studied by Clegg (1981).

## Conclusion

The labeling of different forms of conflict as faction-fighting or political violence has often resulted in very different approaches being taken to the study of these forms of violence.

However, examples from regions such as Umbumbulu, where both faction-fighting and political violence occurred in quick succession, suggest that there is much to be learned from studying these forms of violence side by side. The history of figures such as Mkhandi Shozi and Sipho Mkhize, as they went from being war leaders to ANC freedom fighters, suggests that the causes of the Embo-Makhanya war and the later political violence cannot be understood separately. In addition, the form of violence in the region, from battles between *izimpi* to small-scale attacks on *imizi*, remained very similar despite the transition from faction-fighting to political violence. The role of male youth groups and warlords in political violence has often been highlighted, and yet even these forms had precedents in earlier faction-fighting. Despite the emphasis of this paper on continuities, there were also aspects of political violence that were distinctly different. At its root, political violence entailed a new form of loyalty and mobilization that had a complex relationship to previous forms of mobilization and resulted in some shifts in the nature of violent conflict in the region.

## Appendix 1

Excerpts from Umbumbulu Court Inquest 298/86, the investigation into the deaths of the three policemen shot by the Makhanya impi in 1986.

### *Excerpts from the Testimony of Muzi Petros Mbatha*

On Friday 1986-02-07 at about 19h30 I got home from work. My wife informed me that during the day many males came to my kraal and left messages there for me that all the warriors of our area who had their kraals in Madundube had to go and report to the camp where all the men of our area gathered.

On Saturday at about 09h30 I left my kraal and I went to the kraal of Bonga Shozi to attend to his funeral.

I noticed that Mneliswa Khuzwayo, the chosen war induna, Zusha Shozi, Shini Shozi, Siphon Shozi, Siphon Mkhize and Mfungelwa Ngcongco were the leaders at the funeral. At this stage there were over 400 males.

All the people at the funeral were armed. The arms I saw in their possession were: assegais, bhoko sticks, sticks, nuted sticks. I saw one man who is unknown to me who was armed with a homemade rifle. This man also fired two shots in the air when the coffin of the deceased was lowered into the grave.

After the funeral and after the Ntinyane people left all the males of my area remained and they started war cries led by Ngawoyakhe Shange... Shusha Shozi then informed us that we are not allowed to go home but instead we all left on foot and we went to a spot next to a river, the Ntinyane river, still in the Madundube area. This camp was about 1km from the kraal of Ndawoyakhe Shange.

Zusha then instructed us that not one of us there would be allowed to go home but we would have to go and fight the Embo people on the following day, Sunday 1986-02-09. During Saturday night males kept on coming and reporting and staying in the camp.

Big containers of muti were brought to our camp by an unknown male. This muti was then placed on the ground and we formed one long line and as each person walked past the pots of muti each male had some of it to drink.

We were then again told by Zusha to sit down and we were then inoculated with other muti by two males which I also could not identify in the dark. We were inoculated as follows: 1. We received two cuts on our heads between our hairs. 2. Two cuts above our right eyebrows. 3. Two cuts on our chests just below our necks. 4. Two cuts on our right waists. 5. Two cuts on our front legs just above the knees. 6. Two cuts on both our feet. 7. Two cuts behind both our legs. We were then told to sleep.

On Sunday early in the morning while it was still dark Zusha woke us and we were told by him he was going to select his soldiers for the attack on Embos.

When we left the camp we were on foot and we went past Induna Mayeye Makhanya's house, up to Mkhanyese and from there to KwaMaya.

At this stage Ndawoyakhe Shange was armed with a firearm. I do not know if it was a factory or a homemade firearm. I was armed with an assegai and a nutted stick. Dan Khwela was armed with a homemade firearm.

At KwaMaya we broke up into two groups. One group led by Ndawoyakhe Shange and his group moved down the valley and the group in which I was were going along a dirt road up a hill.

I heard war cries from below us and I saw a man fall to the ground in the veld.

While the group of Ndawoyakhe Shange was moving down the valley I heard a lot of gunshots.

Near Ezigeni we joined up with the group of Ndawoyakhe Shange. Again, and we started moving up a hill. We then saw a blue policevan coming down the same hill towards us.

Ndawoyakhe Shange then again gave a war cry and ordered us to sit down.

Two unknown men of our group then left to go and speak to the police. The police van then stopped. There were three policemen in the front of the van and the driver and one passenger got out and they greeted the two men from our group.

Ndawoyakhe Shange then gave a warcry and all of us got up from the grass. As I was getting up I just heard gunshots fired from our group and from the police. I then turned and started running away.

As I turned to start running I heard Ndawoyakhe Shange shouting to us to 'Ebuya' meaning to return.

Earlier when we were instructed to sit in the grass when we saw the police van N. Shange told us that should the police fight us we would have to fight the police. He also told us that should any of our group run away we would be killed at our kraals.

*Excerpt from the Testimony of Constable Sifiso Khwela*

At that moment a group of about 500 men jumped up from the bushes and all sang a war song. They started shooting at us. I threw myself down and opened fire. I saw that some of our members were retreating into the forest. As we all ran into the forest we split up. I took cover and hid myself in the forest until the fighting stopped.

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