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“But Let Us Remember Him Then and Never Forget...’: The Dilution of Satyagraha in South Africa”

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Abstract

The author posits that Satyagraha as a concept and practice suffered three dilutions in South Africa. The first occurred in 1961 when Nelson Mandela launched Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) without the African National Congress (ANC) or Albert Luthuli's knowledge or support. Mandela's insubordination placed the ANC, in his own words, "on a new and more dangerous path". Satyagraha's second dilution began in 1967 when South African nationalist historiography began to mythologise the past by articulating that Luthuli, arguably the quintessential satyagrahi, supported the turn to armed struggle. Satyagraha's third dilution began in 2003 when the Gandhi Development Trust began through the Satyagraha Award to link Satyagraha with those who launched MK and thus chose violent methods to liberate South Africa. The author argues that bestowing the Satyagraha Award upon those who ultimately did not spiritually, ethically or strategically subscribe to Satyagraha ('the means justify the ends') dilutes the Award's potency to advocate for non-violent methods. By challenging morally confused associations adopted by defenders of a sanitised history, the author claims that those who fought Apartheid are not therefore, by default, worthy of emulation and that a mere vision of and/or admirable striving for a non-violent and peaceful society does not therefore qualify one as a proponent or practitioner of Satyagraha. The author cautions against oxymoronically grafting Satyagraha to the ANC's struggle against Apartheid post-1961. Such an incongruous fusion often demonstrates an allegiance to a political party rather than to Satyagraha's values. The resultant moral confusion is painfully evident in today's violent South African society.

Key Words: *Satyagraha, Mohandas Gandhi, Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, John Dube, Defiance Campaign, Apartheid, African National Congress, Nobel Peace Prize, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge*

Introduction

In 1907, the Asiatic Registration Amendment Act, or the 'Black Act', fostered Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's (1869-1948) political opposition to racial discrimination.¹ The resistance to or

¹ A.J. Parel, "The Origins of *Hind Swaraj*", *Gandhi and South Africa: Principles and Politics*, Judith Brown and Martin Prozesky, eds. (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1996), p. 41. The Act confirmed Ordinance 29 of the Transvaal (1906).

non-cooperation with the Black Act and other racist laws catalysed the birth of Satyagraha.² The Act required Transvaal Indians (and Chinese) to register their identities with the government, submitting themselves for fingerprinting as was often required of criminals. Other raced-based laws prohibiting the immigration of Indians to the Transvaal (1907), delegitimising Hindu, Muslim or Parsee marriages (1913), the interference with Asian trading and the three pound head tax for ex-indentured Indians (1913) spurred continued resistance.³ Gandhi's defiance campaigns manifested themselves in non-violent public protests against and non-compliance with racial laws. Campaigns courting mass arrest sought two objectives: one, to attract attention (supportive public opinion), and two, to saturate the legal system (cases in court) and infrastructure (prisons) thus rendering a change of heart and/or a realisation that legislation was unenforceable. Satyagraha not only sought to transform the will of the oppressor, it sought to transform the psychology of the oppressed, morally strengthening them by turning racial and cultural symbols of shame into 'badges of honour'.⁴ Just as followers of Jesus of Nazareth converted the demoralising cross into a symbol of hope for both Jews and Roman soldiers and just as Steve Biko re-conceptualised Black-ness for Blacks so as to engender a greater sense of reciprocity between the races, so Gandhi intended with Satyagraha to transform both protagonist and antagonist for the better, improving the morals, characters and actions.

Gandhi explained that Satyagraha "is a method of securing rights by personal suffering[;] it is the reverse of resistance by arms" (author's emphasis).⁵ Satyagraha is often translated as 'Soul' or 'Truth Force', "grasping onto principles", 'passive resistance' or "force that comes from truth and love and non-violence". With *Satyagraha*, *Ahimsa* (Abstention from Killing) and *Sarvodaya* (Welfare of All) form the 'Gandhian Trinity' and each defines the others. While the definition of Satyagraha may be broad, open to limited exegetical interpretation and encompass a variety of political and social action, the philosophy implemented at a minimum is restricted to actions that do not physically harm others. A sober interpretation of Satyagraha is that it includes pacifist ideals, that is, it 'opposes military ideals, war or military preparedness and requires that disputes be settled by arbitration' and thus in a non-violent manner.⁶

Elise Guyette, *Gandhi in South Africa: A Teacher's Guide*, "Laws Relating to the Immigration of Asians to South Africa and Controlling Their Movement in the Country" (inclusion), publication details unavailable, p. 16.

² Johan Wassermann, *A Man for All Seasons: Mohandas Gandhi*, Voortrekker Museum, Series No. 2, no date, pp. 12-3.

³ Transvaal Immigration Restriction Act, No. 15 (1907) and the Immigrants Regulation Act of the Union of South Africa (1913).

⁴ Judith Brown, "The Making of a Critical Outsider", *Gandhi and South Africa*, p. 29.

⁵ Gandhi Development Trust, "2012 International Day of Non-Violence: Quote", www.gdt.org.za/current/, accessed 09 January 2013, p. 2.

⁶ 'Satyagrahi' is singular and 'satyagrahis' is plural for a practitioner of Satyagraha.

Note: A Satyagrahi is not necessarily a 'pacifist' in the absolutist sense (it is often incorrectly assumed that a 'pacifist' is one that objects to violence in *all* circumstances despite there being varying degrees of 'pacifism'). One who subscribes to Satyagraha may permit the use of violent force to protect oneself from an individual criminal attack but prohibits force to resolve societal or governmental conflicts that require intentional and coordinated responses. For example, on more than one occasion Albert Luthuli declared emphatically that he was *not* a pacifist, though within the South African context in the 1950s and '60s he articulated a pacifist position.

Charles Hooper, "Letter to the S.A. Press", *Sechaba*, October 1967, p. 7.

Gerald Pillay, ed., *Voices of Liberation, Albert Luthuli*, Vol. I (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1993), p. 157. Pillay excerpted from Luthuli's evidence at the treason Trial (August 1958-March 1961).

Mark Juergensmeyer began his book on Gandhi's method of conflict resolution by stating, "The basic idea of Gandhi's approach to fighting is to redirect the focus of a fight from persons to principles".⁷ Gandhi used the word *himsa*, Sanskrit for 'desire to harm', for the word 'violence'. The definition of *Ahimsa* (non-violence) therefore is deeper than action and articulates an emotive intention to violate physically, mentally or emotionally, the integrity of another.⁸ Therefore, a more conservative Gandhian interpretation of Satyagraha does not even permit 'coercion' for coercion is the act of compelling one to do something against his or her will thus forcing them to capitulate.⁹ This did not mean that Gandhi avoided conflict or was 'passive'. Far from it. Gandhi chronically engaged in conflict. However, the method of conflict had to gain the antagonist's attention, convince and engender a changed behaviour in accordance with a new will. Therefore, Gandhi advocated non-cooperative methods such as strikes, boycotts and protests that 'pressured' for a changed will. One can understandably discern, though Gandhi certainly did not, that the prosecution of non-violent 'strikes' is synonymous with implementing non-violent acts of 'sabotage' as both are means intended to change the antagonist's will. However, a Gandhian interpretation of Satyagraha would not countenance a more liberal perspective that might allow for the use of 'sabotage', or violence against inanimate objects because such action would constitute coercion and in practice would inevitably lead to loss of life.¹⁰

Cape Argus, "Luthuli Proud – But with a New Burden", 24 October 1961.

Star, "Added Burden upon People of Liberation Movement", 24 October 1961.

The theoretical difference between a satyagrahi who is not an 'absolute pacifist' and an 'absolute pacifist' may lie in immediacy of the situation and whether a rational response can be discerned. As the next paragraph will make clear, Satyagraha focuses on principles. Therefore, an act of violence that, to the protagonist, is spontaneous, immediate and irrational (such as a home intruder physically attacking the owner with a knife) can only be resolved by confronting the antagonist with force and not with abstract principles or thought-engaging actions of protest.

There is a 1961 statement wherein Luthuli does articulate an absolute pacifist position. Luthuli wrote: "I firmly believe in non-violence. It is the only correct form which our struggle can take in South Africa. Both from the moral and the practical point of view...To refrain from violence is the sign of civilized man...we must see to it that we do not create situations where others, rightly or wrongly, for whatever reason, will declare it necessary to use violence against us...let us remember that to create situations where violence becomes inevitable makes one a sponsor – intentional or not – of violence".

Albert Luthuli, "Why I Believe in Non-Violence", *Golden City Post*, 28 May 1961.

⁷ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Gandhi's Way: A Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 3.

⁸ Juergensmeyer, *Gandhi's Way*, pp. 27-8.

Although, as stated earlier, another valid definition of *Ahimsa* is "Abstention from Killing" which is different than 'Abstention from Violence'.

⁹ Juergansmeyer, *Gandhi's Way*, pp. 28-9.

¹⁰ Prudently, MK forbid or discouraged the loss of life. From 1961 to 1964, sabotage efforts resulted in the loss of only one life. A MK saboteur, Petrus Molefe, died setting explosives on 16 December 1961.

In at least one instance, MK saboteurs disobeyed the order to preserve life. Bobby Pillay acknowledged that his team acted against instructions to cause loss of life. They decided to bomb a train and somehow placed a bomb underneath an old black man. Pillay wrote relieved, "Thanks God it did not go off" (sic).

University of the Western Cape (UWC), Robben Island Mayibuye Archives (RIMA), Bobby Pillay, "How MK Grew", *Dawn: Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe: Souvenir Issue, 25th Anniversary of MK*, (African National Congress, 1986), p. 20.

In one botched assassination attempt, MK accidentally caused the death of a fourteen year old girl in East London. On 11 December 1962, a suspected collaborator, Siphon Mange, was assassinated in Port Elizabeth on 12 January 1964.

Janet Cherry, *Umkhonto weSizwe: A Jacana Pocket History* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2011), p. 24.

Sabotage attracts a violent response and the reprisals on both sides cause a loss of control over the conflict. As Nelson Mandela stated, "We were embarking on a new and more dangerous path, a path of organised violence, the results of which we did not and could not know...Death in war is unfortunate, but unavoidable".

Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (London: Abacus, 1995), pp. 324 and 338.

When one descends down the wormholes of definitions, one can easily fail to distinguish between a permitted ‘pressure’ or ‘force’ from an unpermitted ‘coercion’. Within much Gandhian literature, even non-violent words are defined using violent terms making nuanced meanings of Satyagraha dizzying. For example, the Phoenix settlement identified Satyagraha as “a *weapon* of resistance” (author’s emphasis).¹¹ Also euphemisms with violent connotations abound when speaking about Albert Luthuli (1898-1967), the first African Nobel Peace Prize winner (1960), often described, even by himself, as ‘militant’. In a full-page special tribute to Luthuli, he is headlined as a “Foot Soldier” despite the fact that Luthuli never was a ‘soldier’ (in the literal sense, let alone a ‘foot soldier’, or underling) and advocated for exclusive non-violent methods to subvert the Nationalist Party’s white supremacist rule (Apartheid).¹² While not the subject of this paper, language itself, especially the English language as a second or third language to most South Africans, can be considered a contributing factor to the dilution of allegiance to Satyagraha in South Africa when non-violent actions and or proponents are described using violent terms.

The definition of ‘violence’ itself is very much open to interpretation. Theoretically, Gandhi’s definition of Satyagraha is almost impossibly strict to fully comprehend, let alone implement; it is therefore an unattainable ideal for which to strive. As stated earlier, according to Gandhi, violence can manifest itself even through thought alone. Likewise, theoretically, ‘violence’ in the broadest sense of the word is almost impossibly too vast around which to articulate a single thesis. Contemporary definitions of violence allow for its affliction through deprivations of emotion, nutrition and education. In addition, it must be acknowledged that Gandhi’s philosophies and the political strategies (including Satyagraha) were themselves not static; Gandhi’s thought was evolutionary.

Due to the broad and evolutionary interpretations of Satyagraha and ‘violence’, this article’s thesis must be predicated on only the ‘lowest common denominator’ of each definition thus not subjecting it to endless and futile debate. This article’s thesis is not strictly predicated on the nuances of what Gandhi understood to be Satyagraha or to what technically constitutes ‘violence’ according to modern psycho-social and theological philosophy. Therefore, for the intent and purpose of this article, the definition of Satyagraha (non-violent resistance) is restricted to ‘tactics of opposition that do not physically harm other human beings through physical force’ despite the fact that Gandhi’s understanding of Satyagraha was far more broad and therefore puritanical and many readers’ definition of ‘violence’ would understandably be far more inclusive.

For Gandhi and likeminded satyagrahis, perhaps what is most defining about Satyagraha was that its advocacy and practice was not based upon or determined by its immediate practical efficacy. In other words, that it often, usually or never worked in the short or medium term did not delegitimise its choice as a method of resistance. For Gandhi, no amount of failures or setbacks unjustified non-violent

“...and casualties – you can’t avoid casualties when you are starting a new method of political activity”.

Nelson Mandela, *Conversations with Myself* (London: Macmillan, 2010), p. 79.

¹¹ Trustees of the Phoenix Settlement, “Phoenix Settlement” brochure and event programme, April 2004, back cover.

¹² “A Giant and a Foot Soldier: Chief Albert Luthuli”, *The Mercury*, Special Insert, n.d., pp. 1-12.

tactics because “If we take care of the means, sooner or later we are bound to reach the ends”.¹³ As important as the end result is the method of attaining it. Gandhi said of his satyagrahis, “One single act of violence...would have lost their cause”.¹⁴ Ethically, Gandhi understood that the ‘means must justify the ends’.¹⁵

*Your belief that there is no connection between the means and the end is a great mistake. Through that mistake even men who have been considered religious have committed grievous crimes. The means may be likened to a seed, then end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree...*¹⁶

According to Gandhi, the weapon (the means) is the goal itself (the end) just as “the field of battle is in our own body”.¹⁷ Juergensmeyer argued, “Non-violence, according to Gandhi, is the litmus test of truth...[therefore] violence is very close to being the same thing as untruth”.¹⁸ Hence, as was quoted earlier, Satyagraha is the ‘reverse’ of resistance by arms.

Also worth noting is that this article understands that one can have an allegiance to non-violent methods (satyagrahi) and implement both non-violent and violent methods, simultaneously. One can’t, by definition, be a satyagrahi *and* a pursuer of an armed struggle. Many of those who justify the armed struggle indicate that non-violent methods were not abandoned. However, the implementation of non-violent methods while simultaneously perusing violent methods does *not* make one a satyagrahi. The two actions are oxymoronic; as stated earlier in the paper, they are in Gandhi’s thought “the reverse”. Hence, this paper does not subscribe to a perspective whereby ‘because non-violent methods are utilised in conjunction with violent methods’ (the African National Congress’ (ANC) Four Pillars of the

¹³ Juergensmeyer, *Gandhi’s Way*, p. 38 and 161. Juergensmeyer cited, *Yeravda Mandir* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1945), p. 9.

¹⁴ Juergensmeyer, *Gandhi’s Way*, p. 27 and 161. Juergensmeyer cited, *Young India*, 16 August 1928.

¹⁵ Ironically, Gandhi’s ideological metropole itself, Phoenix Settlement, was burnt to the ground in 1985. Phoenix Settlement may have been a victim of, what is euphemistically termed at the re-built site, “Apartheid violence” instigated by the African National Congress (ANC), the same political party to which prominent leaders of the Gandhi Development Trust, such as Ela Gandhi and Mewa Ramgobin, belong. A day after Victoria Mxenge was killed in Umlazi, the ANC’s *Radio Freedom*, through which many ANC and United Democratic Front activists received their direction, transmitted the following: “Let us hit at Botha’s puppet and agents. Let us attack small police and army units. Let us spread this people’s war to the white suburbs. Let them feel that the country is at war...While we continue eliminating enemy agents inside our country, let us also spread the campaign into the white, Indian and coloured residential areas. The whole country must go up in flames”. During the first week of mourning after Mxenge’s death, unrest was unleashed. “The first attack on an Indian shop in the huge Inanda informal settlement (where Indian traders lived in close proximity to a vast mass of African shack dwellers) came the following day...By Wednesday 7th August all the shops in Inanda had been burnt and 500 Indians had fled their homes”, and Phoenix Settlement was rendered charred rubble.

Anthea Jeffrey, *People’s War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009), pp. 63 and 101-2.

¹⁶ “2005 Awards: Quote”, Gandhi Development Trust, p.1.

http://www.gdt.org.za/current/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59%..., accessed 27 January 2013.

¹⁷ Juergensmeyer, *Gandhi’s Way*, pp. 38, 16 and 160. Juergensmeyer cited, *Young India*, 05 November 1919.

The genius of Joseph Lelyveld can be found in the subtitle of his biography on Gandhi: “Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India”. The title could have easily been “..His Struggle against Imperialism” or similar. However, Lelyveld understood that for Gandhi the struggle against an antagonist is actually the struggle of and within the protagonist, in ‘the body’ or in ‘the people’ or ‘in the country’, India itself.

¹⁸ Juergensmeyer, *Gandhi’s Way*, p. 27.

liberation struggle) therefore ‘non-violent methods have not been abandoned’.¹⁹ Likewise, the desire for or preference of non-violent over violent methods nor the utilisation of violent methods to obtain a non-violent ‘peace’ does not qualify one as a practitioner of Satyagraha.²⁰

Post-Gandhian Satyagraha in South Africa

Though Satyagraha did not ultimately prove to be effective against white supremacist rule during his time in South Africa, Gandhi believed he had composed its theory and practice sufficiently to wage a national campaign for home rule in India (*Swaraj*). Jan Smuts and the white parliament repeatedly “outmaneuvered” Gandhi’s brinkmanship, negotiation and Satyagraha campaigns.²¹ Joseph Lelyveld chronicles the practical failure of Satyagraha in his book *Great Soul*.

Nearly five years after the start of Satyagraha, [Gandhi] had nothing to show of the resistance his leadership had inspired...The world had fleetingly taken notice...The situation of Indians in South Africa got worse, not better, after he turned his attention to India. They were no better than second-class citizens and often less than that. Under Apartheid, Indians were more ghettoised and segregated than ever before...²²

In 1914, Gandhi departed South Africa, sojourned to England, returned to India in 1915, toured India in 1916 and began implementing Satyagraha with indigo farmers in 1917, with mill workers and farmers in 1918 and initiated the first national campaign against repressive legislation in 1919. This 1919 campaign was suspended due to outbreaks of violence.

In South Africa, the embers of Satyagraha glowed dimly after Gandhi’s departure. Though Indian and Blacks occasionally intersected in opposition to white supremacy, their cooperation was limited as the two groups understood their rights as distinct and even in competition. Despite the fact that John Dube, a Congregationalist minister and first President of the ANC from 1912 to 1917, and Gandhi were contemporaries living and working within kilometers of each other, their substantive cooperation, if any, is undocumented. In her book *First President*, Heather Hughes casts doubt on the mythology that Dube and Gandhi directly cross-fertilised despite their parallel philosophies and

¹⁹ The four pillars are commonly understood to be: armed struggle, mass mobilisation, viable political underground and international isolation of apartheid.

²⁰ An example of this confused manner of thinking can be found in Nelson Mandela’s Umkhonto we Sizwe Manifesto wherein he states initially that “The methods of Umkhonto we Sizwe mark a break with that past [non-violent policy]” while later stating “We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought - as the liberation movement has sought – to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We do so still”. The above quotes demonstrate that the use of violence can’t constitute a “break” from non-violence and be coterminous with it. MK’s very nature as an army in action contradicts Mandela’s claim that it seeks to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash”. Barry Feinberg and André Odendaal, eds. *Nelson Mandela: The Struggle Is My Life (His Speeches & Writings 1944-1990)*, rev. ed. (Cape Town: David Philip, 1994), p. 123.

By this coterminous logic, even National Socialist Germany that sought the annexation of Czechoslovakia through peaceful means can be considered a practitioner of non-violent methods. Most who pursue violence will usually chose, if able, non-violent methods to obtain that what they desire.

²¹ Joseph Lelyveld, *Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2011), p. 99.

²² Lelyveld, *Great Soul*, pp. 99 and 130.

communities' close proximity to each other.²³ Both Dube and Gandhi emphasised their own race in their advocacy efforts. Joseph Lelyveld sketches the reasons for the lack of Indian and Black cooperation: Gandhi's latent racism, Black understandings that Indians with Whites were also their oppressors and actual violence between the two races in January 1949 when many Indians were attacked by Zulus in Durban.²⁴ Yet, a lack of direct collaboration between Indians and Blacks did not mean that the Black nationalist movement was not influenced by Gandhi's Satyagraha campaigns. There is evidence that non-violent demonstrations of Indians' resistance impressed Dube. In late 1913, Dube witnessed an event in Phoenix that moved him.

*About five hundred Indians were sitting together in a group. They had come there after going on a strike in their factory. They were surrounded by white managers, their staff and white police...Whiplashes began to descend on the backs of the Indians sitting there, in quick rapidity, without stop. The whites beat them with lathis and said, "Get up, do your work. Will you do your duty or not?" But nobody rose. They sat, quite motionless...When the whips and lathis failed, gun butts come to be used.*²⁵

Gandhi was impressed with a speech Dube delivered in 1905 stating that Dube was a "leader 'of whom one should know'"²⁶ Though there may have been a lack of direct contact, most historiography affirms that Gandhi influenced the early ANC, which Dube led as its first president, and until 1961 only utilised non-violent methods.²⁷ In one imagined narrative Dube speaks to some of his ANC colleagues in March 1919 declaring, "Well, the ANC's approach to resistance has certainly been influenced by [Gandhi's] ideas".²⁸ The narration of Gandhi's struggle in South Africa concludes with Dube's colleague replying, "I'm impressed. Peaceful protest can bring about political and social change". To which Dube replies, "Yes, and his methods seem to be working in India too".²⁹

While it is true that both Gandhi and Dube advocated non-violent methods to achieve political rights, violent options were not a realistic. In the wake of the brutal crushing of the Bhambatha Uprising (1906), it is anachronistic to suggest that there was even a debate as to 'whether' violent strategies or non-violent strategies should be employed as a strategy to procure political rights for Blacks or Indians; such a debate did not exist in South Africa until the 1950s.³⁰ A realistic violent strategy could not be

²³ Heather Hughes, *First President: A Life of John L. Dube, Founding President of the ANC* (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2011), pp. 109-10.

²⁴ Lelyveld, *Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi*, pp. 70-75.

²⁵ Lelyveld, *Great Soul*, pp. 73 and 367. Lelyveld cites a document in the Gandhi-Luthuli Documentation Centre at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, File 1262/203, 3984, HIST/1983/14.

²⁶ Hughes, *First President*, pp. 113 and 281. Hughes cites Enuga Reddy's translation of an *Indian Opinion* article dated 2.9.1905.

²⁷ From its founding in 1912 until 1923, the African National Congress was originally named the South African Native National Congress (SANNC).

²⁸ The Gandhi Committee (Custodians of the Tolstoy Farm), "Gandhi in South Africa", no date, p. 1.

Sashini Pather, "Gandhi, the Comic Hero: New Strategy to Teach Apathetic South African Youth about the Great People of Their History", *Sunday Times*, 17 October 2004, p. 3 (Extra News).

²⁹ The Gandhi Committee (Custodians of the Tolstoy Farm), "Gandhi in South Africa", p. 19.

In regards to the earlier statement about the desire to utilise Satyagraha despite its apparent inefficacy, the reader should note that the imagined dialogue took place in 1919 and India's independence was not won until 1947 (28 years).

³⁰ Nelson Mandela relates "The debate on the use of violence had been going on among us since early 1960. I had first discussed the armed struggle as far back as 1952 with Walter Sisulu".

Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, p. 320.

envisioned for either the Blacks (Dube) or Indians (Gandhi) against a heavily armed white state. Furthermore, as a disciple of the moderate Booker Washington and as an ordained Congregationalist minister, Dube did not philosophically or theologically advocate violence. Due to the pacifist Leo Tolstoy's influence and the Hindu scripture of *Bhagavad Gita*, Gandhi also did not countenance violence. Because of a lack of viable violent alternatives, both Gandhi and Dube's programmes of resistance included 'non-violence' by strategic default. The difference between the two may have been that for Gandhi non-violence was an offensive strategy whereas for Dube non-violence was an imperative because the alternative was simply unviable and was the equivalent of suicide. Not until 1952, when the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the ANC partnered in a campaign called the Defiance Campaign of Unjust Laws, did Satyagraha resurrect itself. Not until the Defiance Campaign did non-violent strategies cease to become a self-preserving necessity for both Indians and Blacks. With the Defiance Campaign, non-violent strategies became a chosen proactive 'weapon'.

Albert Luthuli

Albert Luthuli is arguably South Africa's most prominent black African *satyagrahi*. His pedigree as an advocate for non-violent resistance is long and consistent. Luthuli traveled to Tambaram, India in 1938 for the International Missionary Conference. This conference on the eve of World War II no doubt exposed Luthuli, if not already, to Gandhi's biography and thus tactical example. The trip engendered for him "wider sympathies and wider horizons".³¹ In 1948, Luthuli traveled to the United States and spoke on behalf of the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Society in Washington, D.C. In his address, Luthuli spoke of his admiration of John Dube and Gandhi. He affirmed "the dignity of man and the efficacy of non-violence as an instrument of struggle in seeking freedom for our oppressed people".³² Luthuli praised Gandhi's teachings and pleaded that "those so inspired by [Gandhi's] philosophy become his undaunted disciples".³³ Two of the most famous images of Luthuli are at his desk reading Gandhi's *Non-Violence in Peace and War* and another in repose on a sofa reading *Gandhi's Autobiography*.³⁴ Other members of the ANC, such as Dube, also had strong *amaKholwa* (Christian) backgrounds and would not consider violence as a means of resistance. Luthuli very much followed in the footsteps of the elder statesman Dube. They were both born and bred in the bosom of the American Board of Foreign Missions. Both had strong connections to Inanda Seminary and Adams College. Both led the ANC in Natal and nationally and subscribed to its non-violent methods of appeals to the white supremacist government. Both operated as leaders within domestic and international multiracial missiological orbits. Like Dube, Luthuli perceived wisdom in Gandhi and his movement.

In June 1952, the ANC and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) launched the Campaign for the Repeal of Discriminatory Legislation, commonly known as the 'Defiance Campaign'. The Campaign demonstrated opposition to South Africa's then recent 300 year anniversary celebration of Jan van

³¹ Albert Luthuli, *Let My People Go: The Autobiography of Albert Luthuli Nobel Peace Prize Winner* (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers, 2006), p. 70.

³² Scott Couper, *Albert Luthuli: Bound by Faith* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010), pp. 50 and 242. Couper cited: Luthuli Museum, [Mahatma Gandhi] Memorial on the Occasion of the Centenary Celebrations of [Howard University], original handwritten draft, pp. 3-4.

³³ Couper, *Albert Luthuli*, pp. 50 and 242. Couper cited: Luthuli Museum, [Mahatma Gandhi] Memorial, pp. 3-4.

³⁴ Both images are part of the Bailey's African Photo Archives (DRUM) collection in located in Johannesburg.

Riebeek's arrival at the Cape in 1652. The Campaign utilised 'textbook' Satyagraha tactics undoubtedly influenced by the SAIC and its Gandhian adherents. The Campaign sought to overwhelm the South African judicial and criminal justice systems by swamping them with volunteers arrested for violating petty apartheid laws. The objective was to create a public relations crisis for the National Party by forcing its realisation that Apartheid's petty restrictions were unenforceable. For the public relations *coup* to occur, volunteers had to remain non-violent in the face of abuse and unrest. The non-violent response by volunteers would demonstrate that those arrested are not 'criminals' and the laws enforced are unjust. Should volunteers resist arrest, the courts and prisons would not be flooded. Should volunteers respond with violence, then they would lose the moral high ground in the eyes of an already biased white press and populous.

Although initially holding an Africanist perspective that precluded cooperation with Communists and other race groups such as Indians, Nelson Mandela was persuaded by the then ANC leader James Moroka to support the Campaign and be its Volunteer-in-Chief. Albert Luthuli who had recently been elected President of the Natal branch of the ANC, led the effort in that province. Mary Benson recorded Masabalala Yengwa's recollection of how Luthuli met with his lieutenants advising them that "they would be calling upon people to make very important demonstrations". Unless they were "sure of the road ahead and prepared to travel along it [them]selves, they had no right to call on others to do the same".³⁵ They all stated they were prepared, and Luthuli prayed. More than 7,500 volunteers were arrested during the course of the campaign.³⁶ The Campaign was eventually called off due to the eruption of violence and the adoption of legislation such as the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Public Safety Act that banned such civil disobedience and the leaders that advocated and organised it.

In the wake of the Defiance Campaign, the government dismissed Luthuli from his chieftaincy in the Christian village of Groutville. In response, Luthuli preached a sermon on 09 November 1952 at Adams College entitled "Christian Life: A Constant Venture" upon which his famous statement "The Road to Freedom Is via the Cross" is based.³⁷ Using scripture text from Luke chapter five wherein the disciples fish all night without catching anything, the sermon advocated that current efforts to establish justice must be continued despite the seeming futility of past efforts.³⁸ In his sermon, Luthuli worries of those who are often "paralysed or discouraged with [their] failures". Luthuli preaches that it is only in "complete obedience" that one moves forward notwithstanding the daunting future. The political sequel to the homiletic address released by the ANC and the Natal Indian Congress was his announcement that he was 'launching into the deep' by devoting himself entirely to the ANC. Through the ANC, Luthuli believed he could best manifest his spiritual convictions. His political statement mirrored his sermon: He was not changing tactics; rather, he was immersing himself further. The

³⁵ Mary Benson, *The Struggle for a Birthright* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 144.

³⁶ Michael Moris, *Every Step of the Way: The Journey to Freedom in South Africa* (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2004), p. 167.

³⁷ Luthuli wrote the statement six days after he preached the sermon. For an extended reading on this thesis read: Scott Couper, "When Chief Albert Luthuli Launched 'Into the Deep': A Theological Reflection on a Homiletic Resource of Political Significance", *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa*, 130, March 2008, pp. 76-89 and 108-111.

³⁸ Luke 5:1-11, text verse 4: "When [Jesus] had finished speaking, he said to Simon, 'Put out into the deep water and let down your nets for a catch'. Simon answered, 'Master, we have worked all night long but have caught nothing. Yet, if you say so, I will let down the nets'".

statement and its title affirm that through trial and suffering, liberation would be wrought. Luthuli emphatically declared:

*I have embraced the **Non-Violent Passive Resistance technique** in fighting for freedom because I am convinced it is the only non-revolutionary, legitimate and humane way that could be used by people denied, as we are, effective constitutional means to further our aspirations (author's emphasis).³⁹*

Luthuli is obstinate in his advocacy for non-violent methods *despite* the fact that earlier in his statement he asked:

In so far as gaining citizenship rights and opportunities for the unfettered development of the African people, who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of my many years of moderation? Has there been any reciprocal tolerance or moderation from the government...No!⁴⁰

Yet, Luthuli continued:

*It is with this background and with a full sense of responsibility that, under the auspices of the African National Congress (Natal), I have joined my people in the new spirit that moves them today, the spirit that revolts openly and boldly against injustice and expresses itself in a determined **non-violent manner** (author's emphasis).⁴¹*

Like Gandhi, Luthuli advocated a non-violent policy that was not predicated on prior effectiveness. Luthuli's Christocentric worldview wherein a non-violent struggle resulted in a sacrificial death and ultimate liberation fused easily with a Gandhian worldview wherein the purist goals could "never justify impure or violent action".⁴²

Soon after the Defiance Campaign and the release of his "The Road to Freedom" statement, Luthuli was catapulted to the leadership of the national ANC in December 1952. Luthuli's election was due in large part to the contrast made between his statement and his predecessor's, James Moroka, shameful avoidance of incarceration at the expense of his co-accused during his trial following the Defiance Campaign. Luthuli led the ANC's non-violent struggle throughout the rest of the 1950s. For example, in September 1954 Luthuli "called for the enrollment of fifty thousand 'Freedom Volunteers', in the spirit of the Defiance Campaign. The call for Freedom Volunteers harkened back to Gandhi's call for satyagrahis. Luthuli enjoined his followers:

...to respect the policy of non-violence wisely adopted by our Congresses. Non-violent resistance in any provocative situation is our best instrument. Our strongest weapon is to acquaint our people and the world with the facts for our situation.⁴³

Luthuli led the ANC during its co-sponsorship of the Congress of the People in June 1955 whereat the Freedom Charter was drafted. In December 1956, the state arrested Luthuli and 155 co-accused and

³⁹ Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 235.

⁴⁰ Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 233.

⁴¹ Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 233.

⁴² Juergensmeyer, *Gandhi's Way*, pp. 39 and 161. Juergensmeyer cites, *Young India*, 18 December 1924.

⁴³ Couper, *Albert Luthuli*, pp. 67 and 244. Couper cited: Pillay, *Voices of Liberation*, p. 80.

tried them for high treason in what became known as the Treason Trial. What ultimately led to all the accused to be acquitted in 1961 was the testimony and evidence that consistently held that the liberation movement intentionally applied non-violent tactics in its quest for equal rights. Luthuli testified the following:

*...as far as the Congress is concerned, in the circumstances that obtain definitely we are for non-violence. When it comes to a personal level, as to whether at any time one would, I would say that if conditions are as they are, I would never be a party to the use of violence because I think it would be almost national suicide...because of my Christian leanings I would hesitate to be a party to violence...*⁴⁴

In addition to serving numerous bannings, Luthuli himself was physically assaulted while giving an address in August 1958 by a group of white supremacists. After a severe beating, Luthuli resumed his speech unaltered hoping that Black amity would not change to enmity. The 1960 Nobel Peace Prize represented Albert Luthuli's penultimate achievement, one that not even Gandhi had been awarded. Luthuli's Peace Prize was awarded specifically for his non-violent stance in resistance to Apartheid.⁴⁵ On 10 December 1961 in Oslo, Norway, Luthuli accepted the award on behalf of the ANC and the wider liberation movement, and not himself personally, thus contradicting the nationalist mythology that Luthuli was aware of and supported the *launch* of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK).⁴⁶ The Nobel Committee's Chairperson, Gunnar Jahn, in his introduction to Luthuli confirmed to Luthuli that the Prize was awarded due to his past, present and future non-violent stance.

*Never has [Luthuli] succumbed to the temptation to use violent means in the struggle for his people. Nothing has shaken him from this firm resolve, so firmly rooted in his conviction that violence and terror must not be employed...Well might we ask: will the non-whites of South Africa, by their suffering, their humiliation and their patience, show the other nations of the world that human rights can be won without violence, by following a road to which we Europeans have committed both intellectually and emotionally, but which we have all too often abandoned? If the non-white people of South Africa ever lift themselves from their humiliation without resorting to violence and terror, then it will be above all because of the work of Luthuli, their fearless and incorruptible leader who, thanks to his own high ethical standards, has rallied his people in support of this policy, and who throughout his adult life has staked everything and suffered everything without bitterness and without allowing hatred and aggression to replace his abiding love of his fellow men. **But if the day should come when the struggle of the non-whites in South Africa to win their freedom denigrates into bloody slaughter, then Luthuli's voice will be heard no more. But***

⁴⁴ Couper, *Albert Luthuli*, pp. 93 and 247. Couper cited: Pillay, *Voices of Liberation*, pp. 152 and 163.

⁴⁵ In contrast, Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk jointly won the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts of reconciliation and negotiating a peaceful transition, not for non-violent resistance to Apartheid or *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, respectively.

⁴⁶ Luthuli was aware of the *formation* (not launch) of MK as the Joint Congresses agreed in mid-1961 to not discipline Mandela should he form an armed movement. Mandela could organise so that in the event that a strategic *cul de sac* was reached, the liberation movement might at least be more prepared for armed conflict. It was also agreed that MK was not to be associated with the ANC but that MK would remain subservient to the ANC and thus to political stratagems. By launching MK without Luthuli knowledge or the ANC's permission, Mandela superseded his mandate to only form (or organise) MK and proved insubordinate by not adhering to the agreement establishing the ANC's (and thus Luthuli as its President-General) suzerainty over MK.

let us remember him then and never forget that his way was unwavering and clear. *He would not have had it so (author's emphasis).*⁴⁷

To the press in Oslo, Luthuli explicitly, repeatedly and consistently advocated the use of non-violent methods as a means by which to achieve liberation for all people of colour. Again and again, Luthuli belaboured non-violent tactics during his Norwegian visit. Various newspapers quoted Luthuli's unambiguous stance highlighting that though Luthuli recognised efforts in the past had not produced reward that he and "responsible members" of the ANC held fast to Gandhian methods of non-violent resistance. Luthuli warned that the government's intransigent stance rendered his efforts "jeopardised" by their less patient and more militant colleagues.

- 07 December 1961 *...even today it would be possible for white and coloured people to live peacefully together in South Africa.*⁴⁸
- 09 December 1961 *There was no animosity on the part of non-Whites in South Africa. The longer the suppression lasts, however, the greater the danger of violence. We might be pressed so far that efforts of those who try to lead the struggle along peaceful lines **may be jeopardised**" (author's emphasis).*⁴⁹
- 10 December 1961 *I firmly believe in non-violence. It is the only correct form which our work and our struggle can take in South Africa. Both from the moral and the practical point of view the situation of the country demands it. Violence disrupts human life and is destructive to perpetrator and victim alike...To refrain from violence is the sign of the civilised man.*⁵⁰
- 11 December 1961 *I am a firm believer in non-violent action, and I hope to see the liberation of my people and all oppressed people in Africa accomplished by non-violent means.*⁵¹
- Through all this cruel treatment in the name of law and order, our people, with few exceptions, have remained non-violent. If today this (Nobel) peace award is given to South Africa through a black man, it is not because we in South Africa have won our fight for peace and human brotherhood. Far from it. Perhaps we stand farther away from victory than any other people in Africa. But nothing we have suffered at the hands of the government has turned us from our path of disciplined resistance. It is for this, I believe, that this award is given.*⁵²

⁴⁷ Kader Asmal, David Chidester and Wilmot James, eds. *South Africa's Nobel Laureates: Peace, Literature and Science* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2004), pp. 20-1.

⁴⁸ *Star*, "Luthuli Suffering from Strain", 08 December 1961.

⁴⁹ *Daily News*, "Big Crowd Will See Lutuli Receive His Nobel Prize", 09 December 1961.

In the past, 'Luthuli' is often spelt 'Lutuli' (without the 'h'). Luthuli himself spelled it 'Lutuli', though his family did not.

⁵⁰ Colin and Margaret Legum, *The Bitter Choice: Eight South Africans' Resistance to Tyranny* (New York: World Publishing Co, 1968), p. 62.

⁵¹ *Daily News*, "Message from Lutuli", 13 December 1961.

⁵² Asmal, *South Africa's Nobel Laureates*, pp. 28-9.

Publication unknown, "Way of Violence Still Rejected", 12 December 1961.

Publication unknown, "S.A. Is 'Museum-Piece of Our Time': Lutuli Surveys Africa Changes", 12 December 1961.

- 12 December 1961 *Even for purely practical reasons non-violence is the only course we can follow. Direct attack by an unarmed public against the fully armed forces of the government would mean suicide. There are no responsible persons among us in the African National Congress who advocate violence as a means of furthering our struggle” (author’s emphasis).*⁵³
- ...militant non-violence in South Africa was still a valid weapon that could be most effective and that it was better than resorting to violence to gain one’s freedom...We feel that to engage in any other method might bring bloodshed. To gain freedom without bloodshed is a much better way.*⁵⁴
- 14 December 1961 *In carrying with me back to South Africa the heavy responsibility inherent in the acceptance of the award, I am strengthened by the knowledge that our belief in the peaceful solution of human problems is shared by millions throughout the world.*⁵⁵

Little did Jahn know that one week after his introduction of Luthuli and two days after Luthuli publically expressed that it was his “responsibility” as leader of the ANC to press for a “peaceful solution” Luthuli’s lieutenant, Nelson Mandela, would orchestrate the ANC’s abandonment of Satyagraha for the armed movement by launching *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (‘Spear of the Nation’, or MK), the ANC’s armed wing.

The First Dilution

Six days after Luthuli accepted the Nobel Peace Prize, Mandela launched MK on 16 December 1961.⁵⁶ If Satyagraha was to ever be considered effective against the Apartheid regime, the effectiveness would have started with the Nobel Peace Prize which brought Albert Luthuli, the ANC and the liberation movement to the front pages of the world’s newspapers. The launching of MK short-circuited any work that the Nobel Peace Prize would have achieved for the satyagrahis. Mandela rendered a humiliated and angry Luthuli politically obsolete as military action repudiated Luthuli’s position on which he staked his domestic and international credibility.⁵⁷ In South Africa, Satyagraha weakened as the liberation movement largest and most powerful congress resorted to the armed conflict. Just as Jahn warned, Luthuli’s voice soon “would be heard no more”. Only recently, some have remembered him and refuse to forget “that his way was unwavering and clear”.

Reflecting on the launch of MK and Luthuli, Walter Sisulu confided in a 1995 interview:

⁵³ *Rand Daily Mail*, “100 brave Cold to Greet Luthuli”, 12 December 1961.

⁵⁴ British Broadcasting Corporation current affairs programme, *Panorama*, 12 December 1961. Cited in: Publication Unknown, “Help from the World Welcomed”, 12 December 2012.

⁵⁵ University of Fort Hare, Howard Pim Africana Library, ANC Archives, A2561, Box 70, Folder C 3.9, press statement by Albert J. Luthuli, 14 December 1961.

Daily News, “Message from Lutuli”, 13 December 1961.

⁵⁶ Due to an operational anomaly, the launch actually happened prematurely in Durban on 15 December 1961.

⁵⁷ Peter Rule, Marilyn Aitkin and Jenny van Dyk, *Nokukhanya: Mother of Light* (Braamfontein: The Grail, 1993), p. 131.

*Now, on the question of Chief Luthuli: We had not, I must confess, by that time attached such an importance to the Nobel Prize itself. But from that time on we began to analyse it and realise its significance.*⁵⁸

Mandela released a manifesto when he launched MK, stating that MK placed itself “under the overall political guidance” of the national liberation movement as was agreed in mid-1961.⁵⁹ However, in Mandela’s biography he states that he was authorised to “create this organisation and would not be subject to the direct control of the mother organisation”, the ANC.⁶⁰ The awarding of the most prestigious humanitarian prize in the world and the constant utterances on the front pages of the world’s newspapers advocating non-violent resistance liberation movement’s leader escaped Mandela’s political calculation. Most likely, Mandela did not feel that he was under the direct (tactical/strategic) or indirect (political) control of the ANC nor under its leader Luthuli. In short, the guidance offered by the President-General of the ANC, the acknowledged leader of the liberation movement, was ignored. Mandela persuasively concluded in his manifesto that Luthuli’s policy invited rather than stemmed further oppression by stating that “the government has interpreted the peacefulness of the movement as weakness”.⁶¹ Mandela simply disagreed with Luthuli in his adherence to Satyagraha and took measures to change the liberation movement’s policy. This action was not uncharacteristic of Mandela. In May 1961, the ANC Executive criticised Mandela for stating to the press, “In my mind we are closing a chapter on this question of non-violent policy”.⁶² Justifying the position, Mandela stated in his autobiography, “...sometimes one must go public with an idea to push a reluctant organisation in the direction you want it to go”.⁶³ With the launch of MK, Mandela actually pushed the ANC in the direction he wanted it to go against the explicit and public statements of its leader published in papers throughout the world. Mandela never confessed to be a satyagrahi; in fact, he expressed that Satyagraha should only be implemented if it proves efficacious. Mandela recalled:

*I was raising the issue of violence so soon after the Treason Trial, where we had contended that for the ANC non-violence was an inviolate principle, not a tactic to be changed as conditions warranted. I myself believed the opposite; that non-violence was a tactic that should be abandoned when it no longer worked.*⁶⁴

Mandela confided to Moses Kotane in mid-1961 that the movement “...had no choice but to turn to violence”.⁶⁵ Therefore, one can conclude that Mandela was perhaps disingenuous when he declared in his manifesto that “We of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* have always sought – as the liberation movement has sought - to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We do so still. We hope – even at this late hour...”. Furthermore, Mandela did not realistically intend the ‘sabotage’ of symbols employed on

⁵⁸ Interview with Walter Sisulu, 15 September 1995. Found in:

Tor Sellström, ed. *Liberation in Southern Africa-Regional and Swedish Voices: Interviews from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Frontline and Sweden*, 2nd ed., (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), p. 190.

⁵⁹ Feinberg and Odendaal, *Nelson Mandela*, p. 9.

⁶⁰ Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, pp. 323-4.

⁶¹ Feinberg and Odendaal, *Nelson Mandela*, p. 123.

⁶² Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, p. 320.

⁶³ Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, p. 320.

⁶⁴ Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, pp. 321-2.

⁶⁵ Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, p. 321.

16 December 1961 to be a ‘warning’ thus preventing ‘violence’ against people. Paul Landau’s excellent article linking Mandela’s initiation of MK with the Communist Party rather than with the ANC highlights that Mandela’s own notes reveal he understood sabotage as “an arm of guerrilla warfare”.⁶⁶ Landau wrote:

*The readings and lectures that Mandela scrupulously took handwritten notes on suggest that Mandela, Nokwe, Sisulu, Slovo, and their allies, sabotage was not just a nudge to the state, not just ‘armed propaganda’, but was a prelude to, or part of, guerrilla war. Mandela’s own words suggest this, and his actions in Algeria, Ethiopia, and the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in 1962, before his final arrest, make this trajectory even more apparent. He also recollected as much 30 years later.*⁶⁷

Nelson Mandela’s 1962 speech to PAFMECA in Addis Ababa went beyond disagreement with Luthuli’s advocacy for Satyagraha; Mandela repudiated it and indicted it saying:

*...a leadership commits a crime against its own people if it hesitates to sharpen its political weapons where they have become less effective...Then on the night of 16 December last year the whole of South Africa vibrated under the heavy blows of Umkhonto we Sizwe.*⁶⁸

When Mandela returned from North Africa, he felt Luthuli’s past position advocating non-violent methods reflected poorly on the liberation struggle. He reported to the ANC’s National Working Committee that Luthuli’s winning the Nobel Peace Prize created “the impression that he was a tool of the West”.⁶⁹ Mandela reported Luthuli’s autobiography *Let My People Go*, with its ubiquitous references to non-violence, “have been extremely unfortunate and have created the impression of a man who is a stooge of the whites” and thus “compromised the ANC”.⁷⁰

With the launch of MK, the faith placed on Satyagraha expired within the ANC. Luthuli, humiliated and angry, became politically obsolete as those who could carry out the administrative machinery of Satyagraha in a heavily repressed political atmosphere were underground, exiled, arrested or killed (some even by their own hands). Upon learning of the attacks on 16 December, Luthuli said in response to the acts of sabotage, “For myself, I regret anything that is violence” and he fumed that the press or others would assume it was directed by Blacks.⁷¹ Luthuli “demanded an explanation of what was going on”.⁷² Only Moses Kotane could pacify him. Luthuli “made it clear that he was not able to tell

⁶⁶ Paul Landau, “The ANC, MK, and ‘The Turn to Violence’ (1960-1962)”, *South African Historical Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3, September 2012, p. 555.

⁶⁷ Landau, “The ANC, MK, and ‘The Turn to Violence’”, p. 555.

⁶⁸ Feinburg and Odendaal, *Nelson Mandela*, p. 131.

⁶⁹ South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET). *The Road to Democracy in South Africa (1960-1970)*, Vol. 1, (Cape Town: Zebra, 2004), p. 433.

⁷⁰ Tom Lodge, *Mandela: A Critical Life* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006), p. 101.

SADET, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, p. 433.

⁷¹ Rule, *Nokukhanya*, p. 130.

⁷² Brian Bunting, *Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary: A Political Biography* (London: Inkululeko, 1975), p. 268.

any member of the ANC to resort to violence, but neither was he prepared to condemn it".⁷³ Luthuli reasoned:

*If my son decides to sleep with a girl, he does not ask my permission, but he just does it. It is only afterwards, when the girl is pregnant and the parents make a case, they he brings his troubles home.*⁷⁴

The Second Dilution

The second dilution of Satyagraha is the silencing of Luthuli's voice and the mutation of his perspective on the use of violence within South Africa's liberation struggle. Domestically, Luthuli continued to publically argue for the prosecution of non-violent methods until 1962. After 1962, the Sabotage Act prohibited Luthuli from publishing his words or being quoted, thus with his banning incurring a 'social death'. Also, there is evidence that he was silenced by the liberation movement. In March 1962, the *Golden City Post* published the following unaltered from Luthuli's pen:

*When we strive for the same goal through non-violent methods, the government visits us with more and harsher laws to suppress – if not completely destroy – our liberation efforts. IS THIS NOT INVITING THE OPPRESSED TO DESPERATION? NONETHELESS, I WOULD URGE OUR PEOPLE NOT TO DESPAIR OVER OUR METHODS OF STRUGGLE, THE MILITANT, NONVIOLENT TECHNIQUES. SO FAR WE HAVE FAILED THE METHODS – NOT THE METHODS US (Luthuli's emphasis).*⁷⁵

In response to articles in which Luthuli continued to advocate for non-violent tactics such as the one above, the Congresses Joint Executive minutes recorded:

*A speaker stated that the articles which Chief Luthuli wrote for "Golden City Post" were frequently so mutilated that the policies expressed there were on occasion distorted, thus being of some embarrassment to the Congresses. A delegate agreed that the matter would be taken up.*⁷⁶

Luthuli publically and privately advocated for the pursuance of non-violent strategies at least until 1964. He did so within the context of the "Appeal for Action against Apartheid" (1962) with his contemporary satyagrahi, the Reverend Dr Martin Luther King, Jr, through his reception of the New York Protestant Council's "Family of Man Award" (1964) and through discussions with United States based ecclesiastic representatives.⁷⁷ Thereafter, the official record is silent. Gunner Jahn's prescience that "...Luthuli's voice will be heard no more" proved prophetic.

⁷³ Bunting, *Moses Kotane*, pp. 268-9.

⁷⁴ Bunting, *Moses Kotane*, p. 269.

⁷⁵ Albert Luthuli, *Golden City Post*, "Our Way Is Right – We Must Keep On", 25 March 1962.

⁷⁶ University of the Western Cape, Robben Island Mayibuye Archives, Congress of Democrats (MCH 229), Report of a meeting of the Congresses' Joint Executives held in March 1962, p. 7.

⁷⁷ Albert Luthuli and Martin Luther King, African National Congress, "Appeal for Action against Apartheid", 10 December 1962.

"Lutuli Gets Grant", publication unknown, 29 October 1964.

"Big Cash Award for Lutuli", publication unknown, 18 October 1964.

Interview with Edward Hawley, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 29 June 2009.

The first public declaration that Luthuli supported the armed struggle was issued by the ANC, through Oliver Tambo, on the day Luthuli died, 21 July 1967. Only after Luthuli's death was the myth cultivated within nationalist history that he supported the armed struggle. Tambo wrote:

Chief Luthuli is irrevocably linked with the [ANC] and the revolutionary movement of the people of South Africa. The period of his leadership of our organisation saw the change over from a reliance of solely non-violent forms of struggle to a need for a combination of both legal and illegal clandestine forms of struggle following the ban on the [ANC] in April 1960. This new period was emphasised by a decision to prepare for armed confrontation with the enemy and the setting up of the armed wing of our revolutionary movement – [MK]. The enemies of our revolutionary struggle who were bent on fanning divisions inside the ranks of the ANC whilst at the same time making futile attempts to isolate Chief Luthuli from the main stream of the revolutionary movement, came forth with allegations that Chief Luthuli never approved the change-over from emphasis on non-violent struggle to the present phase. This was strongly refuted by Chief himself when he made a statement following the passing of prison sentences on our leaders at the conclusion of the Rivonia Trial in 1964... There are those amongst us who, whilst claiming to have been permanently inspired by Chief Luthuli's qualities of leadership are, however, working against the policies of the organisation he led until his last breath. These are people who from within the ranks of the oppressed population are counseling against the use of revolutionary violence with the plea that those who advocate this form of struggle are leading people to catastrophic suicide.⁷⁸

And so the narrative 'Luthuli supported the armed struggle' began. It continued in the ANC mouthpiece *Mayibuye*:

It is true that Chief Luthuli was an advocate of non-violence. He was a champion of a multiracial society in South Africa. But Chief Luthuli never believed in non-violence at all costs in the struggle.⁷⁹

Sechaba iterated a similar defense of the armed struggle:

There is a wrong and unfortunate impression that Chief Lutuli was a pacifist, or some kind of apostle of non-violence. This impression is incorrect and misleading. The policy of non-violence was formulated and adopted by the national conferences of the [ANC] before he was elected President-General of the organisation. The policy was adopted in 1951 specifically for the conduct of the "National Campaign for Defiance of Unjust Laws" in 1952. What is correct, however, is that as a man of principle and as a leader of unquestionable integrity, Chief Lutuli defended the policy entrusted to him by his organisation and saw to it that it was implemented. When that policy was officially and constitutionally changed, he did not falter.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ University of Fort Hare, Howard Pim Africana Library, ANC Archives, Oliver Tambo Papers (A2561), Folder C 39, "July 21", original typed manuscript.

Luthuli did not "strongly refute" that he did not support the armed struggle through his Rivonia Trial statement. Luthuli expressed sympathy and solidarity with men who were "brave" and "just". However, Luthuli did not indicate that he supported their actions. For further explanation see pages 578-581 in:

Scott Couper, "Emasculating Agency: An Unambiguous Assessment of Albert Luthuli's Stance on Violence", *South African Historical Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 3, September 2012, pp. 564-568.

⁷⁹ T. Makiwane, "Somlandela uLuthuli", *Mayibuye* 2, No. 29, 19 July 1968, pp. 4-5.

⁸⁰ No author cited, "Chief Albert John Mvumbi Luthuli, Isitwalandwe, 1898-1967", *Sechaba* 1, No. 8, August 1967, insert supplement.

The author is incorrect in stating that non-violence was employed solely for the Defiance Campaign. The author is incorrect to assume that Luthuli possessed no agency and thus subscribed to non-violence because the ANC did and then abandoned it when the ANC didn't. If one blindly follows the dictates of a political party because it so decrees, then one can't be considered a person of "principle and a leader of unquestionable integrity". A person and leader of character is able to challenge and even abandon his or her allegiance to a political party should that party stray from the person's principles or in any way compromises a person's integrity. The author is very strategic with the phrase "did not falter" because it does not indicate that Luthuli supported the policy but it *implies* that he did. *Long Walk to Freedom* argues that it is untrue that Luthuli was "...deeply opposed to the ANC taking up violence", declaring emphatically, "Nothing could be farther than the truth".⁸¹ Many other sources too numerous to count, until the present day, argue that Luthuli supported the armed struggle. For example, Jacob Zuma rejected as "'erroneous' and misleading suggestions that former President and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Albert Luthuli, never supported the ANC's armed struggle" and erred in claiming that Luthuli named the armed wing.⁸²

The Third Dilution

The third dilution of Satyagraha has occurred more recently as organisations that seek to claim Gandhi's heritage and promote Satyagraha actually highlight and celebrate the contributions of those who were not satyagrahis, even imperfectly. Some recipients even disagree with Satyagraha in theory and practice and therefore led the armed struggle against white supremacy. For example, the Gandhi Development Trust (GDT) is an organisation that advocates and supports efforts to promote non-violent methods of conflict resolution yet confusingly celebrates personalities whose biographies do not reflect an allegiance to the tenets of Satyagraha.

GDT's website states that the organisation "promotes a culture of non-violence" by itemising ten activities. Among those activities are:

*...providing **non-violence** training and tool-kit for learners and teachers...organising the Mahatma Gandhi Salt March in which communities, learners and educators and the public in general are mobilised to commit to **non-violence**...promoting the spirit of unity in diversity on the International Day of **Non-violence**...raising awareness of the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi on the day of his martyrdom...* (author's emphasis)⁸³

⁸¹ Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, pp. 342-3.

⁸² S. Khumalo, "Zuma Slams Luthuli Claims", *The Mercury*, 25 November 2010.

For more on the mythologising of nationalist history regarding Luthuli see:

Scott Couper, "Irony upon Irony upon Irony: The Mythologising of Nationalist History in South Africa", *South African Historical Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 2, June 2011, pp. 339-346.

Nelson Mandela named MK.

Note: The book *Conversations with Myself* contradict Mandela's autobiography in regard to Luthuli's stance on the formation and thus launch of MK.

Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. 78.

⁸³ "9th Annual Salt March: 21st April 2013", pp. 1-2.

<http://www.gdt.org.za/current/>, accessed 25 January 2013.

The GDT also promotes a culture of non-violence through the giving of the Mahatma Gandhi International Award for Peace and Reconciliation (MAGI), otherwise known as the “the Satyagraha Award”.⁸⁴ The motivation for the award is explained as thus:

*The loud and clear message of non-violence in the face of dire adversity is projected by the lives of these icons in our times. We have chosen to honour leaders who have chosen **non-violence** and negotiation as their tools. GDT believes that the award should not merely be seen as an annual event that happens on an evening, but rather is a catalyst for initiating **non-violence**, ubuntu and nation building (author’s emphasis).*⁸⁵

While the honour, morals, integrity, heroism, selflessness and patriotism of all the Satyagraha Award recipients are not questioned, many of the recipients did not and still do not subscribe to the Gandhi’s Satyagraha form of political and moral strategy. The name ‘Satyagraha Award’ strongly suggests that its recipients strived to live their lives as satyagrahis, if even imperfectly. However, the award honours many who not only did not nor do not ascribe to Satyagraha but technically pursued the opposite, or in Gandhi’s words, “the reverse”, that is, violence as a means to obtain a particular political, economic and or social order. If the purpose of the Satyagraha Award is to promote a culture of non-violence then unfortunately the purpose is undermined when awarded to those who have never and/or do not now subscribe to the Gandhian philosophy. By bestowing the Satyagraha Award for ‘any’ contribution to ‘peace’ and ‘goodwill’, it dilutes to uselessness the potency of Satyagraha from a Gandhian perspective. For example, a 2010 announcement for the Award indicated that the “Satyagraha Management Committee is keen ‘to honour *every single individual* whose labour and sacrifice made a difference to building our country’” (author’s emphasis).⁸⁶ While it may be right to honour, for example, Solomon Mahlangu for his labour and sacrifice, it makes little sense to award him in the context of Satyagraha.⁸⁷ While it may be right to honour, for example, Robert McBride for his struggle against Apartheid, it makes little sense to award him in the context of Satyagraha.⁸⁸ The above point does *not* assume that a satyagrahi or a non-satyagrahi is more or less ethical than the other. The above point does *not* assume that a satyagrahi or a non-satyagrahi is any more or less strategically efficacious than the other. The above point does *not* assume that a satyagrahi or a non-satyagrahi is any more or less beneficial to society, patriotic or peace-loving than the other. The above point is made only to highlight a contradiction in that a Satyagraha Award is often bestowed on those who are not satyagrahis, or who do not ascribe to Satyagraha or whose actions and words actively defy or disagree with Satyagraha as a means of establishing peace and justice in the South African historical context. This contradiction confuses that

⁸⁴ The Award’s name is confused. In some GDT documents, the MAGI award and the Satyagraha award are distinct, in some they are synonymous, in some the names are amalgamated. For example, Denis Goldberg won the “2012 Satyagraha Award for Peace and Reconciliation”. However, in practice, it seems that the awards are synonymous. Some documents indicate the Award began in 2003 and others indicate in 2006.

⁸⁵ “Mahatma Gandhi International Award for Peace and Reconciliation: MAGI Awards”, p. 1.

http://www.gdt.org.za/current/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&..., accessed 25 January 2013.

⁸⁶ “Your Assistance Is Needed”, *Satyagraha: In Pursuit of Truth*, April 2010, p. 1.

⁸⁷ Editorial Comment, “Remembering Our True Comrades”, *Satyagraha: In Pursuit of Truth*, April 2011, p. 2.

Jayren Soobramoney, “Solomon Mahlangu – Feeding the Tree of Freedom”, *Satyagraha: In Pursuit of Truth*, April 2012, p. 8.

⁸⁸ Robert McBride was a member of MK and was convicted for the 1986 bombing of Magoo’s Bar and ‘Why Not’ restaurant in Durban.

for which Gandhi advocated. Bestowing the Satyagraha Award to one who uses or used violence to establish peace and justice sends a mixed message to those whom the GDT wishes to educate. Awarding the Satyagraha Award to those who advocated for the use of violence in the past and who presently morally justify the use of that violence does not effectively advocate to a constituency to use strictly non-violent methods to resolve conflict within contemporary issues.

One must have been confused when Billy Nair (1929-2008) also received the GDT's Satyagraha Award in 2007. Tribute was recently given to Nair in the publication *Satyagraha* wherein "Mantashe urged the youth to follow Nair's example".⁸⁹ Billy Nair was a member of MK, participated in the opening campaign and bombed the office of the Indian Affairs Department. In one interview, Nair incorrectly claimed Luthuli's foreknowledge of MK's launch before he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize:

*[Luthuli] already knew, before he left for Oslo, to receive the Nobel, he knew that night, that [MK] was going to be launched. Chief is safe in his home, nine o'clock that night, throughout South Africa there were bombings taking place. And I was a part of that campaign.*⁹⁰

In 2008, in the year he celebrated his 90th birthday, Nelson Mandela, the founder and Commander in Chief of the ANC's armed wing, received the Satyagraha Award. Mandela received the award despite the historical reality that he unilaterally turned the ANC to the path of violence against the public pleadings of Albert Luthuli who argued vociferously for the liberation struggle to continue the non-violent struggle, then given incredible potential through the awarding of the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize. While one may fully agree (for who can not?) that Mandela fought successfully for peace and worked successfully for reconciliation, one can not agree that he followed the tenets of Satyagraha or believed non-violent methods were efficacious against the Apartheid regime's oppression.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Nompumelelo Zuma, "Tribute: African National Congress Honours Billy Nair", *Satyagraha: Pursuit of Truth*, January 2013, p. 3.

⁹⁰ Billy Nair, interview, "The Legacy of a Legend: Chief Albert J.M. Luthuli", documentary video produced by Amandla Communications in cooperation with the National Film and Video Foundation, sponsored by the Department of Arts and Culture, aired on SABC, 2005.

If Nair was accurate in his claim that Luthuli knew of and when MK would be launched his hundreds of statements advocating and pleading for the continuance of nonviolent methods were disingenuous, at a minimum. The entire basis upon which Luthuli knew he accepted the Prize would have made his reception of it hypocrisy of the highest order.

⁹¹ Mandela received the Gandhi/King Award for Non-Violence in 1999. Ela Gandhi, granddaughter to Mohandas Gandhi and member of South Africa's national parliament, presented the award to Mandela and stated that he was "the living legacy of Mahatma Gandhi; the Gandhi of South Africa". At another award ceremony whereat Mandela was awarded the International Gandhi Peace Prize in 2001, President Shri KR Narayanan said, "We are paying tribute to an unusual hero in the Gandhian mould...". While Mandela may deserve every accolade he receives, it is ironic and confusing that he is considered to be "the living legacy" and "mould" of Gandhi when the two had very different philosophies, especially as they regard non-violence and Satyagraha.

Asmal, *South Africa's Nobel Laureates*, p. 85.

Mandala eloquently articulated his belief that the use of violence is valid moral and strategic means by which to fight Apartheid.

"As I said when I stood in the dock at the Rivonia Trial twenty-seven years ago and as I said on the day of my release in Cape Town, the ANC will pursue the armed struggle against the government as long as the violence of Apartheid continues".

Nelson Mandela, "Address to Rally in Soweto, 13 February 1990", *Nelson Mandela: The Struggle Is My Life*, p. 219.

Curnick Ndlovu (1932-2002) received the Satyagraha Award in 2009. Ndlovu was appointed the first leader of the Natal Regional Command. Ndlovu recruited others into the armed struggle and carried out sabotage attacks on government installations around the Durban area from 1961 to 1963. Ndlovu and his comrades bombed the Durban Pass Office. In 2009, the Gandhian institute also bestowed the Satyagraha Award on Rajes Pillay, one of the first Indian women to join the MK in exile.

In 2012, Denis Goldberg received the Satyagraha Award, an award indented to promote a culture of non-violence. Ironically, Denis Goldberg was a member of the MK's High Command and its technical officer.⁹² A leader of a revolutionary armed organisation who seeks to overthrow white supremacy with violence received an award for choosing "non-violence and negotiation as their tools". Too many moral and ethical qualifications are required to justify an award for non-violence to the leader of a violent organisation.

A majority of the Satyagraha Award recipients have never engaged in acts of violence to further their cause and peruse methods that are intentionally non-violent. For example, Gift of the Givers (2006), Dun Aung San Suu Kyi, Paul David and Richard Steele (2009), South Africa's indentured labourers (2010), the Dalai Lama, Paddy Meskin and Saydoon Sayed (2011) and Steve Biko and Susan Britton (2012). However, with members of MK (soldiers) such as Nair, Ndlovu, Pillay, Goldberg, and Mandela alongside the Dalai Lama and Dun Aung Suu Kyi make for confusion when all are bestowed an award that recognises "leaders who have chosen non-violence and negotiation as their tools". For the sake of argument, it is not suggested that Nair, Ndlovu, Pillay, Goldberg and Mandela are less worthy of honour, respect, appreciation, admiration and even emulation than Luthuli, Gandhi, the Dalai Lama or Dun Aung San Suu Kyi. What is recognised is that the former, under incredible and arguably irresistible pressures, opted for a resolution engendered by violence and the later, under equally incredible and arguably irresistible pressures, opted for a resolution engendered by non-violent methods and *both* received an award that acknowledges the importance of non-violent methods in Gandhi's name and under the philosophy of Satyagraha. This contradiction, at best, dilutes, and at worst, distorts, what Satyagraha is and that for which Gandhi advocated and thus confuses the GDT's constituency in regards to the efficacy and worthwhileness of non-violent strategies in various circumstances.

The Gandhi Committee and the Mahatma Gandhi Satabdi Samiti produced an imagined narrative of Mohandas Gandhi's political career in South Africa for the education benefit of children. However, the narrative takes advantage of children's naïveté, or ignorance, concerning South Africa's history and it conveys the confusion, or dilution, that is the thesis of this article. The narrative is told by John Dube and reads as follows:

John Dube: *Could we use peaceful protest to move our cause forward in South Africa?*

ANC Colleague: *In the right hands, I believe it **could** take our people to freedom (original emphasis).*

⁹² "Awards: "The 2012 Satyagraha Award for Peace and Reconciliation", *Satyagraha: In Pursuit of Truth*, August/September 2012, p. 6.

Narrator:	<i>Meanwhile, amongst the rolling hills of the Eastern Cape...</i>
Mandela (child):	<i>I hope I'll grow up to be a strong leader one day</i> (original emphasis).
Mandela's Mother:	<i>Rolihlahla! Stop dreaming and come home. It's too late to be out!</i>
Mandela (child):	<i>A flower for you, Mama.</i>
Mandela's Mother:	<i>I've never known a peaceful boy like you...</i>
Narrator:	<i>South Africa's liberation movement was influenced greatly by Gandhi. People like Moulvi Cachalia and Yusuf Dadoo continued to correspond with him in India. As racial tension in South Africa heightened, Gandhi offered guidance from afar. Gandhi's influence on social justice in South Africa is unmistakable.</i> ⁹³

The above narrative conveys the strength of Gandhi's Satyagraha to free South Africa from white supremacy, the assertion that it could be done and the strong inference that Mandela is the peaceful leader who implemented it. In reality, Mandela did not believe in Satyagraha and said as much in his autobiography.⁹⁴ Furthermore, his launching of the armed struggle immediately following the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize neutralised Luthuli (the *actual* satyagrahi leader) politically and rendered him obsolete as a leader of the liberation struggle. Furthermore, Mandela indicated in Ethiopia (1962) that the continuance of Satyagraha "was a crime against the people". The narrative is a historical misrepresentation of Mandela as an heir of Gandhi's non-violent philosophy, Satyagraha.

The narrator correctly points out that Gandhi corresponded with Yusuf Dadoo (1939-1983) and others providing insights and advice on the South African struggle. For example, in a telegram to Dadoo in October 1946, Gandhi writes: "Glad passive resisters adhere [to] non-violence. Hope no weakening or division among our people".⁹⁵ In a message to South Africa in May 1947, Gandhi writes: "To the satyagrahis: I would advise strict adherence to the fundamentals of Satyagraha which literally means force of truth and this is forever invincible..."⁹⁶ The historiographical problem herein lies: Dadoo did not ultimately follow the path of Satyagraha. Dadoo (with Nair, Mandela and Goldberg) was a member of the South African Communist Party that ideologically advocated for violence as a means by which to catalyse economic and socio-political changes on a global scale.⁹⁷ Dadoo came to become the Vice-

⁹³ The Gandhi Committee, "Gandhi in South Africa", p. 20.

⁹⁴ An instance when Mandela comes the closest to declaring an allegiance to Satyagraha was in September 1992 when he stated, "Gandhiji was a South African and his memory deserves to be cherished now and in post-apartheid South Africa. We must never lose sight of the fact that the Gandhian philosophy may be a key to human survival in the twenty-first century".

Asmal, *South Africa's Nobel Laureates*, p. 85.

⁹⁵ Mohandas Gandhi, "Telegram from Gandhiji to Dr Dadoo", 10 October 1946. Found in: Enuga Reddy, *Dr Yusuf Mohamed Dadoo: His Speeches, Articles and Correspondences with Mahatma Gandhi (1939-1983)*, ed. Fatima Meer, (Durban: Madiba Publishers, 1991), p. 385. Reddy cited: Leaflet of the Passive Resistance Council of the Natal Indian Congress, 25 July 1946.

⁹⁶ Mohandas Gandhi, "Gandhiji's Message to South Africa, 18 May 1947", *Dr Yusuf Dadoo*, p. 385. Reddy cited: *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. 85, p. 442.

⁹⁷ Not all members of the South African Communist Party advocated for violence, either in the global or South African context. Rowley Arenstein, for example, was expelled from the Communist Party for advocating non-violent methods.

Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and the ANC Politico-Military Council directing the armed struggle. Oliver Tambo eulogised Dadoo by stating “He died spear in hand – like a true warrior”.⁹⁸ The historical link, or rather de-link, between Dadoo and Gandhi is not articulated in the Gandhi Committee’s historical account thus confusing and diluting that which is Satyagraha and whose actions represent one as a committed satyagrahi.

Conclusion

In a 2012 *Sunday Tribune* editorial, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge wrote that “the recent spate of political violence, police killings and police brutality in [South Africa] are a cause for great concern”.⁹⁹ When contemplating Satyagraha and how the ‘means justify the end’, Gandhi indicated that when the use of violence is employed, even if justifiable, the unintended consequences are often very negative: “We reap exactly as we sow”.¹⁰⁰ The employment of violence in South Africa to liberate it from racial oppression was justified by the brutal employment of violence of the Apartheid regime. Yet, despite the fall of Apartheid, South Africa remains profoundly and brutally violent. Madlala-Routledge therefore urged “...South Africans to reject violence in all its forms and return to the proud legacy of non-violence bequeathed to us by Luthuli and Gandhi”.¹⁰¹

When Luthuli partnered with the Reverend Dr Martin Luther King, Jr. to issue the Appeal for Action against Apartheid he feared a race war, the unintended consequences of violence that physically, psychologically and spiritually damage both parties.¹⁰² Long after Mandela launched MK, Luthuli pleaded for international pressure and the continued utilisation of non-violent methods, particularly sanctions...

Arenstein also indicated in an interview that Luthuli “very strongly believed in non-violence. At no stage, did Luthuli ever agree to a change of violence. Never!”

Interview with Rowley Arenstein, kwaMuhle Museum, File number 545617, Accession number 99/3697 – 3699 – 4200 - 4204, recording track (11 10 25 12) through (13 12 16 15).

⁹⁸ Oliver Tambo, “A Message to the National Executive Committee at the Funeral of the Dr Yusuf Dadoo by the President of the ANC”, *Dr Yusuf Dadoo*, p. 391.

⁹⁹ Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, “Culture of Violence Poisons SA Society”, *Sunday Tribune*, 04 November 2012.

¹⁰⁰ “2005 Awards: Quote”, Gandhi Development Trust, p.1.

http://www.gdt.org.za/current/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59%..., accessed 27 January 2013.

¹⁰¹ Madlala-Routledge, “Culture of Violence Poisons SA Society”, *Sunday Tribune*, 04 November 2012.

¹⁰² “Appeal for Action against Apartheid”, Albert Luthuli and Martin Luther King, Jr., 10 December 1962.

The American Committee on Africa (ACA) was founded by a pacifist, George Houser, to advocate against Apartheid. During World War II, George Houser was a conscientious objector and was imprisoned for one year for his stance. Luthuli’s affiliation with the ACA was facilitated by a Quaker, Mary Louise-Hooper, who served as Luthuli’s secretary and later became a staff member for ACA.

*...before we are caught in a bloody revolt which would necessarily polarise along racial lines and blot out all hope of justice in South Africa. Such a cataclysm would destroy our movement here; it would endanger hard won progress everywhere....*¹⁰³

Thankfully, the race war never manifested itself due to MK's military inconsequence (in part due to its incompetence and in part due to the ANC's laudable restraint of its employment of violence) and the ANC's multi-racial character. Nonetheless, South Africa seems unable to break its cycle of violence. Madlala-Routledge argued that currently:

*There is no justification for using violence and the state has to lead by example. Non-violence is far more powerful and effective than violence in achieving the legitimate rights outlined in the constitution.... What we need is disciplined, non-violent direct action campaigns addressing issues of injustice and inequality, drawing on the theory and spirit of practitioners such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Albert Luthuli developed in [South Africa], [w]estern Europe and the events of the Arab Spring.*¹⁰⁴

If Madlala-Routledge's wish is fulfilled, it will be up to organisations such as the Gandhi Development Trust to send clear messages about who emulates the core tenets of Satyagraha, and thus Gandhi. On the contrary, the incorrect impression given is that *anyone* who fights for freedom and liberation is therefore a practitioner of Satyagraha, a disciple in the Gandhi, King or Luthuli tradition. To have fought against Apartheid does not therefore make one, *de facto*, a promoter of non-violent methods. The legacy of Gandhi and Luthuli is severely compromised by bestowing the Satyagraha Award on members of, for example, MK's High Command. Such decisions do not communicate an allegiance to the values espoused by Gandhi, but rather an allegiance to a particular political party. What is occurring, historiographically, is that MK freedom fighters' latter laudable efforts at peace and reconciliation are eclipsing their former use of and present ideological justification for violence to solve seemingly intractable conflicts. Mandela's position has always been consistent; from 1952, to 1961, to 1990 to 1994, Mandela was utilitarian in supporting non-violent methods *and* violent methods when warranted. To his credit, Mandela always desired non-violent methods. Yet, Mandela is willing to adopt violence when needed. That Mandela's extraordinary efforts toward peace and reconciliation engendered the well-deserved winning of the Nobel Peace Prize does not therefore merit an award claiming his example embodies an allegiance to Satyagraha, or non-violent resistance. Institutions such as the Gandhi Development Trust (Phoenix), the Luthuli Museum (Groutville) and the ML King Centre (Atlanta) should strictly espouse the values of their progenitors. To do otherwise confuse Gandhi, Luthuli and King's clear positions, dilutes their thoughts and actions and discredits them.¹⁰⁵ Honour Mandela for that which he justifiably believed and acted. Honour Luthuli for that which he justifiably believed and acted. Both are heroes; both deserved, but for different reasons, the Nobel Prize for peace. Mandela ought not be portrayed as one who liberated South Africa by "peaceful protest" and therefore as the heir to Gandhi and Luthuli; to do such is as disingenuous as it is historically inaccurate.

¹⁰³ Amistad Research Centre, American Committee on Africa Collection, Box 100, Folder 20, correspondence from Albert Luthuli to various international leaders, September 1962.

¹⁰⁴ Madlala-Routledge, "Culture of Violence Poisons SA Society", *Sunday Tribune*, 04 November 2012.

¹⁰⁵ Though they both fought honorably for civil rights in the United States, strategic and ideological distinctions must be made between the Black Panthers, Louis Farakan and ML King's movement.

As Gunner Jahn said of Luthuli and his stance on non-violence days before Mandela launched MK, "...let us remember him and then never forget that his way was unwavering and clear".