The South African policing 'nexus'[1]: Charting the policing landscape in Durban

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Paper presented at UKZN History Seminar Series, 21 August

(Work in progress, please do not quote)

South Africa is a society in transition with regulatory gaps; significant deficits in public service delivery; weakening and changing forms of social control; a state trying to assert its governing effectiveness; and a crime-weary civil society. This mix of social factors has created the possibility and the imperative for wide ranging localized responses to experiences of insecurity. Yet there is very little known about the ethnographic details of these localised 'everyday policing' (Buur and Jensen 2004) initiatives or how they interface with public police visions and practices. In South Africa, a fair amount has been written about vigilante responses to crime (Oomen 2004; Minnaar 2001; Sekhonyane and Louw 2002) and about the broad features (including the regulatory framework) of the private security sector (see for example Berg 2007). But aside from the detailed accounts of the Zewlethemba Peace Committees in Cape Town (Cartwright and Jenneker 2005; Shearing 2001), there is almost no recent writing on the ways in which communities are 'legitimately' coming together (either in self-hep schemes or in buying security) to deal with feelings of insecurity. Nor is there much theorising about how these initiatives interface with state policing objectives and strategies.

Governance gaps and high levels of crime and insecurity in South Africa seem to have increased the pace and the depth of the pluralisation of the policing field when compared with more established democracies (Brodeur 2007). Yet throughout the world, including

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[1]. The word Nexus (meaning a hub or a gathering point) is borrowed from a joined-up project between the Australian National University and the Victoria Police. This project aims to build 'smarter policing' by bringing together a range of state and non-state actors in a variety of policing contexts to articulate a role for the police in a pluralised governance age. For more information see Wood and Marks (2007 forthcoming). The Nexus project assessed the roles of non-police agencies and developed new ideas for aligning and coordinating the objectives and strategies of police and non-police groupings in furtherance of more efficient, effective and democratic policing.

in Africa (see Baker 2005), there is a growing recognition that the state police are but one actor within a hybrid policing field involved in the production of security. How exactly this mix works at the micro level and with what outcomes requires a great deal of investigation. Recognising this scholarly need, Canadian criminologist, Benoit Dupont, has called for ethnographic studies that help us understand the actual workings of pluralized policing organisational fields. For him, what is required is a 'mapping' of who the various actors (or nodes) and how they are constituted. But, he says, these mapping exercises must also

> …consider the more subjective relational spheres of each node, that is, the perception of its own position in a larger organisational field, of the other 'nodes' roles, strengths and weaknesses, and of the resources that it can mobilise to achieve certain objectives derived from this reflective assessment (2006:87).

Directed in part by Dupont's suggestion, I decided to look for publicised reports of 'legal' local responses to crime that were declared 'effective' by both state and non-state actors. I wanted to discover what is 'on offer' in the delivery of policing services. I wanted to find out what localised arrangements exist and how these might differ in areas that are geographically close yet far apart in terms of their socio-economic make-up. Two cases attracted my interest – a CBD area that has essentially been taken over by a private security company and a school community in a disadvantaged community that has mobilised a parent patrol to secure routes to and from school. I decided to find out more about these two reported local initiatives. My intention was to find out what these two cases tell us about the policing landscape in South Africa – who does what, how and at what cost? But I also wanted to see what these cases say to us about possible future policing arrangements and the role of the state in these policing arrangements.

The bulk of the paper tells the story of everyday policing in two communities south of Durban. What we learn empirically from these two cases is that creative local responses to security problems are being generated and that state (police) responses to localized policing problems are inchoate. There is a profound unevenness in the types of resources

that communities are able to mobilize and also in the way in which the police engage with these local initiatives of security governance in South Africa. Current policing arrangements reinforce, even deepen, existing structural inequalities. What we also see is that there are real possibilities for strong non-state actors to become 'spoilers' (Menkhause 2007) who see the benefits to them of regulatory gaps and state service provision failures.

The police remain central to local policing arrangements, both because non-state policing actors perceive them to be so and because, nationally, the public police are trying to increase their hold on policing activities. But, neither the police nor their non-state partners are clear about where the state role begins and ends. In part this is because the police themselves are caught in a confusing web of self-identities - on the one hand they want to be all things to all people and on the other hand they want to be recognised as specialists with limited resources.

The paper ends with a discussion about future possibilities for the governance of policing in South Africa. I argue here for the need for clearer distinctions between the role and functions of state and non-state actors, bearing in mind that the public police are primary actors because they have symbolic and legal capital. Drawing on the work of Ken Menkhaus (2007) I suggest that what is required in transitional societies like South Africa is a minimalist approach in defining the core functions of the public police.

Framing thoughts on the governance of security in South Africa
Clifford Shearing has argued that South African criminology has been somewhat blinded by 'the state-centred view of governance that excludes, or at least obscures, private governments'. He argues that those interested in the governance of security – in South Africa and beyond – need to move beyond this way of thinking. In his view, (dominant) state-centred understandings not only constrain a proper understanding of what is really going on and it limits our normative future visions.

Shearing asks why this state-centred view is so entrenched. His answer is that South African criminologists (and arguably South African social scientists more generally) are still hooked into deeply entrenched European understandings of governance and government that are directed toward 'centuries-long process of state building…that has sought to reduce the diversity of auspices of government' (2006:20). But it is not just the theoretical hold that European political and social theory that explains this blindness. It is also the result governance struggles during apartheid - from the bottom and from the top – that were centred on state power and how to transform it. Since the end of formal apartheid, the complex transitional nature of South African politics, economy and institutions has created a sensibility, from both state agents and non-state actors, that the state should be the centre point for change (see for example Marks and Goldsmith 2006).

But any mapping of the governance of policing will show that there it is a 'pluralised' field. As this paper demonstrates, there are a 'myriad of private and hybrid providers' (Dupont 2006: 86) of policing services. Globally policing has been a 'mixed economy' for at least the past three centuries (Zedner 2006), although policing as a commodity to be bought and sold has come into sharper relief in recent decades (Crawford 2006). The result is that today there is 'a fluid coalescence of state, municipal, private and voluntary policing' (Wood 2006:254). South Africa is no exception to these empirical and theoretical observations.

The public police have lost (if they ever really had) their monopoly over the policing enterprise. The organisational field of policing is now characterised by range 'nodes' or institutional actors with variable structures, legal status, resources, mentalities and technologies (Dupont 2006:86). It is broadly accepted by policing scholars (even in South Africa) and by government actors (including the police) that the demand for security exceeds the capacity of the government to provide it (Wood 2006) and that a more nodal or 'networked' approach to governing policing and security will allow for greater effectiveness and a broader reach in terms of service delivery (Rhodes 2006). This does not mean that the public police will recede into the background. As Dupont clearly articulates, 'the erosion of the public police monopoly has not prevented it from retaining

a central status in the governance of security' (Dupont 2006: 88). Indeed, nodal arrangements may give rise to renewed attempts on the part of the public police to assert their centrality.

Even though the police in places like Australia now talk about 'nodes' and 'networks' in their strategic planning (Wood 2006: 254), it is important to bear in mind, as Garland reminds us, that these new governance arrangements are generally not the result of a coherent state governance project. Nor are they indicative of a state in retreat. Rather, governments and state agencies '[tend] to combine responsibilisation moves with measures intended to consolidate central power, directing the actions of others, more or less coercively, to bring them into line with centrally defined goals' (Garland 1996:464). The shape that localized networked or nodal security arrangements take, therefore, vary dramatically as state actors (the police in this case) select where to intervene and how to assert their authority. And, while non-state actors are encouraged to participate in their own security governance, they are not always adequately (or equally) supported in their attempts to do this. Nodal actors may also compete with one another for resources, legitimacy and ownership (Dupont 2006).

Nodal governance theorists 'challenge the proposition that state-centred governance models are a necessary and sufficient precondition for democratic transformation' (Wood 2006:218). They assert that the pluralized governance is a 'normative good'. There are two logics behind the normative reasoning of nodal theorists. Firstly, within these nodal security arrangements, non-police entities are given the space to develop innovative ways of responding to security problems. Secondly, more active participation by non-state actors in governance issues enhances (deliberative) democratic engagement. Police, in this nodal normative view, should be 'brokers' to other 'nodes' of governance that may have the capacity, resources and skills to bring about (enhanced) democratic security outcomes. The public police in this view are not *necessarily* the primary provider of policing services largely because they do not have the knowledge, resources or capacities to deal effectively or fairly with localised security problems.

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For innovation to 'work' and to have effective and fair outcomes there needs to be effective co-ordination between security providers; the ability and will on the part of providers to build social cohesion; and a good practice ethos (Rhodes 2006). There also needs to be a very clear understanding between nodes or providers with regard to the delineation of roles and responsibilities based on a mutually trusting relationship. In reality though, as Rhodes (2006) points out, information exchange is poor and fragmented; there are usually serious co-ordination deficits between nodal/network actors; and accountability mechanisms are weak. In addition, there are usually very real (unfair) consequences to the discrepancy of policing services provided by differentially resourced actors in poor and rich communities.

Where does this all leave us? It leaves us with a need to find out more about how policing (in all its various forms) plays itself out at the local level. We need to have a better understanding of the everyday 'reality' of pluralized (local) security governance. But in uncovering these local maps we need to take stock of how the state is positioning itself in governance arrangements because states remain 'strong' actors not only because of their supposed capacity to mobilise resource, but also because they hold symbolic and real authority and because they are tasked with protecting the public interest. In societies in transition like South Africa, the need and desire for the emergent state to prove itself as a fair and effective player has to be structured into our imaginings.

A local map of 'non-state' security governance – two Greater Durban cases
Living in South Africa one cannot help but be struck by the levels of fear of crime and by the vast array of solutions that local communities have created to deal with this. But there were two local initiatives south of Durban that were reported in local newspapers that grabbed my interest – one a community-generated 'self-policing' initiative and the other a private policing programme spearheaded largely by local business. According to press reports, both initiatives were driven by non-state actors and were lauded as successful by community members and the police. But the two initiatives differ significantly. They target different kinds of 'crime', they mobilize different resources and the 'real' police

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support that has been offered to each of these initiatives is incomparable. Together though they provide us with a micro map of the current policing landscape in South Africa. What I present below is a bit of the story of each of these initiatives drawn from preliminary interviews and observations.

Fortifying the city – private security in Amanzimtoti

On the 26th of May 2007, the front page of *The Independent on Saturday* newspaper was filled with an enlarged photo of men dressed in black combat uniforms patrolling a business district. They were armed with pepper spray paintball guns and protector shotguns. The headline of the photo was 'Crime stopped: Hired guns rid Toti CBD of criminals in five days'. The journalist covering the story reported that 'crime has been almost eliminated from the Amanzimtoti CBD after a security company moved in…to take on criminals following a spate of murders and violent robberies' (Reddy 2007).

The proposal to bring in the private security company (Combat Security) was forwarded by the Concerned Community Policing Organisation (CCPO), a section 21 (non-profit) grouping mainly comprised of (white) business owners[2]. The CCPO called a meeting about security matters in the area which was attended by 2000 residents and business owners. The participants at the CPPO meeting decided to hire a private security company to police the CBD area. They approached a number of private security firms. Combat Security promised to 'clear up' the area and offered a two week free trial period to prove their mettle and by the end of that week heavily armed Combat Security guards had taken to the streets. When approached by the press a few days later, 'locals said they were free to walk the streets without fear for the first time in years' (Reddy 2007). They attributed this to the strong-arm presence of Combat Security.

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[2]. The private security industry in South Africa is massive. In 2004, it was estimated that there are about 4500 private security companies (some foreign owned) operating in South Africa. They employ about half a million security guards, about four private security guards to every uniformed police officer (see Kruger 2004). In May 2007 the Minister of Safety and Security confirmed that the private security industry cashed in about R40 billion, ahead of the national police budget of R33 billion rand. For a detailed account of the private security industry in South Africa, see Julie Berg (2007).

I was curious to find out more about what was happening in the Amanzimtoti CBD. On the 22nd of June I took a drive (with my six year old son) to this upper income coastal town situated about 30km south of Durban in order to get a first hand feel of what was happening in the CBD area.

The CBD area seemed fairly quiet and I observed only two Combat Security guards while I was there. I stopped to talk to one of them. He was dressed in a black fatigue outfit, looking something like a SWAT member from the LAPD. He carried a very large protector shotgun over his shoulder. I greeted him and asked him how everything was going in the CBD area. According to him, crime had decreased dramatically since Combat Security had moved into the area. I asked him about his firearm and whether he had ever used it. He said that he had used it in the past but that he had to be 'very careful not to shoot someone in the back' because his company would be 'very angry' with him if he did this. He then asked my son if he wanted to see the bullets in his shotgun. Much to my surprise (and to the excitement of my son) he emptied the shotgun and displayed the blue birdshot bullets.

While we were interacting with him, he talked intermittently into a two way radio system. I asked if he had direct radio communication with the police. He told me that his radio system was linked to other guards in the area, to the security company's central office and to the chairperson of the CCPO. If the security guards report an incident or a problem that requires the public police, the CCPO chair or the private security company central communication system contact the police. The security guard told me that he had no real need for the public police other than if he had made a citizen's arrest and the police were needed to take the suspect into custody. I then wandered around the CBD area talking informally to a number of shoppers and shop owners in the CBD area. They all claimed that the security situation had vastly improved since Combat Security had 'moved in'. Business owners seemed more than happy to pay the R500 per month to secure the CBD area[3].

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[3]. Combat security are currently trying to expand their operation to the residential area of Amanzimtoti and would charge R100,00 per month (about seven Pounds) per household.

I was very curious to find out more about how Combat Security operates - what thinking guides their actions, their relationship with the police and their understanding of their role in everyday policing. I called the central office (situated about 60km away from Amanzimtoti) to set up an interview with the head of the company, Norman Reeves. I had read about Reeves in the newspapers. He is a military veteran and was recently arrested (and subsequently released) for illegal gun ownership.

Reeves told me I could meet with him if I could get to his office within the hour. I sped off from Amanzimtoti to the Combat Security offices situated in a large house on the beachfront north of Durban. The first thing I noticed on arriving at the Combat Security office was Norman Reeve's vehicle. On the windscreen was a sticker which said 'Save the seals, cull the criminals'. The office was a buzz of activity with Combat Security officers monitoring radios and CCTV cameras. Norman Reeves sat at a table covered with papers and with two or three phones ringing at the same time. After exchanging pleasantries and basic information, we began to chat about Combat Security and their operation in Amanzimtoti.

Reeves was extremely proud of this operation. In his view the Amazimtoti 'model' should be a 'blueprint' for how security is managed throughout South Africa. The CBD area, he told me, is secured like a 'military box system' where there is both internal and external defence. There are active guards both at the perimeter and on the inside who are trained and equipped for any situation. This allowed for what Reeves referred to as 'zero tolerance', 'proactive' policing. Combat Security guards have been instructed to drive out 'troublesome' people such as beggars, street children and vagrants from the areas they are policing. Reeves proudly informed me that his guards use force or the threat of force to 'teach people who should not be in the CBD area some discipline' and show them the 'meaning of respecting the authority of the men in uniform'.

A jab with the butt of the shotgun or a few kicks to the body is a sure way, according to Reeves, to get non-economically active people out of the CBD area. Reeves told me that

at times his security guards 'round up' groups of men who are just hanging around and take them in a van and drop them off in an area far from the CBD. He was not concerned about the rights or freedoms of South Africans. Nor is he concerned that his officers' tactics simply lead to the displacement of 'problem people' to other areas. His sole concern is to secure the areas of his client base, and this he does with no regard for civil liberties or human rights. Ideally, Reeves told me, South Africa should have public shootings of groups of criminals. This, he said, would be the most effective deterrent to crime.

The local SAPS have cautiously welcomed the contribution that Combat Security can make in combating crime. They are, however, concerned about the contravention of civil liberties and constitutional rights that is displayed by Combat Security guards. The Assistant Station Commissioner of the Amazimtoti SAPS, Superintendent Pillay, told me in an interview I had with him in late June 2007 that recently Combat Security guards had arrested a group of unemployed men who were hanging out on a street corner informally demarcated for casual labour pick-ups. For many years now, unemployed men have waited on this corner in the hope that they would be employed for a few hours or a few days. Despite no complaints being laid against these men, Combat Security guards rounded them up and took them to the police station claiming that they had been disorderly and were creating a 'bad image' in the CBD. The local SAPS called business owners in the area concerned who reported no problems. The men were released without charge.

Superintendent Pillay relayed this story to me as just one example of the discriminatory and combative policing measures dished out by Combat. According to him not a single white drug peddler or 'hobo' has been apprehended or arrested by Combat. Superintendent Pillay was disturbed by these and other examples of 'proactive' crime prevention by Combat. The police, he said, are in a double bind. They know that what Combat is doing is not in the broad public interest, but at the same time the 'police need all the legitimate help they can get'. Like police throughout the world, police in South Africa are ambivalent about the role of private security companies. They recognize that

'private security providers help to meet public and corporate demands for protection not readily satisfied [by the public police] under conditions of fiscal restraint' (Zedner: 2006:82).

It is not just the 'clearing up' operations performed by Combat that would (and indeed have) raised the eyebrows of human rights activists and the police. Reeves was proud to tell me about another of his 'effective' tactics. When someone is arrested by Combat Security, they are handcuffed to a pole and a placard is placed around their neck signalling their offence to the public. Examples of these sign are: 'I am a drug dealer caught by Combat' or 'I steal from innocent people and I have been arrested by Combat'. Reeves referred to this controversial practice as 'naming and shaming'.[4]

Combat Security has also been involved in the policing of crowd or public order incidents. This is a function traditionally carried out by specially trained public order police units. Combat Security are instructed to use Pepper Spray if crowds fail to comply with an instruction from Combat or when they perceive a 'sense a danger' from a crowd of people. Pepper spray paintball guns are issued to all Combat Security officers and are also used not only in public order situations but also to 'stop criminals in their tracks' (see Meyer 2007). Pepper spray, according to Reeves, is highly effective as it completely incapacitates those targeted.

Asked how the South African Police Service feel about his tactics, Reeves admits that they are not always comfortable with them. But he made the point very strongly that his company and the SAPS have a very good working relationship. To demonstrate this, he called the Amanzimtoti Station Commissioner on the speaker phone while I was in his office. What became clear to me during this conversation was that Reeves has a direct line to the Station Commissioner and the two are on very familiar terms. Reeves asked if Combat Security had had an impact and the station commissioner answered that he was

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[4]. On the 9th of July I had a brief discussion with the Amanzimtoti Station Commissioner, Superintendent Grobler. Much to my surprise, he used the word 'networked policing' in describing what was taking place in Amanzimtoti. He welcomes the assistance of any grouping – public or private – in combating and preventing crime. However, Superintendent Grobler has informed Norman Reeves that he will not tolerate 'naming and shaming' practices in his precinct.

very pleased with the 'improvement' in the CBD since Combat had entered the area. The Station Commissioner and Reeves then discussed the upcoming rugby game between South Africa and New Zealand and took a bet of a case of beers on who would win the match. They agreed to talk again soon in the near future.

Once Reeves had put down the phone I asked him when he felt it was necessary for Combat Security to call upon the SAPS, either for their assistance or for their specialized skills. According to him, the only time the public police are required is to place someone who had been arrested by Combat into state custody. Other than that, he stated emphatically, there is no reason to call in the public police. In his view, groupings like Combat are better resourced and more mobile than the SAPS. Reeves saw no problem with the fact that his company is only accountable to paying clients, that his tactics may be excessive and dehumanizing, or that the actions of his officers may lead to increased crime rates (through displacement) in surrounding areas.

I made a mental note to discuss these issues with Superintendent Pillay in an interview I had scheduled for the following week. Superintendent Pillay was very worried about each of these issues. He was particularly concerned that the CCPO (the organisation that employs Combat Security) represents the interest of a very select section of the Amanzimtoti community and that poor black people have become the targets of Combat's tactics. He is currently seeking legal advice on the right that private companies like Combat Security to operate in open 'public spaces' like the CBD if they are privately sponsored. Pillay found the fuzzy boundary between public and private very disconcerting but he felt hamstrung by the fact that there is no regulatory framework or structure available for *local* police for working with private companies like Combat Security[5]. South African criminologist Anthony Minnaar who has pointed out that while policing policy provides for partnerships with the private sector, 'there are no fixed policy guidelines on how these partnerships should be formalised' (1999:1).

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[5]. The reality is that the private security companies have entered into communal public spaces and it is very difficult to distinguish between the functions of the private and public police. As Stenning rightly points out, 'it is now almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police which is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and performed by private police in democratic societies' (2000: 328).

Interestingly, the local SAPS were not concerned about the displacement of crime that may result from Combat Security operations. Indeed, the Amanzimtoti Station Commissioner, Superintendent Grobler, plainly stated at a co-ordination meeting of all local security providers that he was happy to displace crime.[6] In his view, as Station Commissioner, he is only accountable for what happens in his local policing jurisdiction. Decreasing crime rates in Amanzimtoti are his prime concern.

What struck me as I sat in Reeve's office is that his security company acts almost as a shadow police force. Their activities span crime prevention, crime combat and order maintenance. According to Reeve's Combat Security have both authority (through police and public support) and the capacity to use force and to curtail civil liberties. There is not much, in Reeve's view or the actions of his officers to distinguish them from the public police.

But the space created by the regulatory gaps and the lack of capacity of the public police has also had other unintended consequences. Reeves has established himself as a security advisor to a wide range of people. In the forty minutes I spent in his office he received at least ten phone calls from members of the public asking him how to respond to a variety of security problems. One of the phone calls was from a woman whose husband (whom she claimed was smuggling drugs and taking money illegally out of the country) was about to leave the country with her two children. She had called Reeves to find out how she could prevent him from doing this and to ask Reeves if he could arrest her husband at the airport. Reeves advised her which units of the SAPS she should call for assistance, acting as a 'knowledge broker' (Ericson 1994).

At the same time as this conversation was taking place, an elderly woman arrived at Reeve's office. She told Reeves that she lives in a high rise building on the Durban

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[6]. Every Monday from 12:00-13:00 local security providers come together at a Ground Operations Coordinating Committee meeting. These meetings are held at the police station and are chaired by the Station Commissioner. On the 9th of July I attended a GOCOC meeting at the invitation of Superintendent Pillay.

beachfront and that she and other residents in her building had been victims of vandalism in their building. Elderly residents and were also afraid to leave the building after 5pm because of the high levels of crime, especially muggings, in and around the beachfront. She had read the lead article about the Combat Security operation in Amazimtoti and was keen for Combat Security to police her building and the surrounding area. She asked Reeves if he would attend their next body corporate meeting and address the meeting about security options that Combat could offer. Reeves agreed to attend the next meeting and told her that his solution to the beachfront problem would be for Combat Security to take security provision in the entire beachfront area. Each resident would be required to pay R50/month for this service. He told her that he was already working on a security proposal for the Durban beachfront which he was hoping to 'sell' to business and residents in the area.

What can we learn from the Amzimtoti Combat Security case? In the first instance, Combat Security has become the most visible security 'node' in the CBD area. The services they provide are both supplementary and alternative to those offered by the SAPS. Despite their highly controversial crime combat and prevention strategies they are actively supported by powerful groups in the Amanzimtoti community and have a highly cooperative relationship with the local SAPS.

Combat Security fills a definite gap in the policing of the CBD. The fact that they are well resourced (in terms of equipment, vehicles and personnel) means that they cannot be disregarded by state or non-state actors. But, there are obvious problems with the security operations of Combat Security. First, they are not rights respecting. Second, as the police point out, the continued involvement of Combat Security is contingent on the ongoing financial buy-in from local business people. Third, the fact that they are privately sponsored means that those who cannot buy Combat's services remain unprotected and

are even targeted as a policing problem. Fourth, Combat Security thrive on public police deficits. They have little interest in building policing as a public good[7].

For the love of our children – the Wentworth Parents Patrol
On the 16th of April 2007, the *Daily News*, a Durban newspaper, reported that 'a unique pilot project [had been] launched…by a Durban community to make the streets and classrooms safer for children' (Andrew 2007). According to the newspaper report, parents in the Durban South community of Wentworth had come together to patrol the streets near to schools as a way of preventing school children from taking drugs and alcohol, from, from smoking and from playing truant from school. The local police were reported to be highly supportive of this initiative and commented publicly that the project should be replicated in other areas. The Parent Patrol project was small-scale. It focused on school children who attended one school in the area, Umbilo Secondary School.

Wentworth is a 15 minute drive from Amanzimtoti. It is a working class area designed as a 'coloured' township by the apartheid government and it houses approximately 40% (about 230000 people) of the coloured population of Durban (Wiley et al 1996). In recent decades Wentworth has become known for its high level of community activism (most notably in industrial and environmental struggles), but also for high rates of alcohol and drug abuse, poor school performance and gang activity (Gule 2006; Desai 2002). .

From the newspaper report, the Parent Patrol seemed like a very dynamic local initiative that had succeeded in harnessing the capacity and resources of community members with the strong backing of the SAPS. I was keen to see how state and non-state policing agencies come together in Wentworth and how these various actors delineate their roles and partner-up. I thought that perhaps this project represented a good example of the possibilities of a state/non-state policing 'nexus'.

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[7] . Loader and Walker define public goods as 'non-excludable' and 'non-rival'. This means, in their view, that 'to provide for one is to provide for all, enjoyment by one does not detract from their enjoyment by all' (2005).

On the 17th of May I paid a visit to the principal of Umbilo Secondary School, an architect of the Parent Patrol initiative. Tired of the lack of response from the SAPS in situations that the police do not consider 'priority matters', he decided that it was time for the community to create a safer environment for school students, particularly as they walked to and from school. Students that attend his school regularly come to school in 'mind altered states', having accessed drugs and alcohol en-route to school. Like Reeves, the principal spoke of the need for 'zero-tolerance' policing. But for him this meant putting out the signal very clearly that students were being watched and that drugs, alcohol and street fighting will not be tolerated. His vision was that students who were observed drinking, taking drugs, fighting or playing truant were to be identified and 'disciplined' by school authorities.

Umbilo school authorities, together with other teachers and parents from the school as well as representatives from non-government organisations operating in the Wentworth area identified the access to drugs and alcohol en-route to school as major contributors to school safety and ill-discipline problems. What was required, it was felt, was a monitoring presence that deterred school kids from taking drugs, drinking alcohol, bunking school and engaging in street fights. In order to practicalise a solution to this local safety problem, a group of volunteers from the community – all of whom are affiliated to a very active NGO called the Wentworth Development Forum (WDF) – agreed to patrol the main routes to the school early in the morning and in the afternoons. The project was to be called the Parent Patrol project and is co-ordinated by the WDF. When the project was launched in October 2006 there were 25-30 volunteers. The Parent Patrol members were drawn from the broader Wentworth community. They were not necessarily parents of students at Umbilo Secondary School but shared an understanding that school safety issues spill into the broader community but, rather, viewed themselves as 'parents' of the entire Wentworth community.

Members of the Parent Patrol wear brightly coloured identifying T-shirts (which are community sponsored) and have a two-way radio system linked to a hired security guard at the school. They go onto the streets at 7:15 in the morning and patrol the most

troublesome spots on the school route. These include corners where shebeens (informal pubs) operate, shops that sell cigarettes and alcohol to kids, and street corners renowned for drug taking activities. When they see 'worrying behaviour', they radio the hired security guard at the school to warn her that school kids with a particular description will be entering the school. Sometimes Patrol members escort the student to the school and directly hand him/her over to the hired security guard[8]. The school security guard then approaches the appropriate authority at the school who decides upon a disciplinary process.

The principal claimed that the Parent Patrol had had a dramatic effect. School students were now arriving at school sober and were more circumspect about their behaviour en-route to school. He suggested that I meet with members of the WDF who participate in the Parent Patrol to find out more about how they conduct their business.

Two weeks after meeting the principal I met with members of the Parent Patrol at their office. There office was a tiny room at the back of a derelict shopping centre and is a centre point for a range of WDF activities. This office was a stark contrast to the offices of Combat Security. It had just enough space for a desk with a very old computer. Seven of us managed to squeeze into the office – five members of the Parent Patrol, myself and a colleague from the university.[9] The five members present at the meeting were the only people active in Parent Patrol at that time. At the time of this meeting, the Parent Patrol group consisted of four women and one man, all in their fifties and sixties. One of the Patrol members informed me that she conducts her patrol duties accompanied by her ten month old grandchild. Only one of the Parent Patrol members had a direct link to Umbilo Secondary School through her grandchild who is a student there. There have been numerous attempts both from the school and from the WDF to recruit more community members to participate in the Parent Patrol. This has proven very difficult. As one of the

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[8]. Umbilo Secondary School has hired a private individual, in this case a woman, to monitor school students behaviour within the school. She monitors students entering and leaving the school and does regular checks to the school toilets to ensure that students don't smoke, take drugs or have sex in the toilet areas.

[9]. Dr Nirmala Gopal and I have begun a research project that focuses on experiences of insecurity among scholars at Umbilo Secondary School. Drawing on a school based initiatives within the Australian Nexus Project, we will also be exploring ways of generating safety together with the school community.

members of the Parent Patrol commented, 'other parents appreciate what we do, but to be part of the Patrol you have to get up early and be focused. Few people are really prepared to do this'.

The commitment to the Parent Patrol of these five active members stemmed from their sense of community, their understanding of the dire social conditions of many Wentworth children, and their belief that as community members they know 'the best ways' to deal with local problems. But their commitment to the project also stems from their distrust in the police who they viewed as corrupt, incompetent and disinterested.

When the Parent Patrol was launched, school students were informed of the purpose of the Patrol and were introduced to Patrol members at an assembly. As is the case with street patrols in other parts of the world, Parent Patrol members have been asked not by the police and local authorities to intervene in suspicious circumstances or enter into premises and they do not carry any instruments for self-defence (Sagar 2005). The mandate of the Parent Patrol was to monitor kids going to school, but not to engage with them. In reality, though, Patrol members are familiar with the school children they are monitoring, and often know their family circumstances. This familiarity has translated, at times, into Patrol members approaching students who they know that are 'veering in the wrong direction'. They reprimand them and try to 'make them aware of the consequences of their choices'. Most often, students choose to go school without being distracted by illicit sales or the lure of playing truant, even if rather sullenly.

Patrol members have walkie-talkies. They also carry cameras to take photos of situations that they consider worrying and require follow-up. Unsurprisingly, school students were initially rude and disrespectful, but are now more respectful and even friendly. When they see the Patrol members they tend not to be diverted into other activities and according to school authorities, 'kids now come to school more sober minded than previously'. According to the school principal kids who were playing truant before the establishment of the Parent Patrol – having stopped off at a shebeen or a friend's home on the way to school - are now attending school more regularly.

While the police attended the launch of the Parent Patrol, there has been very little contact between the police and the Parent Patrol since then. According to Parent Patrol members, the local police have provided no resources to them and have failed to respond to calls from Parent Patrol members or to act on any of the suggestions the Patrol has made to make Wentworth safer for school going youth. Two examples were provided. First, while the local police have been alerted to drug lords, drug dealers continue to operate openly in Wentworth. Second. Illegal sale of alcohol continues to take place despite tip-offs from the Parent Patrol about places that under-age youth are accessing alcohol. Parent Patrol members have also agitated for the closure of the shebeens that operate on the main roads leading to the school. The shebeens are closed by the police for a few days but then begin to operate openly again.

Parent Patrol members were frustrated by the fact that the police had not conducted a single patrol of the school route for four months. The members of the Parent Patrol realize that alone they cannot (and should not) be responsible for securing the streets. Ideally, what they want is for the police to provide a more active police presence in Wentworth. They believe that this is particularly necessary in high-risk areas which, in their view, the police avoid. According to Patrol members, when the police do enter into high-risk areas they tend to 'zoom in with their vans, create a stir and then leave again without having dealt with the real problems on the street'.

Parent Patrol members are very clear that their role and capacity is distinctly different from the public police. While Parent Patrol members agreed that they often have better solutions for dealing with local safety problems, the fact that they are not armed and don't have any formalized public authority means that their interventions are restricted. They told me that there have been times when young people have responded with aggression to the monitoring activities of the Parent Patrol and they find this intimidating.

I met with a SAPS Inspector at the Wentworth police station who is in charge of school liaison and social crime preventions to see whether his view of the Parent Patrol tallied

with those of patrol members. I also wanted to get a sense of how the police in the area viewed their role and function in everyday policing matters. Inspector Naidoo was extremely positive about the Parent Patrol and felt that they play a very important role in reassuring the community that something was being done about school safety. He recognized that the police are not able to respond to many of the school safety issues since they were 'not police priorities'. As he put it: 'The problems that the Parent Patrol deal with like truancy are important, but we can't as the police weigh this up against murder, or domestic violence, cash-in-transit heists. These are national priority areas that we have to respond to first'. He acknowledged that local priorities may be different from national priorities and that police are often not driven by local needs.

For Inspector Naidoo, the role of the police and the Parent Patrol are distinct. Citizen groups were there to *supplement* the police. Interestingly, he used the same speak that police across the world are likely to use. The role of groups like the Parent Patrol was to serve as the 'eyes and ears' of the community and to provide information to the police. Despite the reality that the Parent Patrol was actively involved in safety problem solving and were actively 'sorting out' safety problems, Inspector Naidoo viewed them as playing a 'passive' policing function. At no point in our conversation did Inspector Naidoo ask what the police could do to assist the Parent Patrol in their work as a partner in the policing enterprise. Nor did he talk about how the police and citizen self-help groupings could co-ordinate their activities. There was very little sense of the reality that groups like the Parent Patrol actually do everyday policing or that groups like the Parent Patrol may not view themselves as a handmaiden to the police. Through their knowledge of local area dynamics and social conditions the Parent Patrol have configured a range of solutions to fix a very localized problem. The police pay tribute to the Parent Patrol's work but do not engage them as partners in the way that they would a private security company like Combat which is heavily resourced, formally structured, armed and highly visible.

It is not just national priority crimes that keep the police busy and unable to respond to emergent community safety needs. The Wentworth police have also put a lot of energy

into keeping their local community policing forum buoyant, as instructed by national police policy (see Burger 2007). Together with the community they run crime awareness campaigns, conduct road shows about rape and domestic violence, organize police band concerts, and run competitions in schools. While I was in Inspector Naidoo's office he received two requests to attend local community events that same evening. Having already committed to another community event, he responded by saying that if he finished early enough at the first event he would try to attend the second. What struck me in observing this set of events was that Inspector Naidoo (and probably most other police officers too) are trying to be all things to all people – hard-skilled law enforcement officers dealing with difficult and dangerous crime and friendly community constables. The result is that both the police and community have little sense of what the core functions of the public police are or how the public police fit into the matrix of local policing. It is little wonder, then, that community groupings like Parent Patrol have little regard for the police or that the police have scant time and resources to contribute to groupings like Parent Patrol.

By all accounts the Parent Patrol has played an important role in the everyday policing of a small part of Wentworth. The Wentworth community cannot 'buy security' in the same way that the Amanzimtoti community can. They are dependent either on the public police or the goodwill and voluntarism of community groupings such as the Parent Patrol for their everyday policing needs. While the Parent Patrol clearly lifts some of the burden from the police and provide innovative solutions to policing problems, the public police fail to see the real significance of this grouping in providing an alternative policing service. Again, there are similarities here with experiences of street patrol groupings in places like Cardiff. Street patrols set up to simply monitor targeted policing problems (like prostitution) have found themselves increasingly carrying out the functions of routine police work. Yet, members of the Cardiff street patrol report that the moral and legal backing promised to them by the police has diminished over the years. While Cardiff police do talk positively about the street patrol project, they view it is an example of 'good citizenship' rather than as a groupings whose policing functions have freed the police to get on with what they view as their core business (see Sagar 2005).

The sustainability of the Parent Patrol is even more precarious than the private security initiative in Amanzimtoti. It is far easier to get financially secure people to pay monthly fees than it is to harness the participatory spirit of economically disadvantaged community members who are already responsible for the health and welfare of extended family members. The reality is that there are a minority of community members who are prepared to chip-in to policing activities when they see that the police do not have the capacity or resources to deal with all crime matters. There are clearly limits to the extent to which the participatory spirit and capacity of local communities can be drawn upon. Less resourced communities are often called upon (or forced) to fill security governance deficits through self-help schemes yet they are more pressured for time, more affected by crime, less able to free up resources.

We should not assume that community members, ordinary citizens, *want* to govern their own security at the local level. There will always be citizens like the five diehard members of the Wentworth Parent Patrol. But even those altruistic citizens who are more active in daily governance programmes may be less driven less by a commitment to deliberation and participatory democracy and more driven by frustration at the inadequacy of state service delivery. The extent to which these communities and individuals will willingly engage in self-policing initiatives is likely to wax and wane as they adapt to changed personal and collective circumstances. When crime and insecurity reach uncomfortable levels, it is usually to the state that citizens turn for answers and for assistance, even when past experience shows that this is fruitless.

What our two cases demonstrate is that current policing arrangements reinforce existing social relations of disempowerment and inequity. Within this pluralized field of policing, poorer communities are left on their own to create safe spaces with their own limited resources while wealthier communities purchase security services that criminalize the marginalized. To make matters worse, the public police 'favour' more resourced non-state policing alternatives offering very little practical support to self-help initiatives like community patrols.

Situating the public police within the South African policing matrix

If we were to together tie ideas about the nodal governance of security with localized maps of everyday policing in places like Amanzimtoti and Wentworth we might imagine that the public police would opt to take a backseat in the provision of everyday policing services. We might also imagine that they would have a more limited and clearly defined sense of their core function, offering their specialized services as a negotiated partner and finding ways to support local community generated policing initiatives. But this does not seem to be the case, at least not in South Africa.

What we see instead in South Africa is, as David Garland (1996) puts it, a fluid, fragmented and ambiguous state policing framework which, if anything, is geared toward increasing the reach of the public police. In South Africa, instead of the public police speaking about the decentralisation of policing resources, police leaders now want to centralize public policing resources.[10] The National Commissioner of the SAPS recently announced that he has plans to incorporate city and municipal police into a single South African Police Service. In his view centralizing resources will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the police through a shared system of line functions and accountability. Talk about partnerships is limited to conventional notions of the community assisting the police through providing information and supporting public police initiatives (see for example Cachalia 2007). 'Community policing' in South Africa (and indeed in the rest of the world) is centred on ways of mobilising non-state actors to legitimise and increase the effectiveness of the police. Contrary to early conceptualisations of community policing in post-apartheid South Africa, there is presently no real support for 'counter-hegemonic policing initiatives' (Dixon 2000: 17).

The police and their political authorities acknowledge that the public police are unable to meet even the most basic policing needs. Yet, there are no clear mechanisms or structures for mobilizing policing resources outside of the state. This has created the space for

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[10]. In a recent public presentation, Clifford Shearing (2007) made the important point that in Western democratic societies the police always have and continue to try to realise a dream the dream of monopolising what he calls 'security governance'.

groups like Combat Security to take over CBD areas while the police catch their breath in the race they feel they are loosing against crime.[11] Within the real mixed policing economy, the police see private security companies as their 'natural' allies and partners. The militarized and disquieting responses of these paid private police are disregarded by public police agencies that are keen to have other uniformed, armed and trained personnel on the streets. This was recently reflected in a public statement made by the Minister of Safety and Security in which he stated that 'government is considering a ground breaking plan to rope in the country's 300 0000 strong army of private security guards to help the police fight crime'. His plan is to establish an 'upgraded partnership' with security companies that 'satisfy legal requirements' so they can be called upon in 'emergency situations'. The example he gave was: 'If there is a cry for help anywhere, we look at the monitor and see which is the closest vehicle, and if it is a private security vehicle, it is then dispatched' (see Sekoana 2007). Exactly how this 'upgraded partnership' will work has not yet been decided although there are rumours of 'high-level talks' between the SAPS leadership and private security managers.

There have, at the same time, been many public statements about the need to mobilize community members in the fight against crime in recent years. Yet what we see from the two case studies presented here is that the energy and goodwill of community members in poorer places like Wentworth are not harnessed by state bodies. The reality is that South African police policy frameworks have shifted fairly significantly since the transition to democracy in 1994. Initial policy frameworks such as the 1994 Interim Constitution were framed by broader post-apartheid governmental commitments to citizen participation (see Gordon 2006). Newly elected government actors and policy makers were keen to incorporate communitarian ideals into new policies. The idea in these early days of democracy was for the new democratic state to loosen its monopolistic hold of law and order and to put in place mechanisms for the co-production of security. The Interim Constitution (unlike anywhere else in the world) provided for the establishment of

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[11]. The most recent crime statistics in South Africa indicate that some of the most violent crimes – aggravated robbery and murder – are in fact on the increase. Durban is now, according to these statistics, the violent crime capital of South Africa (Masango 2007). The highest murder rate is in KwaZulu-Natal, the province in which Durban is situated. Here there were 5000 murder recorded from April 2006-March 2007 (see Methmbu 2007).

community policing forums as a way of enabling consultation and fostering the legitimacy of the police at the local level and as a way of getting local communities more engaged in local security governance solutions. The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) also talked to the importance of community policing partnerships and multi-agency approaches to the problems of crime and insecurity (Singh 1997; Rauch and van der Spuy 2007).

But, even in these early years of democratic government, there were signs that commitments to public empowerment were shaky. As Gordon puts it: 'The pool of shared idealism that conceived of justice as co-produced by state and citizen was shallow, and officials of the formal system were…reluctant to concede control over resources or authority to non-professionals who had recently been their antagonists' (2006:216). It is not surprising then that within a few years we see a significant shift in national police policy, most evidenced in the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security. This policy document focuses on ways of making *the police* more effective law enforcers (Rauch 2002; Newham 2005) and is no doubt in part a response to public outcries about high levels of crime and pressure for the state to deal more decisively with this problem. The shift in policy framework was, in turn, echoed in the remilitarization of police discourse (see Cachalia 2007; Dixon 2000). But it is also reflected in the continual increase of public police budgets; ongoing commitments to increases in police numbers; and an almost exclusive focus on traditional indirect indicators of police performance (Bayley 1994) such as numbers of arrests and weapons seized (Rauch 2002; Newham 2005).
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Paul Graham, Director of the largest non-government organisation in South Africa, the Institute of Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), suggests that the shift away from community engagement and governance matters, both on the part of state and non-state actors is understandable. In his view, 'after the intensity of engagement through the transition, the police revert to uniform type and civil society actors move on to the job of life…Citizens increasingly see themselves as clients or customers' (Graham 2007). Perhaps this explains why while Wentworth has historically been recognized for its high

levels of social activism, finding adults in the community who are willing to patrol the streets and make schools safer places of learning has proven extremely difficult.

Despite the public police conundrum about high crime levels and limited state resources, they are unwilling to 'let go' of what they see as traditional (and very broad) police functions. Graham has tried to explain why this is the case in South Africa where there has been a tradition of high levels of social activism and non-state governance, particularly within previously disenfranchised communities (see for example Seekings 2000). He posits that:

> …the police find it particularly difficult to engage constructively with civil society actors. The necessary internal cohesion and hierarchy combines with the uniform to create self-reliant and closed institution…Further, the conflict prior to and during a transition will inevitably have resulted in the police taking a particular view of civil society actors and engaging them in particular ways – as enemies or informers, as prisoners or perpetrators, or as a stumbling block or impediment to police action' (Graham 2007: 3).

South African criminologists Dirk van Zyl Smit and Elrena van der Spuy have also tried to take stock of the hold that the state strives to retain over the authorization and provision of policing services. In their view,

> …it is true that in South Africa, as elsewhere in the transitional world, reform of policing in its widest sense has been reduced to a much narrower reorganisation of law enforcement. The grand alliance of state, market and civil society in pursuit of the 'governance of security' (Shaw and Shearing 1998), as originally anticipated, has failed to materialise. The integration of informal justice and policing structure with the formal machinery of state control has made almost no headway (2004:202).

There are many reasons for this state of play, including those suggested by Graham. But it is also likely that it results from an awareness (and anxiety) on the part of policy makers and state agency leaders that if the democratic government is unable to deliver on the provision of basic services, it is likely to face a crisis of authority and legitimacy. In emerging democracies, perhaps even more so than is the case in more established democracies, the provision of security is 'an indicator of political legitimacy and a key

performance measure for governments' (Goldsmith 2003:9). A loss of confidence in the government's capacity to respond to people's need for security can have a dramatic impact on democratic values and engagement (Smit and Botha 1990; Marks and Goldsmith 2006).

The desire by the public police to 're-imagine' policing as 'their exclusive domain' (Wood 2006:260) has been recognised as an international phenomenon (see Gordon 2006). Studies of policing in places like Australia and the United Kingdom show that the public police are still trying to find ways of asserting their primacy. In Australia the police and their unions are doing this by asserting how indispensable they are as 'professionals' in the policing field (See Wood 2006 and Fleming et al 2006). In England and Wales police leaders have responded to pluralisation of policing by trying to extend the police family at the 'intra-organisational level' rather than the 'inter-organisational level' (Johnston 2007:135). But regardless of these attempts to monopolise, policing governance remains pluralized with the various players viewing themselves and others as significant or irrelevant players. How they view themselves and each other may not 'meet up'. There is also a lack of clarity about the identities or functions of nodal players.

In the absence of such clarity what we have are public police bodies with serious fiscal and resource constraints trying to reassert their authority in a manner that is incoherent and ineffective. The public police are caught between two currents. On the one hand they are expected to expand their knowledge and capacities to meet the challenges of the 21st century policing by forging deeper partnerships and by letting go of established notions of what is the 'public' domain. On the other hand, they are under pressure internally and from the public to retain and demonstrate that they have the 'unique' skills, knowledge and capacity to 'own' the delivery of policing services (Garland 1996:458).

This role confusion, combined with strong directives and close monitoring from the centre has had very worrying consequences. It has resulted in limited possibilities (and support) for local innovation and responsiveness. It has also created the space for private companies with a very narrow set of interests to take over a range of traditionally public

police roles. And perhaps most importantly, it has reinforced a very differentiated and unequal policing playing field within and between localities.

Looking toward the future

Without doubt, to talk about policing as a state activity is an 'intellectual straightjacket' (Zedner 2006: 82). Although the public police (at least at the centre) strive for greater control over the policing enterprise, what is clear is that policing is not wedged in particular institutions but rather is a set of practices performed by different groupings, both public and private. As the Wentworth and the Amanzimtoti cases show, everyday policing at the local level is a complex matrix that results from ongoing negotiations about the boundaries between state and non-state actors who have an interest in creating safer and more secure spaces. The way in which policing (or security) gaps are filled is dependent on the extent to which local communities are able to harness financial and human capital. Differential capacities to do this have reinforced inequalities both within and between local communities.

Good South African 'public sociology' (Cock 2006) needs to factor in pluralized governance realities in thinking about solutions to public troubles such as crime and insecurity. We can no longer afford to focus our energies and our thinking on the state as the sole provider of all collective goods. Neither can we afford to romanticise initiatives (and capacities) from below or blindly accept that market solutions will even the playing field. It is perhaps a truism to state that an indubitable levelling of the policing playing fields requires nothing less than complete social and economic reengineering aimed at making society less divided and less unequal. The inequalities and governance gaps that are experienced differentially by communities are not *caused* by governance of security arrangements. Rather, what happens in the policing landscape is a reflection of much broader governance issues. In the absence of such a reengineering project on the horizon, we need to take stock of current constraints and possibilities in thinking about future possibilities.

While non-state actors are clearly significant, it is important for us to begin with the public police in trying to configure what the future may look like. This is because the police are a public institution with a public mandate to provide a collective security good (See Loader and Walker 2005). And regardless of fiscal, legitimacy and productive constraints, they have not put down the gauntlet of their monopolising challenge. Jennifer Wood (2006a) has pointed out that what is urgently required within nodal policing arrangements is a clearer sense of what the core or essential functions of the public police and what functions can be 'shed' to other non-state agencies. Good policing governance requires strong and distinguishable policing nodes. For this to occur, all parties in these networked arrangements need to be clear about what it is they can individually contribute and what they can realistically expect from the public police. Only once this is achieved will the public police move away from ad-hoc approaches. And it is only then that non-state actors like the Wentworth Parent Patrol and Combat be clear about what to expect from the police and where their interventions begin and end. It will, in short, allow for a formally agreed upon 'negotiated division of labour' (Menkhaus 2007:106) between policing nodes or actors.

One way of doing this is for the state to adopt a 'minimalist approach' in defining its core functions (see Menkaus 2007). In other words, the police would look at what functions are essential to them, claim ownership of these, and then allow all other functions to be outsourced or contracted out. This would allow the police to get on with what they know best and to prove their effectiveness as a key agency of an emergent or transitional state. It would provide a basis for certainty about who does what, how and at what cost. The result, hopefully, would be a state building exercise that harmonises state authority with local systems. Such an approach, Menkhaus argues, is the 'best hope for achieving something remotely approaching effective governance in communities desperate for a more predictable and secure environment' (2007: 108).

The specifics of these core functions would be is a matter for deliberation. In thinking about core functions of the public police, we need to first consider what is unique about the *role* of the public police. I would like to make some suggestions about how we should think about this unique role and then suggest two possible models for deciding upon core

functions within a minimalist framework. Firstly, while the police no longer hold the monopoly over the legitimate use of force they remain unique their specialised training to use ubiquitous coercion in a graduated and discretionary way. Secondly, the police remain a fundamental representative of the legal system (Reiss and Bordua 1967:27) and through their presence demonstrate that a 'regime of law exists' (Bayley 1994:34). Because of this, and because of their capacity to curtail individual freedoms in the most dramatic ways, the police are able to intervene authoritatively to restore order (Bayley 1994).

Let's now turn to what an understanding of core functions could mean for a public police within a minimalist framework. One way of thinking about this is for the police to distinctly outline actual functions that they feel they are uniquely placed, because of their established role. These core functions could refer specifically to the regulation of violence and conflict, or interrogation, or arrest, or controlling crowds, or a combination of these. Another way of thinking about the public police core function would be more broadly for the public police to reinvent themselves as what Clifford Shearing has recently referred to as 'guarantors of guardianship'. What this would mean is that the police (particularly at the local level) would concern themselves less with the actual provision of policing services and more with the job of nodal policing coordinators or facilitators. The key police role, in this view, would to be to ensure that: 1). publicly agreed upon norms for policing are adhered to; 2). due process is upheld; 3). justice is enacted when arrests are made; 4). all community groupings can access collective security outcomes; 5). there is shared knowledge and understanding between policing actors about their own and each others' functions; and 6). knowledge and capacity is shared between nodal policing actors in order to strengthen them

If the functions of the police were more clearly delineated, this would make accountability mechanisms/institutions far simpler to design. It would also make it far easier for the police to demonstrate what exactly they have been up to and what their objectives are. Trusting relationships will be built through a much deeper sense partnership, where the role of each contributing partner is recognised, supported and

respected. In addition, the surest way to build legitimacy on the part of the police is for them to demonstrate their effectiveness in their core function. Once the public police are clear about their own role, and feel less pressured to respond to an ever-widening demand for their interventions, a space will be created for them to actively encourage and even to learn from alternative (non-state) ways of social ordering. This is important because these local, non-state forms of ordering usually enjoy a high degree of legitimacy and local ownership and their solutions to everyday security problems are often more effective than 'inorganic, top-down' state interventions (Menkhaus 2007).

Conclusion

The transitional nature of South African state and society means that the configurations of policing may be somewhat different from those in more established liberal democracies. In transitional societies there is less regulatory capacity, a greater correspondence of actual crime with fear of crime, less certainty about the role of the state, and a weary (yet historically mobilized) civil society. But the about who should be doing what in policing and how this should be done is equally relevant to conflict, transitional and established democratic societies (Johnston 2000: 3).

The mapping of the governance of policing is complex. Each mapping exercise is likely to bear different empirical information about how nodes are structured in relation to one another and about how nodal actors perceive the roles, functions and capacities of other nodal actors. This paper is a very preliminary exploration of two very selective (legal) local policing initiatives, contextualised by current South African public police tendencies. What we learn is that we have a long way to go in solving the problems of a very unequal and in some ways unsustainable policing field.

There remain many questions still to be answered about how to build the capacity of the public police while at the same time encouraging the active participation of local non-state actors in ways that do not reinforce the policing service disparities between and within communities. The added challenge in societies with weak or emergent states is to ensure that the public police don't spoil local institutions and practices in trying to assert

their authority and that non-state policing nodes don't become spoilers with vested interests in public police failure. An equalised and fair policing playing field has the best chance of success if two preconditions are met. First, all actors need know the limits and the possibilities of their contributions and those of other actors. Second, the state police need to remain at the centre policing arrangements so that the many communities in each society feel certain that there is a public agency in the background protecting collective security interests. But this centring of the police in policing governance arrangements should not be confused with encouraging a (re)monopolisation of the state in policing activities. Rather, it should be thought of as a way of 'anchoring' (Loader and Walker 2005) policing so that the most effective and appropriate forms of knowledge and capacity can be harnessed to produce 'good' public security outcomes.

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